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Warfare has long been associated with Scottish Highlanders and Islanders, especially in the 
period known in Gaelic tradition as „Linn nan Creach‟ (the „Age of Forays‟), which 
followed the forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles in 1493. The sixteenth century in 
general is remembered as a particularly tumultuous time within the West Highlands and 
Isles, characterised by armed conflict on a seemingly unprecedented scale. Relatively little 
research has been conducted into the nature of warfare however, a gap filled by this thesis 
through its focus on a series of interconnected themes and in-depth case studies spanning 
the period c. 1544-1615. It challenges the idea that the sixteenth century and early 
seventeenth century was a time of endless bloodshed, and explores the rationale behind the 
distinctive mode of warfare practised in the West Highlands and Isles. 
 
The first part of the thesis traces the overall „Process of War‟. Chapter 1 focuses on 
the mentality of the social elite in the West Highlands and Isles and demonstrates that 
warfare was not their raison d'être, but was tied inextricably to chiefs‟ prime responsibility 
of protecting their lands and tenants. Chapter 2 assesses the causation of warfare and 
reveals that a recurrent catalyst for armed conflict was the assertion of rights to land and 
inheritance. There were other important causes however, including clan expectation, 
honour culture, punitive government policies, and the use of proxy warfare by prominent 
magnates. Chapter 3 takes a fresh approach to the military capacity of the region through 
analysis of armies and soldiers, and the final thematic chapter tackles the conduct of 
warfare in the West Highlands and Isles, with analysis of the tactics and strategy of 
militarised personnel. 
 
The second part of this thesis comprises five case studies: the Clanranald, 1544-77; 
the Colquhouns of Luss and the Lennox, 1592-1603; the MacLeods of Harris and 
MacDonalds of Sleat, 1594-1601; the Camerons, 1569-1614; and the „Islay Rising‟, 1614-
15. This thesis adopts a unique approach by contextualising the political background of 
warfare in order to instil a deeper understanding of why early modern Gaelic Scots resorted 
to bloodshed. Overall, this period was defined by a sharp rise in military activity, followed 
by an even sharper decline, a trajectory that will be evidenced vividly in the final case 
study on the „Islay Rising‟. Although warfare was widespread, it was not unrestrained or 
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Conventions and Abbreviations 
 
For personal names, modern Gaelic forms are generally used for forenames (e.g. Aonghas 
not Angus), while English forms are used for surnames (e.g. MacDonald not Mac 
Domhnaill). This strikes a compromise between authenticity and recognisability.  
For place names, English forms are used, in accordance with RCAHMS. 
All money is in Scots unless otherwise stated.  
The following abbreviations have been used: 
 
AT Argyll Transcripts (Transcriptions of various charters 
relating to the Clan Campbell and their lands) 
 
CSPS    Calendar of State Papers relating to Scotland 
 
CSPI    Calendar of State Papers relating to Ireland 
 
GCA    Glasgow City Archives 
 
HP     Highland Papers 
 
NRS    National Records of Scotland 
 
RMS    The Register of the Great Seal of Scotland  
 
RPC     The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 
 
RPS     The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland 
 
RSS    The Register of the Privy Seal of Scotland 
 
SA    Stirling Archives 
 
SGS    Scottish Gaelic Studies 
 
SHR    The Scottish Historical Review 
 




Among the most persistent stereotypes of the Highlands and Isles of Scotland is that it was 
a region of endless war, disorder, and lawlessness. Long before James VI of Scotland 
labelled the inhabitants of the Western Isles as „alluterly barbares, without any sort or shew 
of civilitie‟ in 1598,1 Highlanders in general had been maligned as wild savages by a litany 
of writers.
2
 Even more positive interpretations of these ingrained ideas, such as John 
Bellenden‟s comment that the „Scottis in the Hieland‟ were „maist sichty in craft of 
chevalrie‟, reinforced the overall stereotype of Highland bellicosity.3 The image of the 
warlike Highlander was later cemented by the „Jacobite wars‟ of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and the service of the Highland regiments in the conflicts of the 
British Empire.
4
 Of all the epochs however, it is the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century that holds the reputation as „the most turbulent and violent period of Highland 
history‟,5 a view ostensibly supported by the title bestowed upon it by Gaelic tradition: 
„Linn nan Creach‟ or the „Age of Forays‟. The traditional narrative, repeated by modern 
historians, maintains that the collapse of the Lordship of the Isles around 1490-3 heralded 
„unusual chaos‟ in the West Highlands and Isles throughout the sixteenth century.6 
Despite the ancient association of war and warfare with the West Highlands and 
Isles, coupled with the infamous reputation of this specific period, there has been little 
attempt to examine the nature of military activity in the region in the late medieval and 
early modern period. Until very recently, there was a historiographical consensus (based 
upon a near-absence of scholarship) that warfare in the West Highlands and Isles was of 
                                                          
1
 James VI and I, „Basilikon Doron‟, in King James VI and I: selected writings, eds Neil Rhodes, Jennifer 
Richards & Joseph Marshall (Ashgate, 2003), 222. 
2
 Martin MacGregor, „Gaelic Barbarity and Scottish Identity in the Later Middle Ages‟, in Mìorun Mòr nan 
Gall, ‘The Great Ill-Will of the Lowlander’?, eds Dauvit Broun & Martin MacGregor (Glasgow, 2009), 7-48. 
3
 The History and Chronicles of Scotland written in Latin by Hector Boece, trans. John Bellenden, Vol. I 
(Edinburgh, 1821), xxvi.  
4
 Christopher Duffy, „The Jacobite Wars, 1708-46‟, in A Military History of Scotland, eds Edward M. Spiers, 
Jeremy Crang, and Matthew Strickland (Edinburgh, 2012), 348-9; Stephen Brumwell, „The Scottish Military 
Experience in North America, 1756-83‟, in A Military History of Scotland, 388-91, 394-7. 
5
 David Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 1994), 21. 
6
 Ranald Nicolson, Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974), 548; Donald Gregory, The History 
of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland (1836, Edinburgh, 2008), 51-8, 86-113; Jenny Wormald, 
Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470-1625 (Edinburgh, 1981), 39-40; Alexander Grant, Independence 
and Nationhood: Scotland, 1306-1469 (Edinburgh, 1984), 220; James A. Stewart Jr., „War and Peace in the 
Hebrides: The Origin and Settlement of the “Linn nan Creach”‟, in Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic 
Colloquium, 16/17 (1996/7), 116; Campbell Letters 1559-1583, ed. Jane E.A. Dawson (Edinburgh, 1997), 44; 
R.A. Dodgshon, From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western Highlands and 
Islands, c. 1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998), 11, 37-8, 102-3; Jane Dawson, „The Gaidhealtachd and the 
emergence of the Scottish Highlands‟, in British Consciousness and Identity: The Making of Britain, 1533-
1707, ed. Brendan Bradshaw & Peter Roberts (Cambridge, 1998), 266, 278; J.L. Roberts, Feuds, Forays and 
Rebellions: History of the Highland Clans, 1475-1625 (Edinburgh, 1999), ix-xiv. 
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little historiographical importance, despite a general renaissance in the writing of military 
history in Scotland and Europe.
7
 Only in the last decade has there emerged any serious 
attempt to understand and analyse warfare in contemporary Highland society. By building 
upon this burgeoning research, this thesis aims to fill a gap in the historical record and 
demonstrate that warfare in the West Highlands and Isles is a theme worthy of study in its 
own right. 
The Collapse of the Lordship of the Isles 
The historiography of the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland in the late medieval and 
early modern periods has often been dominated by the MacDonald Lordship of the Isles. 
This can involve discussion of cultural life in the Lordship,
8
 or analysis of the political and 
military struggles between the Lordship and the Scottish crown during its heyday,
9
 but a 
particular focus has been on the period of its decline and eventual collapse between 1490 
and 1493. 1490 saw the assassination of the main military leader in the Lordship, Aonghas 
Òg, son of Eoin, Lord of the Isles,
10
 and by 29 August 1493, Eoin himself was forfeited for 
the second and final time in James IV‟s so-called „daunting of the Isles‟.11 The power 
vacuum caused by the forfeiture is the explanation most consistently offered by historians 
for the perceived instability and violence in the West Highlands and Isles that persisted 
throughout the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century.
12
 In previous centuries, the 
centralised authority of the Lordship had ostensibly maintained stability and justice in the 
region. With its demise, many clans previously loyal to (or restrained by) the Lordship now 
competed fiercely to establish their own spheres of influence. Alexander Grant has stated 
that the Lordship period was a „golden age in west-Highland history and Gaelic culture, 
between the turbulent thirteenth and sixteenth centuries‟.13 
 
                                                          
7
 „Introduction: Developments in Late Medieval Military History and the Historiography of Anglo-Scottish 
Warfare‟, in England and Scotland at War, c. 1296-c.1513, eds Andy King & David Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 
1-19. 
8
 K.A. Steer and J.W.M. Bannerman, Late Medieval Monumental Sculpture in the West Highlands 
(Edinburgh, 1977); Acts of the Lords of the Isles, 1336-1493, eds Jean Munro & R.W. Munro (Edinburgh, 
1986). 
9
 J.W.M. Bannerman, „The Lordship of the Isles‟, in Scottish Society in the Fifteenth Century, ed. J. Brown 
(London, 1977), 209-40; Nicolson, Scotland, 541-9; Grant, Independence, 206-220. 
10
 Highland Papers [HP], Vol.I ed. J. R. N. Macphail (Edinburgh, 1914), 52; Reliquiae Celticae, Vol.II, eds 
Alexander MacBain & John Kennedy (Inverness, 1894), 162-3; Bannerman, „The Lordship of the Isles: 
Historical Background‟, in Monumental Sculpture in the West Highlands, 207. 
11
 Eoin had previously been forfeited in 1475 for the so-called Westminster-Ardtornish treaty of 1462, in 
which he had agreed with Edward IV of England to „harass the Scottish crown whenever possible‟. See 
Bannerman, „Lordship: Historical Background‟, 207. 
12
 Nicolson, Scotland, 548; Grant, Independence, 220; Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 21; Roberts, Feuds, ix, 
22- 45; Alison Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage: Highland Clanship 1451-1609 (Leiden, 2006), 34-5. 
13
 Grant, Independence, 211. 
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With the forfeiture as the main catalyst, the subsequent upheaval can be divided 
into two distinct phases. The first half of the sixteenth century saw the MacDonalds and 
their allies struggle to restore the Lordship of the Isles. Bannerman identified seven serious 
risings or rebellions before the „inhabitants of the Lordship finally accepted forfeiture‟, a 
clear indication of the strong resistance felt towards the crown‟s measures.14 The last 
uprising that openly aimed to restore the Lordship of the Isles was led by Dòmhnall Dubh, 
the grandson of Aonghas Òg, in 1544/5, and it received widespread support from clans 
within the Western Isles, including the MacDonalds of Clanranald, the MacLeods of Lewis, 
the MacLeods of Harris, and the MacLeans of Duart. Ultimately however, the rising ended 
in failure when Dòmhnall Dubh died of „a fever of five nights‟ at Drogheda in Ireland in 
late 1545.
15
 Several historians have suggested that many clan chiefs had by this time begun 
to welcome the opportunities afforded by an absentee Lord of the Isles,
16
 and the typical 
interpretation of the second half of the sixteenth century is that of a clean break away from 
the Lordship, with clans consolidating their own powerbases by engaging in violent 
competition: 
The different branches of the family of the Isles, and the other tribes inhabiting the 
Lordship, became gradually more estranged from each other, and more desirous 
each to extend its own power at the expense of its neighbours.
17
 
It is generally accepted that this led to fairly continuous turbulence within the West 
Highlands and Isles, until the enactment of the Statutes of Iona in 1609 by the government 
of James VI and I successfully „pacified‟ the clans.18  
 
Since the 1970s, a significant reappraisal of the forfeiture of the Lordship of the 
Isles and its immediate aftermath has been conducted, viewed predominantly through the 
lens of MacDonald/crown relations. A new perspective emerged, spearheaded by John 
Bannerman and Norman Macdougall, that the forfeiture was an inevitable consequence of 
the MacDonalds‟ over-extension of resources in holding the earldom of Ross,19 hastened 
by the incompetence of Eoin, the last lord.
20
 Apart from Bannerman, relatively few 
                                                          
14
 Bannerman, „Lordship: Historical Background‟, 210. 
15
 Reliquiae Celticae, Vol.II, 166-7. 
16
 Gregory, Western Highlands, 179; Bannerman, „Lordship: Historical Background‟, 213; Nicolson, 
Scotland, 548. 
17
 Gregory, Western Highlands, 180. 
18
 Ibid., 332-3. 
19
 Bannerman, „Lordship: Historical Background‟, 205-6. 
20
 Norman Macdougall, James III (Edinburgh, 1982), 123-4; Norman Macdougall, „Achilles‟ Heel? The 
Earldom of Ross, the Lordship of the Isles and the Stewart Kings‟, in Alba: Celtic Scotland in the Medieval 
Era, eds E.J. Cowan & R.A. McDonald (East Linton, 2000), 249-50, 257, 275. 
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scholars tackled the aftermath of the forfeiture. Positioning 1493 as a terminus fits snugly 
into the general narrative of the expansion of crown authority in the late medieval period.
21
 
Fresh perspectives have recently emerged on the consequences of the forfeiture in 1493. In 
2006, Boardman argued that the Dòmhnall Dubh rising in 1502-6 was not a „nostalgic and 
essentially conservative‟ attempt to restore the Lordship, but a protest against the 
„widespread displacement of established landowners and their dependents‟ by the 
government.
22
 In 2014, Alison Cathcart challenged the idea that the forfeiture caused an 
immediate spike in lawlessness and violence, arguing instead that the MacDonalds 
remained a strong force of governance and stability.
23
  
The belief that the post-Lordship period was rife with disorder and rebellion played 
into a pernicious but widely repeated narrative (by Gordon Donaldson, for example) of the 
Highlands and Isles as peripheral, unruly, and existing in a state of constant violence.
24
 
Underlying this perspective is the ancient stereotype of the „wild‟ Highlander, a regressive 
view that nevertheless still crops up in modern historiography on sixteenth-century 
Scotland. Otherwise accomplished scholars are not immune to its appeal,
25
 which in its 
simplicity allows the circumvention of close examination of the region and its people. 
Monarchocentric studies in particular have a tendency to dismiss the region as a 
perpetually unruly area – a „problem‟ for rulers to solve – with minimal consideration of an 
alternative Gaelic perspective. These views may have been influenced by the „new 
orthodoxy‟ of Wormald and Grant in the 1970s, who challenged the idea that late medieval 
Scotland was an anarchic society.
26
 They argued that „co-operation not conflict was the 
norm‟ in the relationship between the crown and the nobility, downplaying the level of 
violence in Scotland to present a picture of stability.
27
 The Highlands may not have 
conformed as readily to these models of stability, thereby perpetuating the notion that they 
were comparatively „wild‟. 
‘Linn nan Creach’ 
The period of „chaos‟ known as „Linn nan Creach‟, the „Age of Forays‟, sharply contrasts 
                                                          
21
 Nicolson, Scotland, 531-75. 
22
 Stephen Boardman, The Campbells 1250-1513 (Edinburgh, 2006), 278-83, 311-7. 
23
 Alison Cathcart, „A Spent Force?: The Clan Donald in the Aftermath of 1493‟, in The Lordship of the Isles, 
ed. Richard Oram (Leiden, 2014), 254-70. 
24
 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 1990), 13-14, 50-2. 
25
 Pamela Ritchie, Mary of Guise in Scotland, 1548-1560 (East Linton, 2002), 157, 167; Jamie Cameron, 
James V: The Personal Rule, 1528-42 (East Linton, 1998), 335; Gervase Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars: A 
Military History (Woodbridge, 1999), 162-3. 
26
 Grant, Independence; J.M. Brown, „The Exercise of Power‟, Scottish Society, 33-65. Their model has been 
challenged by Brown. See Michael H. Brown, „Scotland Tamed?‟, Innes Review, 45 (1994), 120-46. 
27
 Brown, „Scotland Tamed?‟, 123. 
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with „Linn an Àigh‟, the „Age of Prosperity‟, a supposed „Golden Age‟ of stability and 
peace that existed in the West Highlands and Isles until the fall of the Lordship of the 
Isles.
28
 It is not clear when either of these terms was first coined, and it is unlikely that they 
had any contemporary resonance in the sixteenth century. The former in particular was 
notably used by John MacInnes in 1981 to argue that Gaelic historical tradition possesses 
an „inherent strain of realism‟ and does not simply view the past in a „golden glow‟.29 
Since then the term „Linn nan Creach‟ has been widely invoked in academic literature as 
shorthand for the alleged upsurge in violence in the West Highlands and Isles after 1490-
3,
30
 its relative popularity perhaps stemming from the fact that it seemingly corroborated 
the negative external view of the sixteenth-century Highlands. The term expresses 
something else beyond generalised anarchy, specifically a last „Heroic Age‟.31 Although 
recognised by MacInnes, this dual meaning has more often been overlooked, and it 
suggests a more nuanced vision of this period, not defined solely by bloodshed and 
disorder but also by „heroic‟ deeds. 
Exacerbating these problems of provenance and interpretation is the fact that the 
temporal extent of „Linn nan Creach‟ has been very loosely defined. As highlighted by 
Thomson, it can be used to vaguely describe „the age when centralized government had not 
properly succeeded in winning control over the Highland area‟.32 Although the forfeiture 
of the Lordship of the Isles in 1493 is generally accepted as its beginning,
33
 the end of the 
epoch is more contested, with termination points ranging from 1603-9 (with the 
„pacification‟ of the region by James VI),34 to as late as the battle of Culloden in 1746, 
thereby embracing the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and beyond.
35
 Clan historians writing 
in the seventeenth century agree that the collapse of the Lordship of the Isles caused 
serious upheaval in the West Highlands and Isles, yet the duration of this unrest is left 
ambiguous. In the late seventeenth century, Hugh MacDonald, seanchaidh (historian) for 
                                                          
28
 Wilson McLeod, Divided Gaels: Gaelic Cultural Identities in Scotland and Ireland c. 1200-c.1650 
(Oxford, 2004), 2, 62. 
29
 John MacInnes, „Gaelic Poetry and Historical Tradition‟, in The Middle Ages in the Highlands, ed. Loraine 
MacLean (Inverness, 1981), 142-63 at 161. 
30
 Campbell Letters, 44, n.1; Stewart Jr., „War and Peace‟; Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 15-6; Michael 
Newton, Warriors of the Word: The World of the Scottish Highlanders (Edinburgh, 2009), 26; Gary J. West, 
„Scottish Military Music‟, in A Military History of Scotland, 654; Maureen M. Meikle, The Scottish People 
1490-1625 (Raleigh, 2013), 12. 
31
 John MacInnes, Dùthchas nan Gàidheal: Selected Essays of John MacInnes, ed. Michael Newton (Birlinn, 
2006), 52; Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 15-6. 
32
 Derick Thomson, An Introduction to Gaelic Poetry (Edinburgh, 1989), 99. 
33
 MacInnes, „Gaelic Poetry‟, 161; Stewart Jr., „War and Peace‟; Campbell Letters, 44, n.1; Dòmhnall 
Uilleam Stiùbhart, „Highland Rogues and the Roots of Highland Romanticism‟, in Crossing the Highland 
Line, ed. Christopher MacLachlan (Glasgow, 2009), 161-93 at 163; Meikle, Scottish People, 12. 
34
 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, 20-1; Stewart Jr., „War and Peace‟, 116. 
35
 MacInnes, „Gaelic Poetry‟, 161; MacInnes, Dùthchas, 52-3; Thomson, Gaelic Poetry, 99. 
15 
 
Clan Donald of Sleat, memorably described the consequences of the assassination of 
Aonghas Òg, son of Eoin, last Lord of the Isles, in 1490:  
…the Islanders, and the rest of the Highlanders, were let loose, and began to shed 
one another‟s blood. Although Angus kept them in obedience while he was sole 
lord over them, yet upon his resignation of his rights to the king, all families, his 
own as well as others, gave themselves up to all sorts of cruelties, which continued 




Thus with the death of Aonghas Òg, the true power behind the Lordship of the Isles by this 
time, a phase of intense, widespread inter-clan warfare was waged across the West 
Highlands and Isles. Yet how long did this violence last? Hugh MacDonald‟s statement of 
„a long time thereafter‟ is extremely vague. Somewhat more precision is offered by Niall 
MacMhuirich in the „Red Book of Clanranald‟, who implies that the disorder was reserved 
for the immediate period after the forfeiture, until the rising of Dòmhnall Dubh in 1544/5: 
…re feadh na haimsire an rabha Domhnall Dubh ar laimh, do bhi buaighirt mor 
eadar Gaiodhealuibh ag dreim re cenas… 
During the time that Donald Dubh had been in custody there was a great struggle 
among the Gael for power…37 
MacMhuirich goes on to relate the various struggles among the different branches of the 
Clan Donald, meaning that „the Gael‟ refers solely to that clan. The eventual escape of 
Dòmhnall Dubh united these warring factions: „the men of the Isles gathered about him‟.38 
This suggests an alternative vision of the sixteenth century, in which „Linn nan Creach‟ 
was specifically the fifty-year struggle to revive the Lordship of the Isles. It consequently 
ended with the death of the last serious claimant, Dòmhnall Dubh, in 1545. Neither Hugh 
MacDonald nor Niall MacMhuirich ever state that the sixteenth century as a whole was a 
time of „cruelties‟ and „great struggle‟. 
The West Highlands and Isles are not alone, even in Scotland, in bearing the burden 
of notoriety. In the Scottish Borders, the 300-year period spanning the commencement of 
the Wars of Independence in 1296 to the Union of the Crowns in 1603 was allegedly 
                                                          
36
 HP, Vol. I, 52. 
37
 Reliquiae Celticae, Vol. II, 162-3. 
38
 Ibid., 162-7. 
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denoted as the „troublesome tymes‟ by contemporaries.39 Titles such as these invite 
modern audiences to view a historical epoch through a specific lens. While this may be 
warranted as reputations such as these are arguably not conjured out of thin air, they 
nevertheless distort the surviving evidence and, in this instance, predispose most historians 
to view the period as inherently and unprecedentedly tumultuous. Conversely, these titles 
imply that other periods were bereft of violent competition, which in the case of late 
medieval and early modern Scotland is clearly not accurate.
40
 
The Historiography of Warfare in the West Highlands and Isles of 
Scotland 
First and foremost for our period, the lasting contribution of Donald Gregory‟s The History 
of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland from A.D. 1493 to A.D. 1625 must be 
highlighted. First published in 1836, it remains the cornerstone narrative of the West 
Highlands and Isles in this period. As observed by MacGregor, Gregory applied a 
„systematic‟ and „rational‟ approach to his sources, blending governmental records with 
genealogical histories to create a work with a „distinctly modern…flavour‟.41 For this 
thesis, Gregory provides foundational narratives for the two case studies that bookend our 
period: Blàr nan Lèine (the „Battle of the Shirts‟) in 1544, involving the Clanranald and the 
Frasers,
42
 and the „Islay Rising‟ of 1615, led by the MacDonalds of Dunivaig.43 Gregory‟s 
History is not flawless. Given his stated intention was to trace the trajectory of the Scottish 
Highlander and Islander from „wild‟ rebel to „loyal‟ Jacobite, Gregory views the „civilising‟ 
process enacted by the Stewart monarchs as intrinsically positive, no matter how much 
instability it created. At several points in his narrative, he slips into recounting the old 
stereotypes about the „wild‟ nature of the Highlanders as a way of explaining 
contemporary behaviour, an approach that lacks depth and fails to reveal nuanced 
developments in society. Most pertinently, despite the fact that Gregory details numerous 
feuds and conflicts during his period, he never suspends his narrative to discuss the nature 
of this military activity.
44
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Historical coverage of the West Highlands and Isles between 1493 and 1625 can no 
longer be described, as Donald Gregory did in 1836, as „nearly…a perfect blank‟.45 In the 
wake of Gregory‟s pioneering efforts, a crop of dedicated clan studies emerged in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
46
 Many of these works contain valuable insights 
and useful reprints of contemporary material, but their „genealogical tunnel-vision‟ can 
occasionally prove untrustworthy.
47
 Others lack the critical source analysis shown by 
Gregory and are generally limited to recitations of clan tradition about battles.
48
 In more 
recent years, studies of political, linguistic, and cultural developments in the West 
Highlands and Isles have gone from strength to strength, through the work of Martin 
MacGregor, Aonghas MacCoinnich, Alison Cathcart, and Wilson McLeod. In addition, the 
research of Allan Macinnes and Robert Dodgshon has illuminated the long-term process of 




Despite the ever-growing scholarly interest in the West Highlands and Isles, the 
theme of warfare has been given relatively short shrift, perhaps due to a perception that it 
was unworthy of study. In 1979, Cowan dismissed the wars between the MacDonalds and 
MacLeans in the 1580s as „mutually suicidal bloodbaths…almost beyond the scope of 
historical investigation‟.50 This aversion to analysing warfare in the Highlands and Isles 
has allowed the perpetuation of misleading stereotypes which impede our overall 
understanding of contemporary society. For example, some historians have used isolated 
incidents of dubious provenance to make generalisations about warfare in the West 
Highlands and Isles. In his general history of Scotland, Smout adheres to the view that 
violence in the Highlands was much more extreme than elsewhere in Scotland, citing the 
„blood-curdling story‟ of the massacre of Eigg in 1577, the slaughter of students from 
Dumbarton by the MacGregors after Glen Fruin in 1603, and the burning of the 
MacKenzie congregation at Kilchrist by MacDonald of Glengarry, also in 1603.
51
 There is 
good ground for believing that these incidents are apocryphal or at least greatly 
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 Smout offers no qualifying comments or contrasting examples in his 
summation of Highland warfare, leaving the reader with the impression that indiscriminate 
killing was the norm in the West Highlands and Isles. 
Some scholars seem compelled to mould their evidence to fit the infamous 
reputation of the region and its people. An example is Keith Brown‟s Bloodfeud in 
Scotland, 1573-1625 (1986), which has become a touchstone for scholars of the late 
medieval and early modern Scottish nobility. Following pioneering work by Wormald,
53
 
Brown investigated the phenomenon of feuding in noble culture across Scotland, and 
approached the West Highlands and Isles from within a broad Scottish framework. An 
important contribution made by Brown to the study of warfare in the West Highlands and 
Isles, which has received limited comment from historians,
54
 is a statistic that measured 
regional variations in levels of feuding across Scotland. In Bloodfeud, Brown estimated 
that between 1573 and 1625 only 16% of feuds in Scotland took place in the Highlands (48 
feuds in total), compared to 40% which occurred in the Lowlands (120 feuds in total).
55
 
Given the lurid reputation of the Highlander, particularly in this period, this comparatively 
low number appears to have surprised Brown, who is quick to qualify the statistic as 
potentially misleading: 
 
…there may have been more feuds in the lowlands, but they were likely to be less 
violent, and to involve fewer people than highland feuds.
56  
 
For Brown, the scale and quality of the violence in the Highlands was distinctive from the 
rest of the country. Brown argues that this statistical approach obscures qualitative data, 
resulting in a minor feud between two Fife lairds being „equated with the long, wide-
ranging and highly destructive feud between the MacDonald and MacLean clans‟.57 Yet 
this presents a false equivalence as the MacDonald-MacLean feud was a particularly 
extreme example of warfare in the West Highlands and Isles and cannot be considered 
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representative of a „typical‟ conflict.  Many were akin to his Lowland example.58 Overall, 
despite Brown‟s efforts to undermine the accuracy of his own statistics, he nevertheless 
provides a welcome reminder that violence and warfare in Scotland was not restricted to 
the West Highlands and Isles. As Dawson points out: 
 
Attitudes were more important than realities, with the perceived gulf between the 
levels of violence much greater than the actual one.
59
 
What mattered more to contemporaries (and perhaps modern historians also) was not the 
violence itself, but who was perpetrating this violence. Unlike the work of Keith Brown, 
this thesis is not solely concerned with feuding society. Not all feuds involved warfare and 
not all warfare involved feuds. Some feuds were purely legal in nature, and the process of 
the feud can be defined less as a code of conduct and more as a „state of mind‟.60 That said, 
many of the case studies in this thesis do involve feuds either between separate clans or 
within an individual kindred, and research by Brown, Miller and others provides useful 
commentary particularly on noble society, honour culture, and legal mechanisms for 
reconciling feuds. 
The military history of Scotland in general has been growing steadily in recent 
years, as signified by the release of A Military History of Scotland in 2012, and indeed 
England and Scotland at War, c.1296-c.1513 in the same year.
61
 Other important research 
includes Gervase Phillips‟ work on the wars between Scotland and England between 1513 
and 1550,
62
 and Steve Murdoch‟s reappraisal of Scotland as an early modern maritime 
power.
63
 Some scholarship has assessed specific aspects of warfare in the West Highlands 
and Isles, such as weaponry,
64
 or the use of the galley,
65
 but the broader topic of warfare in 
the sixteenth and early seventeenth century has been neglected, often in favour of later 
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periods such as the War of the Three Kingdoms,
66
 or the contemporary situation in Ireland. 
An important milestone in the latter case was Gerard Hayes-McCoy‟s Scots Mercenary 
Forces in Ireland, 1565-1603 (1937), a study of the West Highland and Hebridean 
mercenary trade phenomenon from an Irish perspective.
67
 Although it has been criticised in 
recent years by Kenneth Nicholls,
68
 it nevertheless broke ground as the first concerted 
analysis of the military activities of the Scottish Gaelic warrior in Ireland in the sixteenth 
century. A recent collection of essays, The World of the Galloglass (2007), was envisioned 
as a modern successor to Hayes-McCoy‟s work.69  Ultimately, the collection is a mixed 
success. Cathcart‟s study of James V‟s political intrigues in Ireland provides a fresh 
perspective although it barely features galloglasses,
70
 and Caldwell‟s discussion of the 
military equipment of the West Highland warrior is a useful analysis and compendium of 
sources.
71
 Yet despite the fact that Hayes-McCoy‟s work is listed as a major influence, 
there is little discussion of mercenary activity in the second half of the sixteenth century, 
apart from some brief analysis in Edwards‟ interesting study of James Fullerton, a Scottish 
royal intelligence agent.
72
 The vital period c. 1595-1603, which saw the termination of this 
mercenary trade, went largely unexplored.  
A methodological trend that attained considerable popularity in the twentieth 
century was to tackle Scotland and Ireland in tandem, as they were perceived to represent a 
homogenous pan-Gaelic zone.
73
 This approach had some justification as the two countries 
shared certain cultural features, but it failed to account for the creative independence of 
both countries,
74
 the very different political circumstances they faced, and perhaps, as 
argued by McLeod, the sense of division and separation felt by contemporary people from 
the two „Gaeldoms‟.75 In a military context, this concept of a shared „Celtic‟ tradition 
reached its nadir with James Hill‟s Celtic Warfare (1986), which examined Scotland and 
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Ireland as interchangeable „Celtic‟ states, both equally „primitive‟ in military terms.76 Hill 
presented the sixteenth-century Gaels on either side of the Irish Sea as analogous to the 
„ancient Celts‟ who fought Julius Caesar, a notion that presents both Gaelic Scots and 
Gaelic Irish as frozen in time for over a millennium and a half.
77
 Moreover, Hill only 
deigned to analyse the warfare of the Highlands and Isles of Scotland from the 1640s 
onwards, as only then did the tactical innovations „worked out in Ireland by Alasdair 
MacColla result in…a subtle but telling change in the Gaelic Scots‟ military system‟.78  
Thus the militarised population of the Highlands and Isles prior to the 1640s was stripped 
of personal agency and reduced to a mere footnote in history. 
Direct challenges to Hill‟s notions of „Celtic‟ warfare have only emerged relatively 
recently. In 1998, Gervase Phillips criticised Hill for „arguing backwards from the tactics 
of eighteenth-century Jacobite armies‟, although Phillips‟ own analysis leans too heavily 
on genealogical histories and Lowland literati like Mair and Lesley.
79
 The most considered 
challenge appeared in 2012 with Martin MacGregor‟s article, „Warfare in Gaelic Scotland 
in the Later Middle Ages‟, which appeared in A Military History of Scotland (2012). The 
Gaelic Irish mode of warfare, as interpreted by Katharine Simms,
80
 was compared to the 
Scottish, with MacGregor concluding that while Gaelic Scotland and Gaelic Ireland 
„complemented‟ each other, there was no „commonality of approach‟ in warfare between 
the two. Another important breakthrough was the identification of an apparent 
intensification of warfare in the latter half of the sixteenth century, which may have 
culminated in a shift towards „total war‟ around the turn of the seventeenth century. 
Overall, the nature of warfare was shown to be complex and far from „primitive‟.81 
Although this article has made a start in redressing the neglect shown to this theme, it 
seems fair to say that MacGregor has by no means answered, or presumed to answer, all 
the questions about warfare in the Highlands and Isles of Scotland. This thesis will build 
upon MacGregor‟s broad overview with an expanded and deepened scope, which will 
allow his theories, as well as new interpretations, to be tested.
82
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For the historian laden with the baggage of centuries of bias against the West 
Highlands and Isles of Scotland, there can be a temptation to dismiss all claims of savagery 
and violence as the inevitable by-product of a prejudiced outlook. The approach of this 
thesis will be similar to that of Martin Martin, who, in the late seventeenth century, 
defended the reputation of the population of the Western Isles by pleading, „the Lion is not 
so fierce as he is painted‟.83 The implication is clear: the lion‟s viciousness has been 
overstated yet he is still fierce. Some aspects of Gaelic warfare have been unduly 
exaggerated, but the sixteenth century was governed by a moral framework that may seem 
somewhat alien to modern audiences. For this thesis, simply replacing the stereotype of 
West Highland barbarity with an account of virtuous behaviour would be the trading of one 
artificial viewpoint for another. While also eschewing any notions of „wildness‟ or 
primitivism as an explanation for modes of behaviour, this thesis aims to establish why 
contemporaries engaged in warfare. 
 
Sources 
The source base for the West Highlands and Isles in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century is richer than for any previous period, and this thesis will engage with a wide 
variety of different material. The three central source types utilised are governmental 
records, Gaelic poetry, and genealogical histories.
84 
Scottish and English governmental records, such as the Privy Council, Privy Seal, 
and Great Seal, are essential sources for any political study of this period, and form the 
bedrock of the case studies included here. The first volumes of the Register of the Privy 
Council of Scotland and the Calendar of State Papers relating to Scotland coincide neatly 
with the start of our period (1545 and 1547 respectively). Many of these sources are 
printed and easily available, yet some remain surprisingly underused by historians of the 
Highlands, particularly the State Papers volumes. Like the other core sources of this thesis, 
governmental records come with caveats. Privy Council records, for example, present a 
centralised and often unsympathetic viewpoint of „problem‟ areas in the West Highlands 
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and Isles, and for many conflicts – political and/or military – only include the perspective 
of one party. Additionally, the number of reported incidents from the 1590s onwards far 
outstrips previous decades, especially in comparison to the „artificially low‟ number during 
the Marian Civil War.
85
 Rather than representing a genuine upsurge in disorder, this may 
instead reflect increased government interest, an especially pertinent point in „problem‟ 
areas like the Highlands and Borders, the former of which became a target for plantation 
and expropriation. As the eye of royal government became more fixated upon the West 
Highlands and Isles, the administrative machine documented pacification efforts in detail, 
weighting evidence towards the period c. 1590-1615 and providing a potentially 
misleading impression of the intensity of disorder. Alternatively, this increase in 
documentation may reflect a demonstrable shift towards „total war‟ in the West Highlands 
and Isles around the turn of the seventeenth century, as posited by MacGregor.
86
 For 
historians, a positive result of this upsurge of data between c. 1590-1615 is the creation of 
a rich evidence base that cannot be matched by earlier periods. Within this 25-year period, 
a pinnacle is reached in the documentation of the Irish mercenary trade in the Western Isles 
between 1594-6, which contains unique information about elite attitudes towards warfare, 
and the scope and composition of armies in the West Highlands and Isles. Diplomatic 
records from around this time provide some of our best insight from Highlanders and 
Hebrideans in their own words (in Scots if not Gaelic), with personal correspondence from 
chiefs like the Campbell earls of Argyll or Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart. In addition, 
the government began to order reports in Scots from Gaelic informants like Dioness 
Campbell, the Dean of Limerick, a cousin of the earl of Argyll, which offer fresh 
perspectives on military matters in the Western Isles. 
The second key source type for this thesis is Gaelic poetry, by some distance the 
main source through which the historian can glean insight from inhabitants of the 
Highlands and Isles in their own language. A central feature of Gaelic poetry was the 
„panegyric code‟, a term first coined by John MacInnes.87 This was a collection of stock 
motifs of recognisable meaning to the audience that served to reinforce the rule of the 
patron.
88
 These rhetorical conventions can seem obscure to modern audiences and often 
should not be taken literally, but they nevertheless contain crucial insight into the values of 
contemporary society. Warfare and militarism were crucial points of reference within the 
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poetic repertoire, as common motifs included the praising of a chief‟s weapons and 
armoury, as well as his skill as a warrior.
89
 Heroic ballads meanwhile drew upon Irish 
myth and history to present a worldview that highly venerated martial exploits, thus 
potentially encouraging patterns of warlike behaviour.
90
 Throughout the sixteenth century, 
the increasing use of the Scottish Gaelic vernacular saw the emergence of new forms of 
expression in poetry in terms of metre and language,
91
 and as early as the 1560s, 
vernacular poets began including references to new weaponry, like firearms, which reflect 
the changing trends of that place and time.
92
 Some scholars have cautioned against 
„overinterpreting‟ poetry, i.e. accepting „isolated statements‟ as definite proof of 
contemporary attitudes and outlooks.
93
 This is perhaps even more pertinent in Scotland as 
the surviving evidence is somewhat sparse: in comparison to Ireland where nearly 2,000 
bardic poems survive, only around 160 items of bardic poetry from Scotland have been 
discovered, and more than half date from the period 1450-1550, due in large part to the 
survival of The Book of the Dean of Lismore.
94
 Other scholars, whilst remaining conscious 
of this potential pitfall, have nevertheless demonstrated the value of poetry as a source, an 
approach that this thesis will emulate. In an Irish context, Katharine Simms used poetry to 
reveal the overarching military ethos of medieval Gaelic Irish society, before tracing a 
gradual transition towards the celebration of civility as private war receded in the 
seventeenth century.
95
 In a Scottish context, Martin MacGregor has demonstrated that 
poetry is an historical artefact laden with contemporary detail that can deepen and 
corroborate other documentary evidence.
96
 
Another key set of sources for this thesis are genealogical histories, which have 
been relatively neglected by historians. Although MacGregor has identified „nearly fifty‟ 
of these texts,
97
 few have been incorporated into modern studies, mainly due to their 
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reputation for unreliability. These texts have three key drawbacks as sources. Firstly, they 
are partisan texts (often avowedly so)
98
 that champion the specific clan to which the author 
belonged or with which he was associated, and therefore can distort events to present the 
favoured clan in a more flattering light. Secondly, although these histories may have used 
earlier sources, both written and oral, from the medieval and late medieval periods, they 
were generally written much later, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.
99
 
Therefore, some of these histories were committed to writing literally hundreds of years 
after the events they purport to relate. The third problem also deals with provenance, as 
some of these texts underwent a series of recensions or were highly interrelated, resulting 
in the recycling of material.
100
 Despite these issues, William Matheson recognised that 
genealogical histories should not be wholly discounted, and his work on the traditions of 
the MacKenzies initiated the „rehabilitation‟ of genealogical histories as historical 
sources,
101







 and Martin MacGregor.
105
 
Reconciling these disparate and often contradictory sources is challenging but 
essential. A narrow outlook on sources, based solely on governmental records for example, 
would produce a one-sided picture of the West Highlands and Isles to the prejudice of 
clans engaging in military activity. Adopting a more inclusive approach broadens and 
deepens our understanding of the time period, and can be a rewarding exercise in its own 
right. This thesis will demonstrate that analysing a genealogical history in tandem with 
contemporary documentary material can „inspire confidence‟ in the former source,106 and 
bring us closer to the reality of a specific internecine conflict.
107
 Only engagement with a 
broad array of sources can reveal the realities of warfare in contemporary society. 
Scope and Structure of Enquiry 
War is defined by Oxford Dictionaries as „a state of armed conflict between different 
countries or different groups within a country‟.108 Warfare meanwhile has been defined as 
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„engagement in or the activities involved in war or conflict‟.109 These loose definitions 
clearly embrace a wide array of military activity. This thesis predominantly focuses on 
inter-clan warfare (i.e. warfare between separate clans) and internecine warfare (i.e. 
warfare within an individual clan) in the West Highlands and Isles. Attention will also be 
given to the clans‟ mercenary campaigns in Ireland, the Scottish government‟s military 
interventions in the West Highlands and Isles, and the contribution of Highland soldiers to 
Scottish royal armies. A wide spectrum of warfare was conducted by clans, ranging from a 
handful of armed men rustling cattle from their neighbour to large-scale pitched-battles and 
sieges involving hundreds of heavily armed warriors. All of these various modes of 
warfare will be analysed. By necessity a study of warfare focuses on times of upheaval and 
violence. Times of peace are perhaps harder to quantify and analyse simply because many 
of our sources are often confined to disturbances „with little record of any outbreak of 
peace‟.110 An effort will be made to draw attention where possible to periods of apparent 
peace as a reminder that this was not a period of perpetual bloodshed.  
The geographical focus of this study is the West Highlands and Isles, i.e. the Inner 
and Outer Hebrides. On the mainland, the geographical extent of this study stretches from 
Fortrose north-east of Inverness down through Ross and Cromarty, the Great Glen and the 
Grampian Mountains, with the most southerly areas embracing Loch Lomond and the 
Lennox, Cowal, Bute, and the peninsula of Kintyre. The eastern extent of this thesis 
roughly follows the Great Glen, although the lands of some relevant clans, notably the 
Frasers, lay on the eastern side of this natural fault-line. 
 
Figure 1: Approximate area of study 
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The people that inhabited this swathe of land were predominantly Gaelic-speaking (or, like 
their clan chiefs, bilingual in Gaelic and Scots).
111
 This thesis will avoid using the term 
„Gàidhealtachd‟ to describe the geographical extent covered, as this technically includes 
areas in the south-west of Scotland, such as Carrick and Galloway, which remained Gaelic-
speaking in the sixteenth century.
112
 
The temporal parameters of this thesis, c. 1544-1615, have been chosen for a 
number of reasons. Most pertinently, the increasing richness of evidence from c. 1544 
onwards makes this a natural starting point. Yet it is undoubtedly significant that these 
parameters coincide with two events that have both been interpreted as a „final‟ attempt to 
revive the Lordship of the Isles: the Dòmhnall Dubh rising of 1544/5,
113
 and the „Islay 
Rising‟ of 1615.114 Although the Lordship and the MacDonalds do not dominate this thesis, 
an important theme in our case studies (particularly Chapters 7 and 9) is the extent to 
which the influence of the Lordship of the Isles continued through the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century.  
The first part of this thesis will consider a series of interlinked themes that trace the 
overall process of warfare across four thematic chapters. Chapter 1 will explore the mental 
world inhabited by the Gaelic elite as well as martial culture more generally, with 
assessment of the roles of a chief, honour, military leadership, martial recreation, and the 
role of castles. Chapter 2 assesses the causation of warfare, which will emphasise that 
conflict generally involved an array of contingent and interconnected catalysts. Chapter 3 
focuses on soldiers and armies, covering the recruitment, composition, and supply of the 
latter, as well as the military equipment used by the former. Chapter 4 analyses more 
closely the conduct of warfare, with consideration of fundamentals such as the nature of 
raiding, battles, and sieges, while also assessing more specific issues such as the part 
played by Highland Scots in royal armies. Although the reconciliation process will not be 
tackled in a standalone chapter, it will be a recurrent theme in the case studies. These will 
illustrate that warfare in the Highlands was not continuous, nor was the region a lawless 
„frontier‟. It had its own local mechanisms for mediation and arbitration that were often 
more effective than those imposed by central government.  
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After examining these themes, the second part of this thesis focuses on a series of 
case studies to demonstrate the diverse experience of different clans in the West Highlands 
and Isles. These case studies span a 71-year period c. 1544-1615, beginning with a study of 
the Clanranald from 1544-1577 and concluding with the „Islay Rising‟ of 1614-15. They 
have been carefully chosen to obtain a balance of clans, localities, types of conflict, and 
chronology across the period. A broad sweep of different clans will be included, not only 
as a means of countering the partisanship of clan histories,
115
 but also to determine the 
extent to which there was a uniform approach to warfare across the West Highlands and 
Isles. Due to their enduring prominence even after the forfeiture of the Lordship of the 
Isles, the MacDonalds have often stood as proxy for the entire West Highlands and Isles, to 
the consequent neglect of other important clans.
116
 The MacDonalds remain a key clan for 
this thesis (mainly the branches of Sleat, Clanranald, and Dunivaig), yet equally important 
are other Highland heavyweights, like the Campbells of Argyll, the Campbells of 
Glenorchy, the MacLeans of Duart, the MacLeods of Harris, the MacNeills of Barra, and 
the MacGregors. The net has been cast even further to include other, often neglected clans, 
such as the Camerons of Lochiel in Lochaber and the Colquhouns of Luss in the Lennox. 
These clans provide a counter balance to the MacDonalds, allowing broader representation 
of the West Highlands and Isles. 
 
Perhaps the most notable exclusion is the conflict between the MacDonalds of 
Dunivaig and the MacLeans of Duart, which originally raged in the 1580s and later flared 
up again at the battle of Traigh Ghruinneart in 1598. This thesis is not intended to be an 
exhaustive record of every inter-clan conflict in this period, but more importantly this 
particular feud has recently been covered in detail by Maclean-Bristol.
117
 Nevertheless, this 
feud, especially its climax in 1598, has important ramifications for both the case study of 
the MacDonald/MacLeod feud in 1601 and the theme of conduct, and will be analysed 
from these perspectives. 
 
Variation exists in any large-scale project and should be embraced rather than 
moulded to fit a general pattern of „Gaelic warfare‟. Our case studies offer a chance for 
these variables to emerge with greater clarity. Moreover, analysing instances of warfare 
and conflict in isolation from their political background can result in the violence 
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appearing irrational, unjustified, or „wild‟. All of the case studies in this thesis involve a 
discussion of the political background to acts of war, a crucial step for understanding the 
kinds of pressures faced by contemporaries and why they would resort to violence. Rarely 
was there a sudden lurch towards bloodshed, and in the vast majority of cases there was a 
long process of political conflict before any violence took place. 
By taking a systematic approach towards warfare in the West Highlands and Isles 
between 1544 and 1615, this thesis will analyse how and why military activity took place. 
It will contend that warfare did not dominate society, as has been previously thought, but it 
was nevertheless an important facet of clan life. Moreover, it will challenge the idea that 
the sixteenth century was a time of uninhibited „chaos‟, arguing instead that warfare was 






















Chapter 1: Mentalities and Martial Culture 
The West Highlands and Isles have recently been portrayed as a „frontier‟ society that 
„promoted martial cultures‟ and militarism at a level that outstripped the norm in Scotland, 
apart from perhaps the Borders.
1
 Even a superficial analysis of contemporary sources 
indicates that there is some truth to this view, but as highlighted by Allan Macinnes there is 
a danger in portraying the Highlands as a purely „martial‟ culture defined by an all-
encompassing „military ethos‟.2 Across late medieval and early modern Europe, nobles and 
kings shared a „common value system in which military prowess was prized‟.3 The 
Highlands were no different in this regard, and like elsewhere, military pursuits did not 
dictate every aspect and stratum of society. This chapter will assess Gaelic perceptions of 
warfare and martial culture through extensive use of contemporary poetry, letters, 
diplomatic correspondence, and genealogical histories. It will be shown that warfare was 
not a chief‟s raison d'être, but a necessary aspect of his overarching responsibility to 
protect his clan. Militaristic imagery was nevertheless central to a chief‟s self-identity and 
buttressed by very real expectations about his participation and leadership in military 
affairs. 
1.1: Role of the Chief: Warrior or Protector? 
The arresting visuals of late medieval sculpture provide a clear indication of the martial 
culture that underpinned elite society in the West Highlands and Isles. Effigies and 
graveslabs frequently depict men in armour clutching two-handed swords to their chest, or 
swords suspended as a decorative centrepiece. Other symbols of military power include 
axes, bows and arrows, spears, galleys, and castles.
4
 The heyday of craftsmanship and 
patronage coincided with the temporal parameters of the Lordship of the Isles, but 
sculptural tradition continued into the sixteenth century.
5
 This reflects a highly militarised 
society, perhaps „consciously different‟ from Lowland societal norms.6 The crucial point 
here is that the male clan elite wanted to be portrayed – in life and to posterity – as 
warriors. 
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Figure 2: Effigy from Kilninian Church, Mull (Canmore) 
The fact that the suspended sword, the central design of many sculptures, could act as a 
visual representation of the chief himself chimes with the recurrent motif in poetry that the 
sword was an extension of his hand and power.
7
 The widespread adherence to the 
decorative style of the warrior-chief on effigies throughout the West Highlands could 
merely represent observance of tradition, or even the current trend, but nevertheless, it 
must be assumed that the sculptures represent both the weight of societal expectation and 
the idealised persona of individual chiefs. 
Even richer insight into contemporary attitudes towards warfare is preserved within 
the stanzas of Gaelic poetry. Generally composed with the intent of flattering the 
aristocratic patron, these poems often praised martial skill and valour, drawing from the 
pool of motifs known as the „panegyric code‟.8 Although these poems could be formulaic 
in nature, they present a consistent vision of the specific military qualities held in esteem 
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 Each individual chief may not necessarily have deserved such adulation, 
but poetry continually reinforced praiseworthy qualities and thereby established 
aspirational benchmarks in moral and physical character. Consequently, they may have had 
a direct influence on chiefly behaviour both on and off the battlefield, acting as a catalyst 
for self-actualisation as a warrior-chief. Gaelic chiefs wanted to leave behind a heroic 
legacy, for their deeds to be remembered long after their death. One of the primary appeals 
of poetry was that it offered a form of immortality, as stated in an elegy for the Clanranald 
chief Ailean MacRuaidhrí (d. c. 1509): 
...gé fíor t‟ég, is tú nach teasda: 
 féach do chlú budh dheasda ad dhiaidh. 
 
…though true your death, you have not departed; 




Attainment of such a legacy depended on their ability to emulate and surpass their own 
ancestors. Irish myth and history also provided a number of role-models, and the general 
frame of reference of Scottish Gaelic poetry was „Hibernocentric‟.11 On both sides of the 
Irish Sea, chiefs were flatteringly compared to mythical or early historical figures, like 
Fionn mac Cumhaill or Cú Chulainn, to underline their military prowess and overall 
worthiness to rule. These figures were adopted by some clans as their progenitors: the 
MacDonalds for example claimed descent from Colla Uais, a legendary High King of 
Ireland.
12
 Not all of these heroes were remembered for military exploits: the early king of 
Connacht, Guaire Aidne mac Colmáin, was most renowned for his „legendary 
generosity‟.13 
 
This Irish frame of reference persisted well into the sixteenth century and beyond,
14
 
as related by John Carswell (c.1522-1572), bishop of the Isles. In Foirm na n-
urrnuidheadh („The form of the prayers‟), a Gaelic translation of the 1564 edition of the 
Book of Common Order published in Edinburgh in April 1567, Carswell includes an 
epistle to his patron the Earl of Argyll, which claims the 
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…composers and writers and patrons of Gaelic…prefer and are accustomed to 
maintain and improve the vain hurtful worldly tales composed about the Tuatha Dé 
Danann, and about the sons of Milesius, and about the heroes and Fionn mac 
Cumhaill with his warriors…15 
 
The continuing popularity of these stories is notable in itself, but the desire to „maintain 
and improve‟ them is even more important as it suggests that Irish archetypes were not 
repeated verbatim. Ireland was not always the „centre and the innovator‟ and Scottish 
Gaelic literati were engaged in a continual process of adaptation and evolution.
16
 The 
popularity of certain genres differed on either side of the Irish Sea, as shown by the 
proportionally higher number of elegies in Scottish heroic poetry, which, as Donald Meek 
suggests, may have reflected the „spirit of the age‟ with a „renewed interest in warrior 
elegy and the concept of a lost Golden Age‟ in the wake of the forfeiture of the Lordship of 
the Isles.
17
 In contrast, MacGregor has suggested that the heroic ballads in The Book of the 
Dean of Lismore, rather than acting as a call to arms, may in fact commemorate the 
„passing of a heroic age‟ in the wake of the battle of Flodden in 1513, an event that „shook 
and scarred‟ the Clan Campbell.18  
Warfare is rarely described in extended detail in any individual poem. Martial 
motifs are liberally diffused throughout the bardic corpus, yet they generally do not 
dominate the praise of chiefs and are invoked alongside other esteemed qualities.
19
 Pià 
Coira‟s analysis of Scottish panegyric poetry provides an overview of the various qualities 
that a chief was expected to possess: 
…the rightful king or chief, must be of noble ancestry, an accomplished warrior, 
one capable of exacting rent and tribute, of uniting and protecting his people, and of 
maintaining the peace in his territory. He is also physically attractive, devout, and 
generous to strangers, to the poor and most of all to men of learning. His house is 
vibrant with feasting and gaming, he is a bountiful patron of learning, and beloved 
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of women. He is often said to have been foretold by prophets of old…and he is 
celebrated by nature with clement weather and fertility through the land.
20
 
Martial prowess therefore was just one attribute of many for the ideal clan chief. Assuming 
that Coira‟s overview represents a hierarchy of importance, military skill is clearly given a 
high position, yet it may be outshone by a noble ancestry, identified by McLeod as perhaps 
the „single most important source of prestige for a Gaelic ruler‟.21 It is also notable that the 
two „central preoccupations‟ of The Book of the Dean of Lismore are the „the Argument 
about Women‟ and the kingship of the Scots, not militarism and warfare.22 If the Book is 
accepted as a reflection of the interests and concerns of the elite around the time of its 
compilation between 1512 and 1542, then the intellectual range of the Gaelic nobility of 
the Highlands was diverse and clearly not confined to military affairs.
23
 
The poetic motif perhaps most closely related to martial prowess is the expectation 
that a chief should be a prime physical specimen. The attainment of physical perfection 
reinforced the chief‟s role as a warrior and traditionally it was held that even a minor 
physical disability could be an insurmountable barrier to leadership.
24
 John MacInnes has 
pointed out however that several famous and successful chiefs were given designations that 
conveyed physical infirmities, such as crotach (humpbacked), bacach (lame), or cam 
(squint-eyed), which could instead suggest that „bodily perfection‟, and by extension 
martial prowess, were not quintessential elements for the legitimacy of a chief.
25
 However, 
this seems overly simplistic for several reasons. Firstly, we cannot be sure when these 
chiefs were given these nicknames, and they may have originally been intended as insults 
that gained traction in later tradition. Secondly, if we accept that these chiefs did indeed 
possess these physical „defects‟, it is important to consider when in their life they acquired 
them. For example, according to the „History of the MacDonalds‟, Alasdair Crotach 
MacLeod of Harris was imprisoned in Castle Tioram for seven years, where „he got his 
back broke which made him hunch backed all his lifetime‟.26 This suggests that Alasdair 
was not „hunch backed‟ from birth and originally inherited the chiefship while in prime 
physical condition, before suffering an injury later in life at a stage when his position had 
                                                          
20
 Pía Coira, „Kingship imagery in Classical Gaelic panegyric for Scottish chiefs‟, in Cànan & Cultar / 
Language & Culture Rannsachadh na Gàidhlig 3, eds Wilson McLeod, James E. Fraser and Anja 
Gunderloch (Edinburgh, 2006), 39. 
21
 McLeod, Divided Gaels, 115-6. 
22
 MacGregor, „Creation and Compilation‟, 216-7. 
23
 Ibid., 210, 213-7. 
24
 Simms, From Kings, 49-51. 
25
 John MacInnes, „Clan Unity and Individual Freedom‟, TGSI, 47 (1971-2), 343-6; Cathcart, Kinship, 62-3. 
26
 HP, Vol. I, 68. 
36 
 
already been secured. Thirdly, it seems conceivable that if a chief sustained an injury in 
battle these epithets could have been regarded as a badge of honour, proof that he had 
defended his clan and shed blood in the line of duty. Finally, these particular „defects‟, a 
humpback for example, may not have been so debilitating as to prevent the chief from 
performing his military role.
27
 Despite these qualifications, MacInnes‟ core point still 
stands: the physical ideal of poetry did not always align with reality, and physical 
perfection was not an absolute requirement for clan chiefs. 
Perhaps another reason that these physically impaired individuals remained chief of 
their clan was because they could still fulfil another responsibility, probably the most 
central responsibility of them all. Protection of kin and land has been identified by several 
scholars as the primary duty of a clan chief.
28
 Military prowess was an admirable and even 
necessary trait for a clan chief, yet arguably of little worth if it could not be exercised in 
the protection of the clan. A description of the inauguration of the Lords of the Isles by 
Hugh MacDonald of Sleat notes that at the final part of the ceremony the new lord was 
presented with his  
… forefather‟s sword, or some other sword, signifying his duty was to protect and 
defend them [the clan] from the incursions of their enemies in peace or war, as the 
obligations and customs of his predecessors were.
29
  
What is most striking about this passage is that the sword does not symbolise the Lord as a 
simple warrior. Instead, the Lord must be prepared to use his skill as a warrior to protect 
his people, a responsibility underscored by the allusion to his ancestors‟ successful defence 
of the clan. It is unknown if this same ritual was observed by individual clans before and 
after the dissolution of the Lordship of the Isles, but the duty of protection was 
undoubtedly given primacy. Although the Statutes of Iona of 1609 forbade the use of 
firearms in the Western Isles (apart from in domestic and hunting contexts), clan chiefs and 
their immediate retinues were still permitted to wear arms and armour, an 




                                                          
27
 My thanks to Brian Brennan for discussing this point with me. 
28
 Simms „Images of Warfare‟, 608; Campbell Letters, 12-3; Macinnes, Clanship, 2-3; MacGregor, „The 
Lament‟, 120; Cathcart, Kinship, 62-3. 
29
 HP, Vol. I, 24. 
30




An illuminating example of the nature of protection is provided by the feud 
between the Campbells and the MacGregors in mid-to-late sixteenth century. Following a 
MacGregor raid in August 1570, Cailean Campbell of Glenorchy implored the earl of 
Argyll to demonstrate his ability to protect (and avenge) his own kinsmen: 
For gif your Lordship rememberis rycht an quhen thair was maist familiaritie betuix 
your Lordship and me and maist plesand promesses maid to me be your Lordship I 
and my puir aneis [only] soun thairefter sustenit gretest skayth. Prayinge your 
Lordship haist your Lordshipis ansuer to me quhat ye will do in revenge of this 
caus that I ma tak the nixt best thairefter as God gevis me grace.
31
 
Although quick to remind his chief of his responsibilities, Campbell of Glenorchy had his 
own duty of care. Castles were used to stockpile victuals that could be distributed in times 
of need. In a letter from 18 August 1570 to Griogair MacGregor, captain of Kilchurn castle, 
Cailean Liath pledged to reimburse all the damages incurred by the MacGregor raid, and 
ordered Griogair to give food and shelter to his tenants:  
 
And gif the puir men that wantis geir dwelling onder yow be trew to yow tak thaim 
in to the place [Kilchurn castle] upoun my [ex]pensses and gif to thair wyifis and 
bairnis sum of my vituall to sustein thaim as ye think expedient. I pray yow have 
the place weill provydit with sic furnesinge as ye ma get and [spair] nother my geir 
nor yit your awin for God leuvinge ws [our] heilthis we will get geir enewche…32 
 
Kilchurn was amply stocked with supplies in anticipation of harrying, plundering, or even 
siege by the MacGregors, yet we catch a glimpse of the castle as a centre for social support, 
or as John MacInnes calls it, „a rough and rudimentary welfare system‟.33 Failure to 
provide protection could lead to a haemorrhaging of dependants towards a clan perceived 
as more powerful. This is shown earlier in 1552, when Clan MacCallum „renunciand 
MacGregour thair auld‟ chief in favour of Cailean Liath Campbell of Glenorchy, obtaining 
Campbell‟s „letter of mantenians‟ and agreeing to pledge themselves and their successors 
to his service.
34
 This coincided with Cailean Liath‟s execution of the MacGregor leader 
Donnchadh Làdasach, which must have shaken the MacCallums‟ confidence in the 
                                                          
31
 Campbell Letters, 192; NRS: GD112/39/9/21. In another letter around this time, Cailean Liath criticises 
Argyll for neglecting his duties as lord, which was a matter „wychty and rynis‟ to his „gret honour‟. See Ibid., 
179-80; NRS: GD112/39/12/13. 
32
 Ibid., 190; NRS: GD112/39/9/20. 
33
 MacInnes, „Clan Unity‟, 349. 
34
 The Black Book of Taymouth, ed. Cosmo Innes (Edinburgh, 1855), 194-5. 
38 
 




Protection clearly ranked highly in the hierarchy of a chief‟s responsibilities. In 
July 1595, a large force of around 3,000 „redshank‟ mercenaries took to the sea seemingly 
bound for Ulster but threatening to ravage lands along the west coast of Scotland. A 
panicked earl of Argyll, in a show of „great diligence‟, rushed home on horseback from 
Stirling to coordinate defensive positions.
36
 Argyll was willing to take a backseat in 
military efforts to stall the mercenaries, especially after his defeat at Glenlivet in 1594, but 




Skill and success in war clearly affected a chief‟s ability to defend his clan‟s 
interests, and there is a clear link between martial prowess and protection. An elegy for the 
Clanranald chiefs, Ailean and Raghnall, praised their „defence of [their] tribe‟ and 
protection of Scotland‟s „hospitality and high plains‟ while „dressed in a fine coat of 
mail‟.38 An ideal chief melded protection with expansion: 
Síol ailin is ésguigh náigh 
eigin an raireir do righ 
teid ar faghluibh na iath fein 
giall le bfein go hádhbhuigh nír. 
 
The prosperity of the race of Allan has quickly increased, 
 It is necessary to state that they have been ennobled; 
 All those he left of them in his own country have been free, 




In this poem, the Clanranald chief Dòmhnall (d. 1617) is praised for his aggressive action, 
but importantly he did not overextend the resources of the clan and always ensured the 
protection of his tenants.
40
 Interestingly, Dalglish has observed that the most acclaimed 
Glenorchy chiefs in the clan‟s history, the Black Book of Taymouth, were those who 
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„acquired and secured new lands, or gained influence in new territories‟.41 Expanding the 
wealth and territorial extent of the kindred was another key aspiration for a chief. A poor 
chief failed to protect his kindred and lands, while an average one maintained the status 
quo, retaining the lands he had inherited without making any gains of his own. A truly 
exceptional chief however would expand the holdings of his clan and pass them down to 
the next generation.
42
 Protection was an essential requirement that became noteworthy only 
when it was not provided; prowess in war and clan expansion by contrast were laudable 
goals, but not as essential. 
1.2: Honour in War 
The glue that bound together the chief‟s protective and martial roles was the pervasive 
honour culture inhabited by the clan elite. Honour was derived from two intertwined 
strands: the personal (the chief) and the collective (the clan). Challenging the personal 
honour of a clan chief was a direct challenge to the honour and integrity of the overall clan 
that demanded retaliation in kind.
43
 Honour relations between nobles of comparable status 
could be volatile. In the preparations before the battle of Glenlivet, the earl of Atholl 
refused to join with the royal army because he „cannot like to be commanded by Argyll‟.44 
Nevertheless, he sent his retainer, Iain Dubh, with 400 footsoldiers.
45
 Due to the close 
„interface‟ between honour and warfare, martial pursuits remained a pressing concern for 
the Scottish nobility in the sixteenth century.
46
 Defeat in battle could tarnish the personal 
honour of a clan chief, as evidenced vividly by the fifth and seventh earls of Argyll. At the 
battle of Langside on 13 May 1568, the fifth earl led the forces of Mary Queen of Scots, 
but contrary to his formidable reputation,
47
 he exhibited „nather curage nor vassalage 
[valour] at this conflict‟.48 At Glenlivet in 1594, the young seventh earl of Argyll was 
defeated by a numerically smaller army commanded by the earl of Huntly, and allegedly 
James VI „often spoke to him of the battle with derision‟.49 Although these defeats were 
clearly humiliating, the status of both earls recovered, and given the overarching 
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responsibility of protection, it may have been more shameful to repeatedly fail to protect or 
avenge injured tenants.
50
 For the Hebridean clans, their bìrlinnean or galleys held special 
meaning and worth. During the abortive 1595 mercenary campaign to Ireland, the ambush 
of the MacDonalds of Dunivaig by the English navy at the Copeland Isles cost the 
Hebrideans „many‟ men and at least two (possibly as many as five) ships.51 Their pride in 
their bìrlinnean was so great that their loss was a huge dishonour, perhaps even greater 
than the men killed: 
 
There is among the islesmen great grudge and regret for the loss of their two ships 




In purely practical terms, this was a severe blow because the bìrlinnean were valuable 
possessions, yet these ships also symbolised the largely maritime way of life in the 
Hebrides and embodied much of the island clans‟ autonomy.53 
Tied to ideas of honour, there may have been certain expectations about the „right‟ 
way to wage war. The martial rhetoric of Gaelic poetry may have been idealised, but could 
conceivably be understood as a guide to the proper way for a chief to behave in war and 
peace. One of the heroic ballads from The Book of the Dean of Lismore, „The Death of 
Oscar‟, focuses on the ars moriendi („the art of dying‟). Essentially, this ballad illustrated 
how Oscar, having been mortally wounded in battle, „died well‟ by „enduring his wounds 
and parting with his comrades‟.54 The majority of heroic ballads composed in Scotland 
between 1200 and 1600 focused on Fionn mac Cumhaill and the Fian, his roaming bands 




By juxtaposing the praiseworthy deeds of panegyric poetry with the condemnations 
of satirical poetry, we may unearth a mode of behaviour, an „uncodified custom‟,56 which 
informed the waging of war in this period.
57
 In poetry, the chief could not simply 
mastermind the campaign – he had to participate directly, shoulder-to-shoulder with his 
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men. Some poetry suggests that the clan‟s success in war was shameful if the chief himself 
was not involved: 
 
Is mithigh sgur réd mharbhnaidh, 
a shean bheathaigh bhiothcharnaigh, 
mheic Ruaidhrí ón mhúr a mach, 
fhuair ní gan lúth gan lámhach. 
 
It is time to cease thine elegy,  
thou aged animal ever fleshly,  
thou son of Roderick, from the sea-girt fortress,  




This satire by Fionnlagh Ruadh on the Clanranald chief Ailean MacRuaidhrí presents him 
as the antithesis of the athletic ideal, and his „fortress‟ of Castle Tioram is invoked to 
emphasise his sedentary nature (akin perhaps to a roi fainéant, a „do-nothing king‟). 
Another poem by Fionnlagh Ruadh, addressed to Eoin MacGregor (d. 1519), outlines the 
only honourable and lawful way of initiating acts of war: 
 
‟N uair chinned ar chomhrag, 
‟gá ghairm i gcrích námhad, 
is ris féin do thaobhaid 
i riocht géill is brághad. 
 
When men decide for combat,  
proclaiming it in foemen‟s bounds,  
it is to his side they come  




The attacking MacGregors enter the land of their enemy and signal their intention to raid, 
providing an opportunity for the enemy to give up hostages and prevent any bloodshed. 
Dishonourable behaviour would presumably have been an unannounced, merciless raid 
that offered no room for parley. Many cultures in medieval Europe marked the „transition 
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to and from war‟ through similar ritualistic patterns of behaviour, perhaps because warfare 
breached the „fundamental human taboo‟ of killing another human being.60 Signalising 
intention to raid remained a motif of poetry into the seventeenth century, as shown in this 
composition made c. 1635 by the MacLean poet Eachann Bacach to his chief Sir Lachlann 
(d. 1649): 
 
Nuair a spreagadh sibh pìob 
‟s fuaim bhur creach ga cur sìos 
gum biodh crith air an tìr an tachradh sibh. 
 
Nuiar a nochdadh sibh sròil 
ris na caol-chrannaibh stòir, 
‟s mairg a thachradh d‟a dheòin roimh‟n lasan sin. 
 
When you would start up the pipe,  
with the sound of your forays drowning it out,  
the land where you happened to be would tremble. 
 
When you would unfurl satin banners  
on the slender pointed staffs,  




Other seemingly reprehensible acts included the raiding of church buildings and attacks on 
the clergy, as shown in the already discussed satire of Ailean MacRuaidhrí. Fionnlagh 
Ruadh denounced Ailean for a litany of heinous crimes, the most egregious of which was 
the desecration of Iona monastery: 
 
Do rinn tusa, ‟s ní h-í a mháin, 
creach Íe is reilge Odhráin; 
is tú dhochann go borb ann 
cochall na n-ord ‟s na n-aifreann. 
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You carried out, and that was not all, 
the despoiling of Iona and Odhrán‟s graveyard; 
it was you who barbarously mutilated there 




Not only did Ailean plunder the monastery of Iona, but he purposefully damaged its sacred 
relic in an attempt to subvert religious worship. His staunch commitment to blasphemy and 
law-breaking is portrayed as self-destructive, with divine intervention bringing madness to 
Ailean and poverty to his clan.
63
 The inverse of this satire, the praising of a chief who 
„made no war on church‟, was a common motif intended to highlight piety.64 Perhaps the 
underlying implication of this trope is that such violence was not uncommon, and a chief 
who refused to raid churches was exceptional in his restraint. In the sixteenth century, there 
is at least one genuine example of warfare involving a church or church-ground (the battle 
of Carinish in 1601).
65
 Violence involving churches was a particularly common trope in 
clan tradition,
66
 perhaps suggesting that these incidents were not all fictitious. 
 
 An uncommonly ruthless and bloodthirsty attitude to war is found in another poem 
from The Book of the Dean of Lismore addressed to Gilleasbuig Campbell, the second earl 
of Argyll (d. 1513). This famous poem, a subject of considerable historiographical 
debate,
67
 presents a merciless and brutal vision of warfare, probably in reference to a 
prospective campaign against the Goill („foreigners‟ but probably meaning English in this 
instance) that eventually culminated in the battle of Flodden in 1513. According to this 
poem, this was to be no „gentle warfare‟ but a war of genocide.68 Argyll is encouraged to 
lead the complete eradication of the Goill, including women and children: 
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Na fréamha ó bhfuilid ag fás, 
díthigh iad, mór a bhforfhás, 
nach faighthear Gall beó dot éis, 
ná Gaillseach ann ré h-aisnéis. 
 
Loisg a mbantracht nach maith mín, 
loisg a gclannmhaicne ainmhín, 
is loisg a dtighe dubha, 
is coisg dhínn a n-anghutha. 
 
Léig le h-uisge a luaithre sin, 
i ndiaidh loisgthe dá dtaisibh; 
ná déan teóchroidhe a béo Gall, 
a eó bheóghoine anbhfann. 
 
The roots from which they grow,  
destroy them; over-great is their increase;  
so that after thee no Saxon be left in life,  
nor Saxon woman to be mentioned.     
 
Burn their womenfolk ungentle,  
burn their ungentle children;  
and burn their black houses,  
and rid us of the reproach of them. 
 
Send their ashes down the stream,  
after burning of their bodies;  
show no pity for living Saxon,  
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The above stanzas are characteristic of common tropes associated with „othering‟: the 
continued existence of the enemy is an insult that justified bloodshed („rid us of the 
reproach of them‟) and the ultimate violence involved the „purifying‟ act of the „burning of 
their bodies‟.70 The severe treatment of the Goill advocated here is largely at odds with 
most other contemporary examples that deal with warfare, for which defeat of the enemy 
in battle is generally the end-point. However, the „Flodden Poem‟, apparently composed on 
the eve of battle with the English, tapped into a widespread nationalistic spirit, and could 
be described as a brosnachadh catha, an incitement to battle.
71
 Another poem which bears 
considerable resemblance to the „Flodden poem‟ in both tone and imagery was also related 
to the same battle. Giolla Pádraig MacLachlan‟s poem to Seumas Campbell of Lawers was 
framed by Flodden, but from the bleaker perspective of its aftermath: 
 
 Mac Eoin mhir na slógh ‟s na gconnlann, 
gach ród díobhsan lomlán; 
níor léig Eoin do shíoradh Dubhghall, 
fear díola duan dtromdhámh. 
  
The son of fierce John of hosts and companies,  
each road is filled with them;  
John ceased not from chasing Saxons,  




The enormous human cost of Flodden, including King James IV himself, levelled the 
Scottish political establishment. Seumas‟ father, Iain, was among those killed at the battle, 
as was the second earl of Argyll.
73
 Although the poem elides any explicit mention of the 
heavy defeat,
74
 it has a bitter, even retributive tone that urges Seumas to attack the Goill as 
a matter of honour. The contingent circumstances of these two poems – one of which is an 
incitement to war and the other a call for vengeance – probably explains the extreme nature 
of their vision of warfare, which is generally not reflective of other poetic evidence or 
indeed the actual conduct of Highland soldiers in war, as shown in Chapter 4. 
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1.3: Ritualism and Youth 
A famous passage from Martin Martin‟s A Description of the Western Isles of Scotland 
(1703) suggests that a strong sense of ritual and ceremony pervaded the martial culture of 
the West Highlands and Isles:  
 
Every Heir, or young Chieftain of a Tribe, was oblig‟d in Honour to give a publick 
Specimen of his Valour, before he was own‟d an‟d declar‟d Governor or Leader of 
his people, who obey‟d and follow‟d him upon all Occasions.  
 
This Chieftain was usually attended with a retinue of young Men of Quality, who 
had not beforehand given any Proof of their Valour, and were ambitious of such an 
Opportunity to signalize themselves. 
 
It was usual for the Captain to lead them, to make a desperate Incursion upon some 
Neighbour or other that they were in Feud with; and they were oblig‟d to bring by 
open force the Cattel they found in the Lands they attack‟d, or to die in the Attempt.  
 
After the Performance of this Achievement, the young Chieftain was ever after 
reputed valiant and worthy of Government, and such as were of his Retinue 
acquir‟d the like Reputation. This Custom being reciprocally us‟d among them, was 
not reputed Robbery, for the Damage which one Tribe sustain‟d by this Essay of 





As discussed in Chapter 2, there is evidence to suggest that ritualised, inaugural raids were 
indeed part of the fabric of clan society, and functioned as a „graduation ceremony‟ from 
the clan‟s military „school‟.76 Martin concedes that this „Practice‟ had not been recorded 
„for these sixty Years past‟, and thus by his reckoning, the last ritual cattle raid took place 
c.1640,
77
 which may correlate with events such as the 1645 raid of Moyness by young 
warriors of the Clan Cameron.
78
 Brown has observed an analogous proclivity towards 
ceremonial violence among the aristocratic youth of both the Highlands and the Lowlands. 
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Young noblemen in the Lowlands were encouraged by their fathers to „earn their stripes‟ 
and enhance their family‟s honour, and often „acted on impulse…with a bravado [that] was 
extremely dangerous in this kind of society‟.79 He argues that these individuals were often 
at the „epicentre‟ of violence during the sixteenth century.80 This ritualised violence may 
be linked even more broadly to the arguably universal concept of the rite of passage. 
Forays provided the heir or newly inaugurated chief with a platform from which he 
could demonstrate his martial prowess and consequent worthiness to rule. Simms has 
claimed that in Gaelic Ireland the chief was expected to be at the forefront of the raid and 
exhibit „reckless bravery‟ or even „suicidal eagerness‟,81 which resonates with Martin‟s 
description of inaugural raids in the Highlands. Victims of a raid may have endured the 
ransacking of their lands more easily in the knowledge that their own chief would soon 
respond with a counter-attack, an idea perhaps given voice in an elegy to Dòmhnall (d. 
1617) the Clanranald chief: 
 …an ttiobhradh sin dfoghladh e 
 do fholuigh se treibh dha thi 
 
 All that had been plundered from him 




Raids were not so ritualised or innocuous that the aggrieved relented entirely willingly, as 
even Martin notes that there was a chance the attackers would „die in the Attempt‟.83 
According to Martin, if the raid was successful, the chief and his „retinue of young Men of 
Quality‟ no longer had anything to prove, at least in terms of martial ability.84 The clear 
encouragement of young men to prove their martial worth suggests that the succession of a 
new chief was intended to usher in a fresh generation of warriors for the clan, many of 
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Hot-headed behaviour by young clansmen was considered extremely conventional 
by contemporaries. In March 1591, John Auchinross, the secretary of Lachlann Mòr 
MacLean of Duart, claimed that the „young and loose men in the west isles, Kintyre, 
Argyle and other places will be readily allured‟ by the promise of money to aid the 
rebellion of Ó Néill and Ó Domhnaill in Ireland.
86
 In a letter to the English diplomat 
Robert Bowes from 4 July
 
1595, MacLean himself described the MacLeods of Lewis and 
the MacLeods of Harris as „young men of high spirit, desirous to “acqwent thame” in wars 
and receiving great gains‟.87 This reinforces the idea that young men felt an urge to 
experience war, not just to gain riches but to prove themselves as warriors. Importantly, 
MacLean is defending, not criticising, the MacLeods‟ motivations, and actually 
recommends them for future service with the English crown. This suggests that these 
youthful aspirations were considered entirely acceptable in elite society in the Highlands 
and also that MacLean expected this to be readily understood by the English. 
1.4: Military Leadership 
On occasion clan chiefs would delegate military affairs to their sons. In 1555, the earl of 
Argyll sent his son, Gilleasbuig, on campaign in Ireland,
88
 and in 1595, Aonghas 
MacDonald of Dunivaig sent his son to overwinter with the Irish chiefs.
89
 This may have 
become more common as chiefs aged, allowing them to retreat from intensive military 
activity whilst simultaneously providing potential successors with vital experience. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that delegation did not stop at military affairs and that chiefs 
could bequeath the overall management of clan affairs to his heir.
90
 As MacGregor has 
suggested, surrogate military leaders were occasionally used in the Highlands and Isles, 
although arguably the most famous example, Dòmhnall Ballach (d. 1476), was active 
earlier than our period.
91
 Apart from the aforementioned elevation of a chief‟s son (which 
is arguably a different phenomenon), there are relatively few examples of the surrogate in 
our period,
92
 and MacGregor‟s three examples of surrogacy in war from 1601, 1603, and 
1614-15 are somewhat problematic.
93
 In 1601, Alasdair, the brother of Ruairidh Mòr 
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MacLeod of Harris, led his clan‟s forces against an invasion by Dòmhnall Gorm 
MacDonald of Sleat, yet this was out of pure necessity as Ruairidh was absent in Argyll.
94
 
This was a crisis in which someone had to take responsibility, a rather different scenario to 
a nominated surrogate in military affairs. In 1603, MacGregor of Glenstrae‟s brother Iain 
Dubh does appear to have played a pivotal role in the battle of Glen Fruin, but his brother 
and chief Alasdair was also active in the battle.
95
 In these examples from 1601 and 1603, 
the brother of the chief seems to have acted as a trusted lieutenant and second-in-command, 
rather than a military surrogate. A late example of the surrogate may be Colla Ciotach, 
who was certainly the „driving force‟ behind the early stages of the „Islay Rising‟ under 
Aonghas Òg in 1614.
96
 Yet his later actions suggest that he was an independent operator 
not a loyal „right-hand man‟, as shown when he betrayed Sir Seumas in the final moments 
of the rising.
97
 As Sir Seumas was a capable military leader in his own right, his 
relationship with Colla more closely resembles a loose alliance of near equals rather than a 
chief/surrogate scenario. 
 
More striking than military surrogacy is how often chiefs would personally lead 
military campaigns in this period, most vividly evidenced by the fact that several chiefs 
died in battle: Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat (d. c. 1540);
98
 Hugh or Ùisdean Fraser 
of Lovat (d. 1544); and Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart (d. 1598).
99
 The mercenary 
campaigns to Ireland in 1594 and 1595 also illustrate the extent of chiefs‟ involvement. In 
these years, MacDonald of Dunivaig, MacDonald of Sleat, the captain of Clanranald, and 
MacLeod of Harris all led their clan contingents across the North Channel, although the 
Clanranald captain was ambushed by MacLean of Duart before he left Scotland. This may 
stem from societal expectations of the chief‟s military role: some were young men with 
something to prove (MacLeod of Harris and the captain of Clanranald), while others were 
experienced veterans in their prime (MacDonald of Sleat and MacDonald of Dunivaig). 
Additionally, the chiefs may have wanted personal control of the payment for their service 
or to use the campaign to cultivate diplomatic links with the Irish chiefs. Beyond a strict 
military role, they may have even felt obliged to oversee these campaigns as protector and 
provider of the clan. Various motivating factors caused chiefs to campaign in Ireland, yet 
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the very fact of their personal involvement indicates that these military operations were 
regarded as a matter of primacy in clan affairs. 
1.5: Martial Recreation and Hunting 
Thus far it may appear that young men dominated the martial culture of the Highlands and 
Isles, but militarism was not the sole reserve of the youth. A lively martial culture was 
broadly engendered by chiefs to maintain fitness, martial proficiency, and esprit de corps 
in times of war and peace. In his letter to Henry VIII, John Elder claimed that the Highland 
Scots „delite and pleasure...in rynninge, leapinge, swymmynge, shootynge, and thrawinge 
of dartis‟.100 The Clan Fraser history claims that the chief Ùisdean (d. 1544) was a „great 
hunter and a man of the field, lovd sport, and tooke pleasur to train his men exactly at 
sword and bow, the onely arms then in use‟.101 Ùisdean‟s grandson and namesake 
maintained this dedication to training, but pioneered an element of communal competition.  
During his youth, Ùisdean visited his mother, Jean Campbell, and her new husband, 
Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat, in Skye: 
…there he learned to be a bowman, and in a short time few or none could compeat 
or cop with him in arching, either at buts, bowmarks, or roaving, and perhaps 
afterwards had the better of some who gloried much and were masters in that manly 
art, which now is wearing away by degrees, and the gun takeing place.
102
 
So impressive was Ùisdean‟s skill and dedication to the practice of archery that by his 
„example all the country turnd expert in arching…and he oblidged every parish to have 
their bowmarks, and set dayes of game, and himself went in circuit to see it put in 
practice‟.103 These public competitions had several purposes, not least the provision of 
entertainment for the wider kindred.
104
 No matter how recreational Hugh‟s motivations 
may have been, these competitions amounted to training in a deadly weapon, and were 
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Martial recreation and competition extended to hunting, a ubiquitous practice 
among the elite that was often couched in military language. As Andrew Wiseman has 
recently demonstrated, there was an indissoluble connection between hunting and warfare 
within Gaelic society, a link substantiated by copious evidence from contemporary poetry 
and West Highland sculpture.
106
 The two activities clearly complemented and informed 
each other, with hunting acting as a prelude to (or interlude between) open conflict with 
human foes – a „further, and greater, happening‟.107 Hunting was considered a „noble sport‟ 
across Scotland and Europe,
108
 and in Basilikon Doron, James VI offered sparing praise for 
hawking because it did not „resembleth the warres so neere as hunting doeth, in making a 
man hardie, and skilfully ridden in all grounds‟.109 Alasdair Crotach MacLeod of Harris‟ 
tomb in St Clement‟s Church in Rodel depicts a hunting scene in which the chief is fully 
equipped for war.
110
 In a letter written in August 1595 to the English diplomat Robert 
Bowes, Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart expressed his eagerness to be deployed against Ó 
Néill and Ó Domhnaill in Ireland on behalf of Queen Elizabeth by likening his prospective 
military campaign to the hunt: 
 
I am here in Argyle at pastime and hunting with the Earl [of Argyll]. I have respect 




This interplay was noted as early as 1527, when Hector Boece argued that the Highlanders‟ 
penchant for hunting was part of a strict regimen which maintained physical fitness in the 
interval between military campaigns.
112
 The relationship between hunting and warfare is 
perhaps best understood as essentially representing the same pursuit but in different arenas 
of conflict: hunting was conflict against animals, war was conflict against man. 
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A poem from The Book of the Dean of Lismore composed for Maol Coluim, chief 
of Clan Gregor from 1415-1440, further underscores this connection: 
 
Cungbhálach na coimhshealga 
Mac Griogóir as garg daoine; 
níor mhionca coin chroidhearga 
go longphort Clainne Baoisgne. 
 
Líon troda do thóiseachaibh 
éirghidh leis i ló catha; 
fíor íota ar óirshleaghaibh 
‟gá lucht tighe san dtachar. 
 
Ceannas feadhna is féitheamhnas, 
coitchoinn is clú dá chineadh, 
ar beirn ghaisgidh ghléidhearbhas 
Mac Griogóir grádh na bhfileadh. 
 
Maintainer of the joint hunt is  
MacGregor whose men are fierce;  
not oftener did hounds red with gore  
enter the encampment of Clann Baoisgne.  
 
A full battle-complement of captains  
goeth out with him in day of strife;  
right thirsty are the golden spears  
of his household in the encounter. 
 
Captaincy and protection  
(it bringeth glory to all his tribe alike)  
MacGregor, loved of poets,  
clearly shows in valour‟s gap.113 
 
                                                          
113
 Scottish Verse, 28-31. 
53 
 
In this poem, hunting is so closely aligned with warfare that the two activities are nearly 
indistinguishable. The poet‟s aristocratic audience would immediately recognise the 
martial connotations and practical military application signified by hunting. A possible 
consequence of this close association was the conflation of expectations of a chief in 
hunting and war. This may be evidenced in the final stanza quoted above, which 
highlighted the concept of „valour‟s gap‟.114 In hunting, this was a moment of high drama 
and danger, in which a chief tested his courage by attempting to kill a deer „head-on in a 
very public display of…machismo‟.115 This potentially deadly encounter suggests that 
chiefs were prepared to risk life and limb in order to prove their martial prowess. Wiseman 
assessed the above stanza solely in regard to hunting, yet as mentioned, the surrounding 
detail may suggest „valour‟s gap‟ applied to a military context – Maol Coluim departed in 
„day of strife‟, or perhaps, „day of battle‟.116 From the militaristic imagery of the hunt in 
this poem, it may be inferred that a chief was expected to perform similar acts of daring 
and bravado in warfare, akin to „valour‟s gap‟. 
The hunt was much more than a simple surrogate for warfare however. As an 
exclusive right of the aristocracy, the ability to hunt freely within a given area signified 
lordship and control. Early Irish law stipulated that a chief would lose his honour-price if 
he hunted without a retinue,
117
 and from a broader perspective, Beaver has argued that the 
„carefully orchestrated violence‟ of the hunt was a practical reinforcement of the 
established social order and hierarchy.
118
 Moreover, there was a clear economic function to 
the hunt, in which a successful hunt allowed the chief to act as a provider and protector of 
his clan by laying on a feast.
119
 Although the military connotations of the hunt are obvious, 
there were other practical reasons to engage in this activity. 
1.6: The Role of the Castle 
The central hub of a clan‟s territory was the chief‟s castle or stronghold. In recent years, 
there has been increasing recognition of the „military overstatement‟ in studies of the castle. 
These structures had various purposes beyond their martial role and were understood by 
                                                          
114
 Ibid., 28-31. 
115
 Wiseman, Chasing the Deer, 32. 
116
 Ibid. Watson translates „catha‟ as „strife‟, but „cath‟ fundamentally means „battle‟. This may simply 
underline the intrinsic military nature of the hunt, but could indicate a battle with human foes. See Edward 
Dwelly, Faclair Gàidhlig (Edinburgh, 2001), 173. 
117
 Fergus Kelly, A Guide to Early Irish Law (Dublin, 1988), 19. In 1703, Martin Martin noted that the 
„chieftain [was] usually attended with a numerous Retinue when he goes a hunting the Deer, this being his 
first Specimen of manly Exercise‟. See Martin, Description, 107. 
118
 Daniel C. Beaver, Hunting and the Politics of Violence before the English Civil War (Cambridge, 2008), 
17. 
119
 Dodgshon, Chiefs to Landlords, 84-7. 
54 
 
contemporaries as symbolising lordship and territorial control, while functioning as daily 
residences for local lords.
120
 Significantly, in Scottish Gaelic poetry, the castle is 
predominantly featured as a venue for lavish feasts, rather than as a military base or the site 
of a destructive siege. Although this could stem from the poet‟s position as household 
entertainer rather than warrior, Simms has argued that chiefs could modify the message of 
a poem depending on how they wished to be represented.
121
 This suggests that they 
preferred to be depicted as generous hosts rather than fearsome besiegers of strongholds. A 
poem addressed to Eoin MacGregor (d. 1519) presents a gregarious image of a chief‟s 
household: 
 
Fhuras mo rogha theach mhór, 
i mbí na cliara ag comhól... 
 
Neirtghníomhradh a chon ‟s a shluagh 
is meinic le Eoin armruadh : 
a h-aithle na sealg ón teach 
gach faithche dearg ón fhiadhach. 
 
Mar soin dh‟fhág na saoir ar chóir 
bruidhean chúplach Mheic Ghriogóir, 
gan locht saoirse ré ar linn 
ar dtocht dhaoibhse ar a h-árainn. 
 
Fíon ‟gá ibhe ag mnáibh malla, 
Mheic Ghriogóir, id mhórthalla : 
id bhrugh tréan fairsing, ar linn, 
céir ar lasadh go h-ursainn... 
 
Fairsing dá thaobh do thaighe, 
líonmhor a lucht comhnaidhe : 
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ríoghól na gcéad ar a lár, 
mór do théad is do sheandán. 
 
I have found of houses my choice supreme, a house  
wherein the poet-bands are wont to feast… 
  
Mighty deeds by his hounds and his hosts  
are frequent with red-weaponed John;
122
  
when hunting is made from the house,  
the hunt leaves every greensward red. 
 
Thus did the masons leave aright  
the coupled house of MacGregor,  
nor is there any lack of masonry in our time,  
since thou has come to its demesne. 
 
Wine is drunk by stately dames,  
MacGregor, in thy spacious hall;  
in thy wide firm mansion, as I deem,  
wax is ablaze even to the door-post… 
 
Wide are thy house‟s two sides;  
many are they who dwell therein;  
a royal banquet for hundreds is on its floor;  




MacGregor‟s castle undoubtedly functioned as a muster point for his military forces, but 
his household is the site of all kinds of activity: hunting parties depart from the castle gates, 
poet-bands and other visitors are constantly passing through, and Eoin hosts bounteous 
feasts with hundreds of guests. Thus this poem presents an image of merriment rather than 
militarism. A repetitive but insightful poem by Feilimidh MacDougall outlines all that the 
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poet finds „not good‟, and by reversing these proclamations we can ascertain what is 
„good‟.124 Again the hosting-and-hunting aspect of a castle is paramount:  
 
…ní math caisléan gan mheadhar, 
ní math dearmad chon toighe… 
 
…ní math aolchloch gan talla. 
 
…not good a castle without merriment,  
not good to neglect the household dogs… 
 




One contemporary poem suggests that the chief‟s castle was quite literally a living entity. 
Lamenting the death of Eoin MacDougall of Dunollie, the poem states:  
 
D‟éis uí Cholla na gcuach n-óir 
mar thá na tír, truagh na tíormór; 
traothadh ar tuireadh ní fhuil, 
saothadh a ndún ‟s a ndúthaigh. 
 
Alas! How the death of Colla‟s descendant of golden goblets  
has left the land; sad is the mainland;  
abatement of lament there is none;  




Without the lifeblood provided by the chief‟s vibrant feasts, the castle and land slowly 
weaken and die. The fate of the castle was bound inextricably to the chief and vice versa, 
and as argued by Dodgshon, if the „chief lived well then so did the clan‟.127 The liveliness 
of the chief‟s castle could therefore measure clan prosperity at a glance. Poems that detail 
lavish feasts may implicitly celebrate the martial prowess of the host, as only chiefs who 
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protected their food reserves could afford to lay on such opulent festivities.
128
 Some poetry 
directly correlated successful cattle raids or victories in battle with subsequent celebratory 
banquets hosted by the chief at his stronghold using the spoils of war.
129
 Feasts could 
therefore symbolise success in war, and on a more prosaic level, the celebratory feast also 
fostered and maintained morale among the warrior elite of the clan. 
 
Some poetry directly links the castle to warfare, yet such allusions are rare and 
often abstract, again emphasising that there are limits to the military ethos of society.
130
 
The castle as a mustering point is a motif used in the elegy for Donnchadh Campbell (d. 
1631): 
 
Iarla Abhuill is Iarla Drumonn 
diúcfhuil Mhoráigh, mór an dáimh; 
sgach glún da n-gargshlógh ‟na n-deaghaidh 
gu múr ardmhór Bhealaich bháin. 
 
The Earl of Atholl and the Earl of Drummond,  
the ducal blood of Moray, great the train;  
and each knee of their fierce hosts behind them  




The poem goes on to relate a feast of „mílidh meardha/brisk warriors‟ at Balloch, 
suggesting that these festivities were a prelude or epilogue to military activity. An elegy to 
the Clanranald chief Dòmhnall (d. 1617) conjures an abstract image of military activity at a 
castle: 
 Smúal ro bhras dod ghormloinn ghéir 
 a Dhomhnaill fa dhoras dúin 
 ceilter ré os cholbha cúain 
 do chuaidh dé na foghla fúibh. 
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A spark flew from thy sharp blue sword, 
O Donald, at the fort‟s gate; 
The moon is hidden above the banks of the coasts, 




Overall however, it is clear that castles were not viewed purely as military structures in the 
West Highlands and Isles, which resonates with new research about their function 
elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it appears likely that they did function as both a 
military base and a venue for social bonding for the chief and the warrior elite. 
1.7: Conclusion 
Among the elite, the militarisation of Gaelic society was profound but not all-
encompassing. The elite of society inhabited a martial culture that regarded warfare and 
militarism as a natural, even necessary aspect of lordship, a view that permeated through 
poetry, sculpture, and personal action. Indeed, the prevailing image of the contemporary 
male, as shown by both sculpture and poetry, was that of a warrior, yet this was mirrored 
by noble culture elsewhere in medieval and early modern Europe. Moreover, this image of 
the warrior could also symbolise lordship and the protective aura of the chief. The 
continuing influence of heroic literature, like the Ulster Cycle, potentially maintained 
warlike aspirations and affinities in the Highlands, which, when coupled with deeply held 
views of honour and dishonour, could provoke conflict. Nevertheless, honour culture 
placed theoretical restrictions on bloodshed by inculcating a sense of the „right‟ way to 
wage war. The worldview of the elite must have been shared, at least partly, with those 
lower down the social scale, especially through martial displays such as hunting, and the 
broad participation in warfare across most social classes, as will be shown in Chapter 3. 
Clan leaders and their retinues clearly felt the burden of societal expectations about the 
martial prowess of the elite, and as a consequence, they often became directly involved in 
military campaigns. 
Although a chief was undoubtedly expected to be a capable military leader, the 
paramount concern of clan society was his ability to protect his clan and lands. After all, 
what good was a warrior-chief who failed to protect his clan? All other responsibilities 
flowed outwards from the central principle of protection, and in this way, chiefs were 
distinguished from petty warlords whilst still inhabiting a mental world largely defined by 
war.
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Chapter 2: Causation of Warfare 
A frequent refrain of Lowland literati from the sixteenth century was that the people of the 
Highlands were innately bellicose: 
…men of the Highland…are not less, but rather much more, prompt to 
fight…because, born as they are in the mountains and dwellers in forests, their very 
nature is more combative….war rather than peace is their natural condition.1  
Some modern writers have broadly accepted the view that warfare and feuding in the 
Highlands was „more intense‟ than the rest of Scotland because the „land was hilly and the 
king remote‟.2 Relatively little work has been conducted into the causation of warfare in 
the West Highlands and Isles, which has perhaps allowed stereotypes of the „warlike‟ 
Highlanders to proliferate for longer than they should. This chapter will demonstrate that 
warfare was generally waged in the region for specific reasons and towards specific goals. 
Although the martial culture of the Highlands may have inculcated a certain propensity for 
violence, war was not the natural state of Highlanders and Islanders. As MacGregor has 
observed, a recurrent and perhaps „predominant‟ cause of armed conflict was „right – to 
land, chiefship, and lordship‟.3 When these core rights were perceived to have been 
violated or challenged, warfare could be exerted in response. This chapter begins with an 
assessment of these „rights-based‟ causes of war, before discussing other key motivations 
including honour, government policy, magnate rivalries, mercenary culture, and religion.  
In 1986, Brown analysed feuding culture from a broad Scottish perspective and 
often adopted a quantitative approach to causes and origins of conflict.
4
  Defining a single 
cause for conflict, whether feuding or war, is often an oversimplification as an array of 
contingent factors were generally involved in outbreaks of warfare. Although the different 
causes discussed below represent a rough hierarchy of importance in terms of the causes of 
war, it should again be emphasised that few conflicts can be distilled down to one single 
catalyst.  
2.1: Land Disputes 
Conflicting rights to land were perhaps the most common cause of violence in the West 
Highlands and Isles. Disputes often went unresolved for decades, creating enduring tension. 
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As explored in Chapter 5, a near century-long dispute over Glenelg was contested between 
the MacLeods of Harris and the Frasers, and later drew in the Clanranald and the 
Campbells of Auchinbreck. Simmering tension existed between the MacDonalds of Sleat 
and the MacLeods of Harris over the lands of Trotternish in Skye (as discussed in Chapter 
7), and the Camerons and Mackintoshes over Glen Loy and Loch Arkaig,
5
 while the 
MacDonalds of Dunivaig and MacLeans of Duart fought over the Rhinns of Islay for much 
of the second half of the sixteenth century. All of these disputes eventually escalated into 
reciprocal violence and bloodfeuds. Once the vendetta took precedence, the issue of land 
was easily obscured and downplayed, but it was probably the principal catalyst for the 
initial violence in these cases. Brown has claimed that Blàr Tràigh Ghruinneart in 1598, 
the culmination of the feud between the MacDonalds and MacLeans, was an example of 
„casual and explosive‟ violence caused by the „universal carrying of weapons‟ within 
Scottish society,
6
 but this ignores the backdrop of enduring tension over control of Islay.  
Landholding could be justified through a number of different and often opposing 
concepts. Firstly, còir a’ chlaidhimh (or „sword right‟) was a form of lordship based on 
sheer strength of arms.
7
 In 1549, Dean Monro observed that the isles of Raasay and South 
Rona rightfully belonged „be heritage‟ to the Bishop of the Isles, but were held „be the 
sword‟ by MacGille-Chaluim on behalf of MacLeod of Lewis.8 Furthermore, Monro noted 
that the castle in Loch Gorm on Islay pertained to the MacDonalds of Dunivaig „of auld, 
now usurpit‟ by MacLean of Duart.9 The second form of landholding was the Scottish 
concept of „kindly tenants‟, i.e. the hereditary right of tenants to continuously occupied 
land.
10
 This was somewhat similar to the more complex Gaelic concept of dùthchas: 
attachment to land or „unity between land, people, and culture‟.11 Macinnes has argued that 
clan attempts to „align‟ oighreachd, a third form of landholding based on charter grants 
and titles, with their dùthchas „created the grounds for feuding‟, but his interpretation of 
the latter term as „heritable trusteeship‟ is somewhat oversimplified.12 Warfare could be 
sparked by conflicting claims based on còir a’ chlaidhimh, „kindlieness‟, dùthchas, or 
oighreachd, with force of arms occasionally being the deciding factor in these debates. For 
example, the contest over the Rhinns of Islay between the MacDonalds of Dunivaig and 
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MacLean of Duart was eventually settled in battle in 1598 when the two sides failed to 
negotiate a settlement. In the talks before the battle, MacLean claimed his right stemmed 
from „ane new lease and right be the Kings Controller‟, while MacDonald invoked „ancient 
right, title and possesioune‟. MacDonald then reportedly offered that eight of his „friends‟ 
and eight of MacLean‟s party should „meet betwixt the armies to decerne to whome those 
lands of the Rinnis were most kindlie‟. Knowing that the terms of this mediation were 




The government could cause or exacerbate land disputes through confusing and 
contradictory charter grants. Trotternish in Skye, for example, underwent a series of grants 
to various clans between 1495 and 1507, with the inevitable consequence of land 
disputes.
14
 Similarly, McLean has suggested that the MacLeans and the MacDonalds both 
held valid charters to the same lands on Islay.
15
 The loss or deliberate destruction of 
charters held by clans could aggravate these conflicts.
16
 Throughout the sixteenth century, 
the MacLeods of Harris‟ claim to the lands of Glenelg was contested by the Clan Fraser, 
and latterly the Clanranald. The legal basis of the MacLeods‟ case was seriously 
undermined by the disappearance of their instrument of sasine during the internecine 
dispute that erupted after the death of their chief Uilleam in 1551. Argyll, the sponsor of 
Uilleam‟s successor Tormod, was reportedly furious, and warned the new MacLeod chief 
that his „negligence…would caus ye Lord Lowett [to] steale fray all ye petendit richt and 
entris‟ to the lands of Glenelg.17 With no legal challenge forthcoming from MacLeod, the 
Clan Fraser and the Clanranald were free to hold Glenelg by force. Loss of charters 
severely inhibited legal recourse, almost necessitating military retaliation in the event of 
the occupation of their lands. Of course, the viability of còir a’ chlaidhimh was dependent 
upon the relative strength of the parties involved, and if a kindred could not (or would not) 
challenge militarily, their lands could be occupied for decades, as shown by the 
MacLachlans‟ „violent occupation‟ of the Lamonts‟ lands of Auchenahall for around forty 
years,
18
 and the Clanranald‟s occupation of Glenelg from the mid-sixteenth century.19  
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Land disputes were more overtly tied to ideas of honour than other causes of war 
because land was „never viewed simply as an economic resource, but…as the essential 
foundation of all noble power‟.20 It was therefore extremely dishonourable for a chief or 
noble to lose „any part of the territorial core‟ that had been acquired by his ancestors.21 
Certain core estates were considered „inalienable‟.22 In the dispute between Lachlann Mòr 
MacLean of Duart and Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig in 1598, the ancestors of both 
chiefs had inhabited parts of Islay.
23
 Given that Islay had been the heartland of the 
MacDonalds for centuries, stretching back to the Lordship of the Isles, the prospect of 
losing the island to MacLean may have been so shameful for Sir Seumas as to be almost 
unbearable. This view was encapsulated by Sir Seumas in 1615 when Islay was later 
granted to Campbell of Cawdor:  




2.2: Succession and Inheritance  
A period of general instability and uncertainty tended to follow the installation of a new 
chief, prompting internal leadership challenges or external incursions by rival clans. 
Uncles, younger sons, or illegitimate offspring were often poised to challenge for the 
leadership of the clan, perhaps due to the endurance of the principle of tanistry in the 
Highlands and Isles.
25
 In comparison to primogeniture, the other main mode of succession, 
it is often thought that tanistry caused more immediate turmoil upon the death of a chief, as 
leadership contests were legitimised by the practice. Primogeniture, however, carried its 
own negative implications: a clan could face a long, unstable minority, and additionally, 
younger sons of clan leaders with little prospect of land inheritance could be forced to turn 
to banditry.
26
 Bannerman has suggested that the two principles may have been strategically 
used in different circumstances, with tanistry being employed in chiefship succession, 
while primogeniture was standard in land succession.
27
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Prime examples of the instability and low level warfare caused by succession are 
provided by the two branches of the MacLeods, Harris and Lewis. The death of Uilleam 
MacLeod of Harris in 1551 initiated a decade-long violent struggle for the chiefship of the 
clan.
28
 Later in the century, the MacLeods of Lewis were internally divided by a prolonged 
contest between two rival heirs to the chiefship, as discussed below. In some cases, 
leadership challenges occurred for good reason, and the removal of an incompetent chief 
was seen as a necessary step for the welfare of the wider clan. As shown in Chapter 6, the 
killing of Sir Umfra Colquhoun of Luss by his younger brother Iain in 1592 appears to 
have been motivated not by jealous desire for inheritance and control, but from a lack of 
faith in his brother‟s haphazard leadership. 
 
The prevalence of secular or irregular marriage in the Highlands and Isles was a 
recipe for internecine strife, as shown vividly by the situation within the Clanranald in 
1577.29 Additionally, the collapse of the MacLeods of Lewis in the early seventeenth 
century, although undoubtedly exacerbated by the attempted colonisation of Lewis by the 
Fife Adventurers,30 was hastened by the clan‟s „partial implosion‟ in the 1560s and 1580s 
through a succession crisis caused by irregular marriage.31 After the breakdown of his first 
marriage c. 1541 to Janet, the daughter of MacKenzie of Kintail, Ruairidh MacLeod of 
Lewis disowned his eldest son, Torcuil Conanach, as illegitimate due to Janet‟s infidelity. 
Ruairidh then married Barbara Stewart, daughter of Lord Avondale, and soon named their 
son, Torcuil Oighre („the heir‟), as his heir.32 When Torcuil Oighre died at sea in 1566, a 
leadership challenge emerged, with Torcuil Conanach supported by his grandfather, 
Coinneach MacKenzie of Kintail. Ruairidh was captured, imprisoned, and forced to name 
Torcuil Conanach as his rightful heir. The dispute erupted again in 1585, when Ruairidh 
again dismissed Torcuil Conanach‟s right to succeed him as chief, naming in his stead 
Torcuil Dubh, a son begot from his third marriage, to a daughter of MacLean of Duart. 
This fresh controversy divided the MacLeods into two factions, and intermittent violence 
resulted in the death of several of Ruairidh‟s sons on both sides of the divide. Ruairidh 
remained clan chief until his death in 1596, but his named successor, Torcuil Dubh, was 
then challenged once again by Torcuil Conanach. A retaliatory raid launched by Torcuil 
Dubh on Torcuil Conanach caused the former to be denounced as a rebel by the Privy 
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Council (probably at the instigation of MacKenzie of Kintail, Torcuil Conanach‟s 
grandfather). Torcuil Dubh was then captured and executed by MacKenzie in 1597, but his 
cause was upheld by his three sons and his brother, Niall.33 This lasting upheaval 
fundamentally weakened the clan from within, and before it could regroup, the external 
challenge of the Fife Adventurers was brought to bear. As the eldest son, Torcuil Conanach 
would have felt entitled to succeed his father. Illegitimacy was not necessarily considered a 
barrier to leadership in the Highlands and Isles, although on this occasion it was the 
pretence Ruairidh required to disown his son. The most distinguished example of an 
illegitimate son rising high within a clan was Iain Muideartach, chief of the Clanranald, a 
position achieved by both merit and birth. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Iain was 
legitimised by the government in 1531, and it may suggest that this would have further 
secured his position in the eyes of the wider clan. Indeed, Iain‟s illegitimacy may well have 
been one basis for Raghnall Gallda‟s leadership challenge in the 1540s.34 
 
Even the benign intentions of a standard marriage alliance could create unrest some 
years later. For example, in early 1546, Lachlann MacLachlan and Gilleasbuig Campbell 
of Auchinbreck launched a joint legal bid to gain possession of Iain Lamont‟s „Intres‟ 
[landed estate] of Inveryne by petitioning the Lords of Council. Their maternal grandfather 
was Iain of Inveryne (d. 1500-08), uncle of the incumbent Lamont chief, and Iain (the elder) 
had two daughters: one married Lachlann‟s father, the other Gilleasbuig‟s father Dubhghall. 
In court, the Lords of Council favoured Iain Lamont due to his possession of a charter from 
James V. The MacLachlans and the Campbells, unhappy with the legal outcome, then 
employed violence to further their claim, killing Gilleasbuig Lamont of Stillaig, the brother 
of Iain the chief, in a raid in May 1546.
35
 Small-scale raiding and occasional killings 
continued in Cowal for at least a generation.
36
 As explored in Chapter 8, a similar situation 
led to recurring internecine feuds within the Clan Cameron in 1569 and 1612-3, as the 
progeny of Eòghann and Iain Dubh, the younger sons of Eòghann mac Ailein (d. 1546), 
born of his second marriage, challenged the chiefships of his grandson Dòmhnall Dubh and 
great-grandson Ailean. Their claims first led to the murder of Dòmhnall Dubh in 1569, and 
then later resulted in Ailean ambushing and killing 20 of his opponents in 1613. 
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As shown in Chapter 1, honour, both personal and clan, was a paramount concern in the 
Highlands and Isles. Much like their Lowland counterparts,
37
 the Gaelic elite was 
extremely sensitive to perceived slights, especially to their reputation. According to Hugh 
MacDonald, at a feast held by the Lord of the Isles in the fifteenth century, three of his 
guests – MacLean of Duart, MacLeod of Harris, and MacNeill of Barra – „went out in a 
rage‟ vowing vengeance after Iain MacDonald, tutor to the Clanranald heir, bade them to 
„sit as they please‟ because they were „upstarts‟ with pedigrees of dubious provenance.38 
This was a particularly offensive insult in a culture that venerated lineage, history, and 
ancestry.
39
 According to Hugh MacDonald, MacLeod of Harris ravaged the Clanranald‟s 
lands of Moidart on his homeward journey and the two clans were „never [again] intimate 
or in good terms‟.40 Perhaps the most notable example of honour relations instigating 
conflict from our immediate time period is the feud between the MacLeods of Harris and 
the MacDonalds of Sleat. As detailed in Chapter 7, conflict was initiated by the repudiation 
of Màiri MacLeod, the sister of Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod of Harris, by her husband 
Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat. Oral tradition has probably embellished the nature of 
the incident,
41
 but there can be no doubt that the humiliation struck deep at the heart of the 
MacLeods‟ sense of clan honour. While the repudiation may alone have been sufficient 
catalyst, the fraught relations of the two clans in previous years must have contributed to 
the ire that was kindled in 1601. Additionally, it is easy to overlook the fact that 
MacDonald of Sleat may have felt his own personal honour had been insulted when 
MacLeod of Harris, his brother-in-law, renounced their alliance to align with his rival, 
MacLean of Duart. 
 
As also discussed in Chapter 7, the MacLeods of Harris were heavily defeated by a 
company of English horsemen when they landed in Ireland on mercenary service in August 
1595. Sixteen „gentlemen…two or three of them very special gentlemen‟ were killed.42 
The MacLeods‟ allies the MacDonalds had suffered their own defeat, having capitulated to 
the English and returned to Scotland, but MacLeod of Harris stayed on in Ireland for some 
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months „in great anger for revenge, if possible, for such scathe and dishonour he has 
gotten‟.43 The loss was not only felt by the chief, Ruairidh, but by all of his kin: 
He and his whole people are so stirred to anger by their last dishonour that they 
have vowed never to leave Ireland if it be not repaired to their contentment.
44
 
The MacLeods eventually returned to Scotland after helping Ó Domhnaill capture the 
castle in Costello from the English.
45
 The untimely deaths of some of the clan‟s highest 
nobility demanded a violent, retaliatory response from their chief. Ruairidh would have 
accepted this responsibility to save face and redeem lost honour, but his military action 
against the English was probably also compelled by personal grief and a genuine desire for 
revenge. 
  
Vengeance, an aspect of honour culture, was an undeniably powerful motivating 
factor for contemporaries. Breatnach has demonstrated that the murder of Shane Ó Néill in 
1567 by the MacDonalds of Dunivaig was an intricately plotted and premeditated 
retaliation for their defeat at Ó Néill‟s hands at the battle of Glenshesk in 1565.46 In 1602, 
MacKenzie of Kintail provoked MacDonald of Glengarry to violence by killing two of his 
kinsmen. Rather than seek reparations from the government in Edinburgh, Glengarry „went 
about, at his own hand, to revenge the slaughter of his kinsmen‟, and as a result, he was 
declared a rebel.
47
 The extreme nature of the massacre of MacLean of Duart‟s kinsmen in 
1586 by MacDonald of Dunivaig undoubtedly stemmed from the dishonour he had 
endured and his desire for vengeance. The MacDonald chief had negotiated with MacLean 
in good faith to avert a feud between his brother-in-law MacLean and his cousin 
MacDonald of Sleat, but was imprisoned in Duart Castle indefinitely until he renounced 
his rights to Islay in MacLean‟s favour. An account written c. 1620 claims that upon his 
release, MacDonald „receiving the wrong at Maclean his hand…went about, by all means, 
to revenge the same‟,48 culminating in the cold-blooded killing of between 40 and 80 of 
MacLean‟s kinsmen over a number of days.49 Later in August 1598, the young Eachann 
MacLean supplicated the king for justice for the killing of his father Lachlann Mòr by the 
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MacDonalds of Dunivaig, but James VI dismissed his case, claiming the battle was „well 
fought on both sides‟.50 Some years later, in the summer of 1602, Eachann invaded Islay 
with a force of 1,500 men, banishing Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig from the island, 
and finally achieving retribution for his father‟s death.51 The English diplomat George 
Nicolson, a keen supporter of the MacLeans, commented: „God send good news of sound 
revenge!‟.52 
Most of these examples have focused on shame and dishonour, yet the positive 
attainment of honour was also a key catalyst. In a report from early 1596, Dioness 
Campbell, the Dean of Limerick, suggested that during military campaigns in Ireland the 
MacLeans and Campbells should be divided into respective „garrizons, to be comaunded 
and directed by the Generall in severall partes for service‟. Campbell claimed that this 
 
…syperation shall brede an emulation betwene them, stryvinge for honor and 




Friendly competition between clans could be encouraged to maximise efficiency and 
enthusiasm on military campaigns. 
 
2.4: Clan Expectation 
Young heirs were poised to inherit more than just the estates of their predecessors. Bitter 
bloodfeuds could endure over several generations, with hereditary hatreds passing from 
father-to-son and manifesting themselves in cycles of retaliatory violence. In Margaret 
Campbell‟s testimony on the assassination of Iain Campbell of Cawdor on 4 February 
1592, she describes the intense pressure faced by the young chief Seumas Campbell of 
Ardkinglas to „follow out‟ his father‟s feud with Cawdor. A clan council, consisting of 
members of his own branch of the Campbells, along with the Campbells of 
Auchavuilling
54
 and George Balfour,
55
 claimed that „the Laird of Caddel wes lyke to 
decourt‟ [dismiss] Ardkinglas and his followers. They reminded the young chief of the 
scheme his father had „laid agains Caddel in his awine tyme‟, which he had deemed to be 
„for the weill of his hous‟. The young Ardkinglas protested, claiming it „wes owre great a 
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feud to bring on my hous‟, but this only encouraged further upbraiding from his cadet 
branch: 
 
Thaireftir they answerit to me [Ardkinglas] that they were unhappy that had sic an 




Ardkinglas was clearly being shamed for perceived timidity, which raises issues of honour. 
Patrick of Auchavulling pledged his undying support should Ardkinglas agree to prosecute 
the feud: 
 
…Patrick of Auchavulling said…geif I tuik that matter in hand…theye wuld die 
and leif with me and, geif mister wer that I might not bruik the country, they wuld 




For all its apparent sincerity, this pledge of allegiance also contained a thinly veiled threat 
that placed Ardkinglas in an impossible situation: either continue a potentially damaging 
feud or forfeit the support of close allies and possibly face deposition. When Ardkinglas 
eventually acceded to the wishes (or demands) of his kinsmen, this tense exchange was 
somewhat soothed by Patrick of Auchavulling‟s assertion that the experience would „make 
ane man‟ of Ardkinglas.58 This suggests military action was clearly anticipated, and was 
considered a necessary step in Seumas‟ transition to adulthood and leadership of the clan. 
This episode provides a useful insight into the burden of responsibility borne by successors, 
and suggests that some young leaders were constrained or compelled by the ambitions of 
their allies or kinsmen. Another example of this can be found in 1543, when Uilleam 
Mackintosh, the young heir of Dunachton, made a bond of manrent with the earl of Huntly 
on behalf of himself and the Clan Chattan, and 21 leaders of that clan pledged to renounce 




The ideological framework that underpinned the martial culture of the West 
Highlands imbued warfare with a degree of ritual and ceremony. This has been explored in 
Chapter 1, but may be further elucidated through a brief case study: the succession of the 
MacGregor chief, Griogair Ruadh in late 1562. Cailean Liath Campbell of Glen Orchy 
promised Griogair Ruadh the lands of Glen Strae on two conditions: his „faithfull homage 
and service‟ to Cailean and his successors, along with the surrender of two of Griogair‟s 
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dependants who murderered Alasdair mac Eòghain Dhuibh. A letter written by Cailean 
Campbell of Ardkinglas to Cailean Liath in November 1562 stated that Griogair Ruadh 
would only accept these terms if he was allowed „the skaytht of fyif or sax merkis‟ of Glen 
Orchy‟s lands.60 This stipulation was accepted by Cailean Liath with seemingly little 
hesitation. Ultimately just a week later, Griogair Ruadh decided to assert his military 
power in dramatic and violent fashion by murdering eight Campbells at an inn in Allt 
Girnaig and capturing several more in Kincraigie.
61
 This episode allows us to infer that the 
right to the „skayth‟ [to harm or damage by physical action] of Campbell‟s lands was 
integral to Griogair Ruadh‟s initial succession and long-term viability as clan chief.62 
Unconditional submission would have irrevocably damaged his position as chief, and 
securing permission to raid was perhaps the only way he could salvage his integrity. 
Ritualism aside, the idea that raids on the lands of an overlord could be conducted with the 
overlord‟s tacit consent seems extraordinary, yet the symbolic value for the smaller clan 
was considerable as the raid would demonstrate that their chief still maintained a 
semblance of personal autonomy, however nominal. The fact that Cailean Liath readily 
agreed to Griogair Ruadh‟s proposal suggests that raids of this nature had precedent, and 
were presumably tolerated in order to appease a vassal kindred. With the prospect of 
submission looming, a situation never endured by any of his predecessors, Griogair Ruadh 
may have concluded that the concession to raid Glenorchy‟s lands would not be enough to 
placate his fellow kinsmen, especially with the added condition of surrendering the 
murderers of Alasdair mac Eòghain Dhuibh. All chiefs were expected to offer protection 
and therefore if Alasdair abandoned his dependants to Campbell justice whilst 
simultaneously submitting to Cailean Liath he would have almost undoubtedly faced 
leadership challenges. Therefore, Griogair‟s eventual decision to spill Campbell blood had 
two clear messages. For the Campbells, it was a statement of his intention to resist. For the 
MacGregors, it was a vivid demonstration of his martial prowess and his commitment to 
protect his kinsmen. 
 
In the early seventeenth century, there was a notable trend by which a chief‟s 
leadership was internally challenged on the basis of his new fidelity to the Scottish crown. 
In 1610, members of the Clanranald revolted against their chief Dòmhnall,
63
 in 1612, 
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Lachlann MacKinnon of Strathardle was similarly challenged,
64
 and in 1613/14, the 
Cameron chief Ailean was almost overthrown by two rival branches of his clan, as 
discussed in Chapter 8. According to the testimony of the three chiefs, the rebels had 
spurned their allegiance to God, the king, and their clan leader and continued „thair 
accustomed trade of murthour, thift, soirning, and oppression‟.65 These ostensibly shared 
motivations may indicate that the Statutes of Iona in 1609 had stoked widespread fears that 
the old way of life in the Highlands and Isles was now under threat. However, in the case 
of the Camerons and possibly the Clanranald,
 
the rebels also held claims to the chiefship 
and had previously come into conflict with the main kindred, which suggests that their 
professed motive of defending traditional clan values was a convenient excuse to disguise 
their true goal of overthrowing their chief.
66
 Alternatively, the chiefs themselves may have 
been employing the language of civility to ensure that their disobedient kinsmen were 




2.5: Mercenary Culture 
Mercenary service in Ireland by clans in the West Highlands and Isles provided an 
invaluable source of income that strongly incentivised the militarisation of society. In the 
fading years of the sixteenth century, their services were pursued by the Irish chiefs Ó 
Néill, Ó Domhnaill, and Maguire, who were embroiled in a war against the English. In 
early 1594, the Irish chiefs offered the earl of Argyll a yearly pension of £8,000, raised 
later in the year to £10,000, in exchange for 2,000 soldiers.
68
 When Argyll refused to get 
involved, comparable, if more frugal, offers were made to MacDonald of Sleat, MacLeod 
of Harris, MacDonald of Dunivaig, and the MacLeods of Lewis. Cash advances spurred 
their involvement. In April, the MacDonalds were sent £300 in „silver and silver work‟, 
with the promise of another £600 (half of which was to be paid in armour, clothes, and 
horses) when they landed in Ireland.
69
 In July, the MacLeods were sent £500 sterling.
70
 
Presumably this payment was kept by the chiefs and not distributed amongst the thousands 
of mustered mercenaries, and for the actual soldiers, any enrichment probably depended on 
the plunder taken on the actual campaign. As indicated by the elegy for Ruairidh Mòr 
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MacLeod of Harris, which details the Irish campaign in 1595, the attainment of „wealth 
and riches‟71 or „booty of cattle‟ was a very real prospect.72 Clearly, the mercenaries would 
not have become so frequently embroiled in the volatile and dangerous situation in Ireland 
unless the reward matched the risk.
73
 In 1595, Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart noted that 
some English „commandaris‟ trained in Ireland wanted the war in Ireland to continue 
indefinitely, presumably to protect their livelihood.
74
 Given the lucrative nature of the trade, 
the Hebridean „redshanks‟ may have held similar views, and this kind of war profiteering 
was a clear incentive for the Highlands and Isles to remain militarily active. 
Outside of these economic pull factors, the mercenary trade was an outlet for the 
militarised elite that may have actually diminished conflict within Scotland. For example, 
the feud between the MacGregors and the Campbells was suspended while the former 
fought in Ulster with Somhairle Buidhe MacDonald in the summer of 1563.
75
 This 
decrease in activity on the homefront may partly explain why in 1495 James IV agreed to 
provide the Irish chief Aodh Ruadh Ó Domhnaill with 4,000 Gaelic soldiers, commanded 
by Alasdair MacLean of Duart.
76
 Following the forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles in 
1493, the king may have been attempting to redirect the islanders away from internal 
warfare in Scotland and towards Ireland (although he was also probably hoping to forge 
links with the Irish chieftains with a view to countering English aggression). The battle of 
Flodden in 1513 halted that particular relationship and the Irish chiefs increasingly liaised 
with the earls of Argyll as brokers for Scottish mercenaries. Prendergast has argued that by 
1560 Argyll had achieved nominal control over much of Ulster through shrewd marriage 
contracts and careful leasing of his mercenary forces.
77
 By the end of the sixteenth century, 
the mercenaries‟ continued involvement in Ireland was a source of considerable tension 
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Previously the mercenary trade has been understood as terminating in 1601/2,
79
  or 
even as late as the Flight of the Earls in 1607,
80
 yet evidence suggests that it was brought to 
an end earlier in 1595/6. Focused policing of the North Channel by the English navy was 
coupled with a decline in the mercenaries‟ importance as the Irish chiefs developed their 
own standing armies.
81
 A highly lucrative source of external revenue was removed, and 
hundreds of idle veteran warriors now turned inward. Dormant feuds reignited and an 
overall intensification of warfare in the Western Isles culminated in pitched battles 
between the MacDonalds of Dunivaig and the MacLeans of Duart in 1598, and the 
MacLeods of Harris and the MacDonalds of Sleat in 1601. Additionally, MacGregor has 
suggested that this coincided with a shift towards „total war‟ in solidarity with the 
escalating situation in Ireland.
82
 Macinnes has contended that the termination of the trade 
was a principal reason for a lack of large-scale massacres between 1590 and 1640,
83
 but on 
the contrary, it caused a marked upswing in violence in the Highlands and Isles. For at 
least a decade, there was little attempt by the Scottish government to follow up the 
termination of the trade by tackling the underlying issue of militarisation in the Western 
Isles through programmes that harnessed this potential or promoted demobilisation.
84
 
Although the mercenary campaigns could cause or exacerbate tensions between 
participating clans, they also fostered a sense of unity and common purpose, perhaps 
evoking the heyday of the Lordship of the Isles. Clans with fractious relationships in the 
political milieu of Scotland often seemed able to set aside their differences to pursue a 




2.6: Government Policy 
The government‟s approach to obtaining authority in the Highlands and Isles was typically 
quite limited and unimaginative. The crutch of the commission of lieutenancy, often given 
to magnates like Argyll and Huntly, was hindered by the political agendas of the chosen 
                                                          
79
 Macinnes, Clanship, 58, 67-8; Goodare, „Statutes‟, 56; MacCoinnich, „Conflict and Identity‟, 154-5. 
Rumours continued to circulate as late as 1601 that Tyrone was seeking the redshanks‟ services, but if any 
crossed the North Channel, they were much reduced in number. See Calendar of the Carew manuscripts, Vol. 
III, eds J.S. Brewer & William Bullen (London, 1867), 272; Vol. IV, 49. 
80
 Dawson, „The Gaidhealtachd‟, 266. 
81
 Crawford, „Irish Mercenary Trade‟. 
82
 MacGregor, „Warfare‟, 211. 
83
 Macinnes has argued that the mere existence of the mercenary trade perpetuated conflict as it formed „a 
ready reservoir of manpower to perpetuate feuds‟. See Allan I. Macinnes, „Slaughter Under Trust: Clan 
Massacres and British State Formation‟, in Levene, Massacre in History, 129-130. 
84
 MacGregor, „Civilising Gaelic Scotland‟, 40. 
85
 From around 1618, the Scandinavian mercenary market may have filled the vacuum of the Irish mercenary 
trade, although this was a more Scottish-wide phenomenon. See Steve Murdoch, „More Than Just “Mackay‟s” 
and Mercenaries: Gaelic Influences in Scandinavia, 1580-1707‟, TGSI 60 (1997), 161-85 at 164-71. 
73 
 
lieutenants, who tended to put their own interests before that of the government, while 
exploiting the legal authority bestowed by the office. A similar strategy was the 
commission of fire and sword, a programme of „licensed violence‟ that provided clans in 
crown favour with legal indemnity to prosecute their feud.
86
 Conflict was therefore 
legitimised rather than terminated. Violence „licensed‟ within these parameters was 
theoretically unrestricted and could „all too easily provide a cloak for private expansionist 
ambitions‟.87 Accordingly, these commissions were regularly abused by Highland nobles. 
In 1593, the Galbraiths used a commission against the MacGregors to prosecute their feud 
against the Colquhouns and the MacAulays.
88
 Similarly in 1618, Mackintosh of 
Dunnachton used a commission against the Camerons to hold the earl of Huntly‟s tenants 
in Lochaber and Badenoch „undir a slavische thraldome‟, an abuse of power that 
precipitated conflict between the Mackintoshes and the Gordons.
89
 Thus, commissions of 
fire and sword could stoke rather than extinguish feuds in the Highlands and Isles.  
The government frequently bemoaned the lawless nature of the „wild‟ Highlands 
and Isles whilst simultaneously exploiting local feuds in the region to destabilise political 
rivals and opponents. For example, in 1543, Regent Arran released the imprisoned 
Clanranald chief Iain Muideartach along with other „Irish‟ to divert the attention of Argyll 
and Huntly, supporters of his main rival, Cardinal Beaton.
90
 As a consequence, Iain led the 
Clanranald against the Frasers in one of the largest clan battles of the sixteenth century in 
the following summer. In 1565, Queen Mary stoked the feud between the MacGregors and 
Campbells „in order to embarrass and encumber the latter‟, who had opposed her during 
the „Chaseabout Raid‟.91 Wrong-footing Argyll was also Regent Morton‟s objective in 
1574 when he fuelled a land dispute between the Clanranald and the MacLeods of Harris 




Expropriation of „troublesome‟ kindreds increasingly became the government‟s 
main solution to the lack of answerability in the Highlands and Isles, a policy that met with 
resistance from the incumbent kindreds.
93
 Perhaps the most notable example of this policy 
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was the plantation of Lewis. This was pursued by a government that had long sought to 
exploit the untapped wealth of the Outer Hebrides (especially fisheries),
94
 an economic 
incentive buttressed by a desire to „civilise‟. The arrival of the Fife Adventurers in 
Stornoway in 1598 initiated a long period of bitter violence that contributed significantly to 
the dissolution of the MacLeods of Lewis as a political entity by 1615.
95
 Other „problem‟ 
areas in the Highlands and Isles had been „earmarked‟ for plantation, including Lochaber 
and Trotternish in Skye.
96
 In 1598, expropriation of the kindreds on these lands was a 
bridge too far, but between 1607 and 1612 the MacDonalds of Dunivaig were dispossessed 
of their lands in Kintyre and Islay to the benefit of the Clan Campbell. Such abrupt 
dislocation made restoration and recovery of land the principal motivation for the „Islay 
Rising‟ in 1615, discussed in Chapter 9. Similarly, the extirpation of the MacGregors may 
have eventually „subdued‟ the clan but it resulted in the „death of many of them and ther 
followers, and no lesse (iff not farr greater) slaughter of the Campbells‟.97 Overall, the 
short-term consequence of this policy of expropriation was a visible upsurge of violence 
and rebellion, as well as an intensification of warfare. In the longer term, Macinnes has 
argued that conflict and disorder had significantly declined by the early seventeenth 
century,
98
 but the continuing disaffection of the dispossessed MacDonalds was a driving 
narrative of the wars of the 1640s and beyond. 
2.7: Magnate Rivalries 
The earls of Argyll could be effective arbitrators of disputes between other clans, and their 
reputation for military supremacy, coupled with their usual status as crown favourites, 
shielded many of their adherents from potential conflict. The mere threat of repercussions 
dissuaded incursions, as indicated by Robert Bowes‟ comment in 1596 that „few of the 
Isles in Scotland or on the frontiers in Ireland towards Argyll will fight and draw blood 
against the Campbells‟.99 Magnates like Argyll could also actively foster upheaval for their 
own benefit. Although enthusiastic participants in royal armies at Flodden, Pinkie, and 
Glenlivet, the earls of Argyll otherwise took little direct involvement in military affairs in 
the West Highlands and Isles.
100
 Cattle raids were presumably beneath them, and their 
recurrent role as lieutenant of the Isles meant they were often under scrutiny to behave in 
an outwardly lawful manner. Proxy warfare was their modus operandi: subordinates were 
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ordered to launch raids on opponents, allowing the earls to achieve their goals while 
maintaining plausible deniability and detachment. An upsurge in proxy warfare may be 
visible towards the end of the sixteenth century, which again may have contributed to the 
intensification of warfare around this time. An obvious proponent of this strategy was 
Gilleasbuig Gruamach, the seventh earl (d. 1638), as shown in Chapter 6. In 1603, Argyll 
induced the MacGregors to launch attacks on neighbouring clans, including the 
Colquhouns, to undermine the position of the Duke of Lennox, his rival for the lieutenancy 
of the Isles. 
The earl of Huntly, Argyll‟s counterpart and frequent rival in the central and 
eastern Highlands, favoured a similar strategy for extending his authority. In the 1540s, 
George Gordon, the fourth earl of Huntly, probably supported a Fraser-led takeover of Iain 
Muideartach‟s Clanranald chiefship,101 and his grandson, the first Marquis of Huntly, 
certainly backed an attempted coup against Ailean Cameron of Lochiel‟s chiefship in 
1613.
102
 Both of these incidents ended in failure for Huntly and his allies, while fostering 
serious upheaval within Moidart and Lochaber. The complicity of these magnates can be 
difficult to ascertain as they maintained an assiduous detachment from the actual violence, 
yet Boardman has recently suggested that the Argyll-Huntly rivalry had already made the 
Western Isles a political battleground by the early sixteenth century, with the first 
Dòmhnall Dubh rebellion in 1501 engineered by Argyll to stymie the growing power of 
Huntly.
103
 Although their relationship was not always antagonistic, the Argyll/Huntly 
rivalry intensified throughout the sixteenth century, reaching an inconclusive climax at the 
battle of Glenlivet in 1594. Smaller clans, such as the Camerons, could be used as pawns in 
a game of political one-upmanship between these two powerful magnates. As seen in 
Chapter 8, when Ailean Cameron of Lochiel broke his allegiance to Huntly c. 1610-12 in 
favour of aligning with Argyll, Huntly sponsored the internal challenge of Ailean‟s 
chiefship by the Erracht and Glen Nevis branches of the Camerons. 
2.8: Religion 
One possible factor that could conceivably have instigated violence was religion, but even 
though this period coincided with the Scottish Reformation, there is little overt evidence 
for religious division causing conflict in the Highlands. As observed by MacCoinnich, the 
battle of Glenlivet in 1594 has been erroneously portrayed as a confessional conflict 
between the Catholic Huntly and the Protestant Argyll, when the battle-lines were actually 
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drawn according to traditional loyalties and rivalries rather than religious affinity.
104
 
Religion may have nevertheless played a quiet role in defining inter-clan relations and 
rivalries. The fervent reforming activities of Gilleasbuig, the fifth earl of Argyll (d. 1573) 
could have contributed towards the growing ideological gulf between the Campbells and 
clans like the MacDonalds who remained Catholic.
105
 Likewise, Lachlann Mòr MacLean 
of Duart was a Protestant, which may have intensified his feud with the MacDonalds of 
Dunivaig over Islay.
106
 Equally, the conversion of Gilleasbuig, the seventh earl of Argyll 
(d. 1638) to Catholicism in 1618 was the foundation upon which an unlikely friendship 
was built with his old opponent, Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig, while they were both 
in exile in the Spanish Netherlands.
107
 Nevertheless, the confessional divide that defined 
the warfare of much of continental Europe during this period is conspicuously absent as a 
major cause of violence in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland. 
2.9: Conclusion 
Land disputes and succession crises appear to be the most prevalent causes of conflict 
within the West Highlands and Isles between 1544 and 1615. In many cases, these causes 
were exacerbated by other contingent issues, such as government interference or magnate 
rivalries, but control of land and kindred was undoubtedly a recurrent instigator of violence, 
especially when coupled with deeply held views on honour. The military ethos of elite clan 
society may have instigated conflict, with chiefs expected to carry out ritual cattle raids 
and hereditary feuds with their neighbours. Other factors, such as mercenary culture or 
religion, played a subtler and more ambivalent role in the causation of warfare. Although 
the former was predicated upon the militarisation of elite male society, it may actually 
have diminished conflict within Scotland, at least until it was terminated near the end of 
the sixteenth century, at which point, the militarism it had instilled was a contributory 
factor to the intensification of warfare around 1600.
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Chapter 3: Armies and Soldiers 
There is general acceptance in the historiography that the Highlands and Isles were more 
heavily militarised than other regions of Scotland in the sixteenth century, but analysis of 
the scale and composition of forces has been scattered and limited.
1
 Brown‟s recent study 
of the martial role of the Scottish nobility is a useful reminder that military affairs 
remained a core focus of noble culture, but his discussion of the Highland soldier is 
hampered by use of unhelpful terminology and repetition of misinterpreted evidence, as 
discussed below.
2
 Similarly, Dawson‟s studies of the fifth earl of Argyll (d. 1573) have 
strongly emphasised the importance of his private military strength in Scotland and 
Britain,
3
 yet evidence suggests a more nuanced picture of the Campbells‟ martial power 
than Dawson provides. This chapter will provide a more systematic assessment of the 
soldiery in the West Highlands and Isles than has been previously attempted. Initially 
adopting a broad view, it will assess the military capacity of the region by contrasting the 
vision offered by recent historiography with a series of English and Scottish government 
reports from 1545, the 1590s, and the early 1600s. It will then analyse a number of more 
specific issues, including recruitment, army supply, army composition, and military 
equipment. This last theme has received the most attention from historians such as Phillips 
and Caldwell, but both employ a limited source-base that generally overlooks 
contemporary poetry, Irish annals, and certain key governmental records, all of which will 
be consulted here.
4
 Overall, this chapter will offer a clearer view of the nature of armies 
and soldiers in the Highlands and Isles by taking a more inclusive approach towards the 
available sources. 
3.1: Military Capacity of the West Highlands and Isles 
In recent scholarship, the military capacity of the Hebrides in particular has been hugely 
exaggerated, perhaps to align with negative perceptions about the level of violence in the 
region. One scholar‟s claim that c. 35,000 seasonal „redshank‟ mercenaries served in 
Ireland at the end of the sixteenth century has found at least one other proponent.
5
 As will 
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be shown, this multiplies the probable military capacity of the Hebrides fivefold.
6
 English 
government reports are one of our most useful sources on the size and composition of 
Hebridean armies. According to one such report, Dòmhnall Dubh led an army of 4,000 
„men of war‟ on 180 galleys into Ireland in the summer of 1545, while another 4,000 men 
stayed in Scotland to „entangle with‟ Huntly and Argyll.7 In total therefore, Dòmhnall 
Dubh promised the service of 8,000 men for Henry VIII, although he requested that 3,000 
men be waged by the English king because they were „gentlemen [who] must be sustained 
and helped‟. He agreed to maintain „the rest‟ at his own expense.8 Therefore, the 3,000 
waged „gentleman‟ soldiers in Dòmhnall Dubh‟s army represent slightly over one-third of 
his total force of 8,000 men, a recurrent ratio in other sources, as will be shown.
9 
In the 1590s, a flurry of English government reports provided estimates on the 
military capacity of the Hebrides in an attempt to control the flow of the mercenary trade. 
The first, written anonymously in Scots in 1593 for William Cecil, Elizabeth I‟s chief 
advisor, was called „The note of the Weste Isles of Scotland‟.10 It begins by estimating the 
size and military muster of individual islands in the Hebrides, before detailing the various 
political controversies and affinities in the West Highlands and Isles in general. The total 
musters of each clan/nobleman is collated in Table 1. 
Clan(s)/Nobleman Muster of men 
MacDonald of Sleat 1,500 
MacLeod of Lewis 1,040 
MacLeod of Harris 680 
MacDonald of Dunivaig 550 




The earl of Argyll (and Campbell of Glenorchy) 360 
MacKinnon of Strath 160 
MacLean of Coll 140 
MacDuffie 100 
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Laird of McKynvin 50 
Stewart of Appin 30 
MacDougall of Lorn  30 
MacLean of Lochbuie 20 
Murray „Ycolmkyll‟ 20 
MacIain of Ardnamurchan 16 
 
Table 1: Estimated Muster of the Hebrides (by clan) in ‘The note of the Weste Isles of Scotland’, 1593
12
 
This report was later updated in the better known „The Description of the Isles of Scotland‟, 
which MacGregor has dubbed a „military census‟.13 The anonymous report, written 
c.1595,
14
 possibly by Dioness Campbell, Dean of Limerick (or the Edinburgh merchant 
John Cunningham),
15
 builds upon and refines the information and muster estimates from 
the earlier 1593 report which it appears to use as a basis.
16
 Appendices 1.1 and 1.2 provide 
a full breakdown of the available manpower in the Hebrides as estimated by both „The note‟ 
and the „The Description‟, but some of the data is worthy of discussion here.  
Clan(s)/Nobleman Muster of men 
MacDonald of Sleat 1,520-1,524 
MacLean of Duart 1,386-1,390 
MacLeod of Lewis 1,040 
MacDonald of Dunivaig 650 
MacLeod of Harris 560 
Lord Hamilton 400 
Clanranald 386-7 
MacNeill of Barra 200 
MacLean of Lochbuie 200 
MacLean of Coll 190 
MacKinnon of Strath 160 
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MacDougall of Lorn 160 
The earl of Argyll 120 
MacDuffie 100 
Stewart of Appin 60 
MacQuarrie 60 
Laird of McKynvin 50 
Laird of Ardinwrthe 16 
 




These estimates may not be exact, but they provide a fairly plausible indication of the 
relative strengths of each clan. According to „The Description‟, the MacDonalds of Sleat 
sit at the top of the pile in terms of potential muster at 1,500 men, almost matched by the 
MacLeans of Duart at c. 1,390 men. Other large musters include the MacLeods of Lewis 
(1,040 men), the MacDonalds of Dunivaig (650 men), and the MacLeods of Harris (560 
men). It is important to note that for the latter two clans, musters from their mainland 
holdings (such as Glenelg for the MacLeods, and Kintyre for the MacDonalds) were 
excluded from both reports, and as a result, their total muster would most probably rival 
the other „big three‟.18 Overall, the combined total of militarised personnel in the Isles is c. 
7,000 men (6,876 in 1593 and c. 7,080 in 1595), although both sources later contradict this 
by claiming that the total muster was generally regarded to be 6,000 men.
19
  
Contrary to Brown‟s assertion, not all of these soldiers were daoine uaisle 
(„gentlemen‟) or as Brown calls them, rather misleadingly, „professional gallowglass‟.20 
Both the 1593 and c.1595 reports stipulate that only one-third or c. 2,000 men were 
equipped with „attounes [aketons] and haberchounis [haubergeons], and knapshal bannets 
[bascinets]‟.21 These men were probably daoine uaisle. In the 1593 report it was expressly 
stated that the remaining two-thirds or c. 4,000 men would use bows or, with increasing 
regularity, firearms.
22
 Thus it is worth emphasising that the majority of soldiers in the 
average Hebridean army may have been lightly-equipped bowmen or gunners, an idea 
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further discussed below. Interestingly, the „History of the MacDonalds‟ claims that before 
the battle of Harlaw in 1411, Dòmhnall, the Lord of the Isles, „raised the best of his men, to 
the number of 10,000, and chose out of them 6600, turning the rest of them to their 
homes‟.23 This number is remarkably consistent with these later government reports, but 
importantly, it also implies that around 3,000 of the levied men were considered unfit or 
unequipped for battle. Overall, the military capacity of the Hebrides may have fluctuated 
considerably over the years, but a total muster of 8,000 men seems entirely possible when 
the region was united under, or attempting to restore, as in 1545, the Lordship of the Isles.  
The Campbell earls of Argyll meanwhile have been singled out by Dawson as 
possessing the most powerful private military force in Britain and Ireland by the later 
sixteenth century, allowing them to act as powerbrokers.
24
 Dawson has claimed that 
Gilleasbuig, fifth earl of Argyll (d. 1573) could raise an army of 1,500 professional 
soldiers and a levy of between 6,000 and 12-15,000 armed men in the 1560s.
25
 These 
estimates should be treated with a reasonable degree of caution. First of all, these huge 
armies did not represent his „private‟ military strength as they were mustered as part of the 
kingdom‟s standing army at battles like Solway Moss in 1542, Pinkie in 1547, and 
Glenlivet in 1594. More problematically, the higher estimates of 12-15,000 men originate 
from dubious sources. Before Solway Moss, a series of increasingly frantic English spy 
reports claimed that the Scottish army totalled 100,000 men of which 12,000 were 
Highlanders led by Argyll.
26
 After the battle, the English reported more soberly that the 
Scottish army numbered c. 17,000 men in total „as they sey theym selvis‟.27 The other high 
estimate of 15,000 men is associated with the Scottish army led by Argyll that opposed the 
English occupation of Haddington in 1548. Gervase Phillips, drawing upon the English 
chronicler Raphael Holinshed, claims that „Argyll and his fifteen thousand Highlanders‟ 
joined the French camp at Musselburgh in August 1548.
28
 Holinshed‟s original report is 
quite different:  
…there came to the aid of the Frenchmen foureteene or fifteene thousand Scots, 
accounting herewith the Irish Scots which came with the earle of Argile.
29
  
                                                          
23
 HP, Vol. I, 29. 
24
 Dawson, The Politics of Religion, 51-6; Dawson, „Gaelic Lordship‟, 3. 
25
 Ibid., 52. 
26
 Hamilton Papers, Vol. I, ed. J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1890), lxxiii, lxxi. 
27
 Ibid., Vol. I, 317-8; Cameron, James V, 319. 
28
 Phillips, Anglo-Scots Wars, 237-8 
29
 Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Vol. III, (London, 1808), 905. 
82 
 
Furthermore, Jean de Beaugué‟s account corroborates that 14-15,000 Scots arrived at 
Musselburgh  
…comptant les savauges, qui etoyent venuz avec le conte d‟Arquil... 
…counting the savages, who came with the earl of Argyll...30  
Both sources clearly imply that only a proportion of the Scottish relief force were 
Highlanders. Phillips‟ misinterpretation of Holinshed has been subsequently repeated by 
Dawson, and latterly Brown.
31
 Tellingly, in 1567 Argyll was only willing to commit 
himself to raising a more modest 5,000 men for Queen Mary.
32
 Furthermore, the seventh 
earl of Argyll (d. 1638) was later able to raise a similar amount of men (c. 6,000) for the 
battle of Glenlivet in 1594.
33
 It should also be emphasised that the muster of the Campbells 
of Argyll would fluctuate between different earls and within the lifetime of an individual 
depending on the strength of their alliances and kin group. Overall however, the idea that 
Argyll could raise 12-15,000 men seems extremely unlikely. Around half of that number, c. 
6,000 men, seems much closer to the truth and an army of this size may only have been 
possible as part of a royal summons. Nonetheless, it is difficult to disagree with Dawson‟s 
comment that raising a private force of 1,000-1,500 men was a „routine matter‟ for Argyll, 
even at very short notice in the fraught political climate of 1595.
34  
Another important source for the military strength of Argyll and indeed the West 
Highlands in general is a „vappenshawing‟ ordered by James VI on 31 January 1602, 
which was intended to muster 2,000 men for service in Ireland.
35
 Table 3 provides a 
breakdown of the amount of men to be mustered by each clan and nobleman.  
Clan(s)/Nobleman Muster of men 
Campbell of Argyll and Campbell of Glenorchy 300 
Duke of Lennox 200 
MacDonald of Clanranald 200 
The Marquis of Huntly 100 
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MacKenzie of Kintail 100 
The earl of Atholl 100 
Mackintosh of Dunnachton 100 
Grant of Freuchie 100 
Fraser of Lovat and Munro of Foulis 100 
The earl of Sutherland and MacKay 100 
The earl of Caithness 100 
Ross of Balnagowan 100 
MacDonald of Glengarry 100 
Cameron of Lochiel and MacDonald of 
Keppoch 
100 
Campbell of Lundy 50 
The laird of Tullibardine 50 
The laird of MacGregor 50 
The abbot of Inchaffray 50 
TOTAL: 2,000 
 
Table 3: Estimated Muster of Highlands in 1602
36
 
Most of the Hebridean clans were excluded due to their „unwillingness‟ to serve against the 
Irish.
37
 Some of the muster estimates seem very low, particularly the combined total of 300 
men for Campbell of Argyll and Campbell of Glenorchy. Typically, Argyll would have 
been entrusted by the king to raise and lead an army for this service, but he was currently 
out of favour with James VI and his political rival, the duke of Lennox, was the king‟s 
lieutenant in the Isles.
38
 It may be that these figures represent the personal/private strength 
of each clan at short notice, as they were only given a month to raise the troops.
39
 It is 
important to note that only Argyll, Glenorchy, Lennox, and the Abbot of Inchaffray were 
physically present to agree to these terms; the other musters were mere estimates based on 
the clan‟s expected military strength.40  
To summarise the discussion so far, if we assess the 1593, 1595, and 1602 evidence 
holistically, a conservative estimate of the total available manpower in the West Highland 
mainland and the Inner and Outer Hebrides is between 9,000 and 10,000 men. 
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Extrapolating the ratio found in several sources that one-third of armies was composed of 
more well-armed soldiers,
41
 it may be assumed that at least 3,000 were daoine uaisle or 
clan „gentlemen‟. 
The estimates from the government reports in 1593 and 1595 probably represent 
approximately the maximum number of men that each individual clan could raise, and in 
reality, the scale of martial action in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland varied 
considerably depending on the situation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the cattle raid, the 
most common form of warfare in the region, typically involved forces numbering in the 
tens rather than the hundreds.
42
 Despite the huge potential at the disposal of the Campbells, 
most situations did not warrant mass mobilisation of thousands of soldiers. The fifth earl‟s 
successor, Gilleasbuig‟s half-brother Cailean, sent just 60 soldiers to raid Lachlann Mòr 
MacLean of Duart in May 1579.
43
 The MacLeods of Lewis are a useful example for further 
illustrating the variability in the scale of warfare. In 1598, Niall MacLeod of Lewis led 40 
men „all bodin in feir of weir‟ in two boats to seize a ship in Loch Broom owned by John 
Pullet and Robert Blair, burgesses of Perth,
44
 yet the clan could muster 200-300 men for 
resistance against the Fife Adventurers,
45
 and 800 men for service in Ireland in 1595.
46
 
Some raiding parties were comprised of only a handful of men when a premium was 
placed on stealth,
47
 but others were between 30 and 40 men strong. In 1601, 40 men were 
sent by MacLeod of Harris to raid Carinish in North Uist, where they fought an even 
smaller MacDonald force. Notably, this was not a minor cattle raid, but was part of a 
serious feud between the two clans.
48
 Even while on mercenary campaigns, soldiers were 
divided into companies of 30 or 40 men, probably the average capacity of a bìrlinn.
49
 Thus 
these companies may well have been dedicated galley crews, a group of men that knew 
each other and worked together on the same vessel. Evidence from the Dòmhnall Dubh 
rising in 1545 implies that clans had dedicated sailors distinct from their warriors, as 1,000 
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The upper limits of the considerable military potential of the Highlands and Isles 
were only rarely explored, either in times of political crisis or, increasingly in the Isles, to 
meet the demands of the mercenary trade in Ireland. The clans that participated in the trade 
in the late sixteenth century, including the MacDonalds of Sleat, MacDonalds of Dunivaig, 
and the MacLeods of Harris, consistently raised substantial armies of thousands of men in 
successive summers.
51
 The mere existence of a mercenary trade may suggest that there was 
a surplus of manpower in the Highlands and Isles, although the trade was a vocation and a 
tradition, not to mention a hugely profitable enterprise. It is perhaps debatable if the 
mercenary trade truly tapped into a pre-existing surplus, and indeed it seems possible that 
the rising demand for mercenaries attracted ever more men to take up arms. However, the 
idea that fighting men were the most valuable export of the Hebrides is perhaps typified by 
the dowry of Lady Agnes Campbell of Kintyre for her marriage to Turlough Luineach Ó 
Néill in 1569: she landed in Ulster with 1,000 Campbell and MacDonald soldiers who 




3.2: Military Recruitment 
A clear and fundamental difference between the warfare in Scotland and Ireland was the 
latter‟s heavy reliance on mercenaries hired from the former.53 The relationship was not 
generally reciprocal.
54
 In Scotland, clan strength was generally self-contained, although 
other kindreds could be hired in times of upheaval: in 1563 and 1570, the Campbells of 
Glenorchy recruited some Camerons to pursue the Clan Gregor.
55
 More formal 
arrangements existed in which some smaller kindreds acted as the military arm of another 
clan. Examples of this relationship include the MacGregors to the Campbells of Argyll and 
the Campbells of Glenorchy,
56
 the MacRaes to the MacKenzies of Kintail,
57
 the MacNeills 
of Barra to the MacLeans of Duart,
58
 and (to a certain extent) the MacLeans of Duart to the 
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Campbell earls of Argyll.
59
 The number of men provided in these arrangements could be 
very substantial, as in 1595, when MacLean of Duart claimed that his „dependaris‟ the 
MacNeills of Barra would provide him with 300 men in wartime.
60
 Certain kindreds may 
have specialised in a particular aspect of warfare: according to tradition, the MacInneses in 
Skye were hereditary bowmen to the MacKinnons of Strath.
61
 Importantly, these 
militarised kindreds were not itinerant mercenaries, as in Ireland,
62
 but had their own 
established territorial domain. Other clans had more informal arrangements, but did on 
occasion provide military support in desperate times. For example, during MacKenzie of 
Kintail‟s feud with the MacDonalds of Glengarry, the earl of Sutherland „by reasone of the 
old friendship and amitie betuein his familie and the Clankeinzie‟ sent 240 men led by 
John Gordon of Embo.
63
  
Certain areas may have been particularly geared towards military recruitment. The 
„Description‟ claims that Sleat in Skye was „occupiet for the maist pairt be gentlemen, 
thairfore it payis but the auld deuteis‟ of victuals, food, and drink.64 Notably, it boasted the 
highest total muster of any single area in the Hebrides at 700 men. It might be expected 
that the more productive and fertile lands would be able to support a greater number, yet 
Trotternish in Skye was actually estimated at a higher rental value than Sleat: 70 merklands 
compared to 30 merklands. Victuals may have been redirected from elsewhere within 
MacDonald of Sleat‟s lordship to maintain these „gentlemen‟, as discussed below. 
Strong, unified clans could draw upon a collective pool of manpower for 
deployment on demand, and this may have been the true strength of the Clan Campbell in 
particular. For example, the Campbells of Glenorchy were frequently reinforced by their 
fellow Campbells and allies in Argyll throughout their feud with the MacGregors.
65
 As 
shown in Chapter 5, the Clanranald also relied heavily upon their kin-ties with the 
MacDonalds of Glengarry and the Clan Cameron in their struggles in the 1540s. The 
Campbells used a tax system for the mustering of troops: one man, serving for 8-10 or 20 
days, was to be provided for every merkland held by the laird or chief.
66
 Military service 
could wax and wane depending on the relative strength and power balance of the kindreds 
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involved. For example, the earls of Argyll were the „ultimate controlling influence‟ behind 
the MacGregors, and between 1513 and 1550, the Campbells of Glenorchy were denied 
their military service as they had been ordered by Argyll to serve Campbell of Cawdor.
67
 
The Campbells‟ reliance on military service from other clans may explain why the musters 
of Argyll and Glenorchy were so low in 1602. 
In the maritime world of the Hebrides and the west coast of the Highlands, lordship 
was configured through an intertwined „network‟ of sea-lanes and coastal castles.68 
Captains of castles and local baillies were obliged to maintain defensive garrisons within 
the castle, as well as bírlinnean or galleys, for the use of their lord. Castle garrisons were 
generally very small, often numbering only a handful of men. For example, it was the duty 
of the captain of Dunstaffnage to maintain „sex homines [six men]‟ at all times.69 In 1615, 
before the „Islay Rising‟, the royal garrison at Dunivaig Castle was only around three or 
four men.
70
 These relatively modest garrisons may suggest that sieges were not anticipated, 
however, small garrisons could hold out for long periods, and victualling large bodies of 
fighting men was a clear economic burden. In fact, the Highlands were far from anomalous 





Along with garrisons, captains of castles were expected to maintain galleys or 
bírlinnean for the use of their chief in the „Wars of our Supreme Lord the King and in our 
private wars‟.72 In September 1573, the earl of Argyll outlined that Donnchadh Campbell 
MacIver, captain of Inveraray and baillie of Glenara, must 
 
…keep and maintain a small birling or galley of 16 oars in our earldom with the 
rest of our ships, just as the Bailies of Glenara have been accustomed to do in past 




On 7 July 1578, Iain Campbell, captain of Dunoon, was ordered by Argyll to maintain a 
„galley of 10 oars‟ and an unspecified number of „men at arms‟ sufficient enough to make 
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 Similarly, on 3 September 1582, Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig 
granted land to his son Gilleasbuig in exchange for his homage and the service of a „galay 
or rather a langfad [long-fhada or longship, also known as a lymphad] of 24 oars well 
provisioned with victual and with men for rowing‟.75 Therefore, in the case of coastal 
castles, galley service clearly implied that fighting men must also be mustered. The size of 
these ships appears to have varied significantly, as indicated by a government report 
completed during the „Islay Rising‟ in 1615:  
Ane galley is ane veshell of xviij airis and abone to xxiiij airis; ane birling is a 
veshell of xij airis and abone to xviij airis. The birth of ane gallay and birling and 
the number of men of weir quhilk thay ar able to carrye is estimate according to the 




Therefore, a fully manned bírlinn would carry between 36 and 54 men, while the larger 
galley (or long-fhada) could carry between 54 and 72 men.
77
 Dòmhnall Dubh‟s army of 
4,000 „men of war‟ was transported to Ireland on 180 galleys, which equates to an average 
of around 22 men on each vessel.
78
 These ships ensured that the sea was no barrier for the 
fighting men of the West Highlands and Isles. 
3.3: Army Supply 
Supplying armies of hundreds or even thousands of men could exert a huge strain on the 
resources of any clan. In a short-term campaign in enemy territory, such as Argyll‟s pursuit 
of Huntly in 1594, the attacking army would plunder the surrounding land for victuals, 
which had the added effect of injuring the enemy. In 1596, MacLean of Duart planned to 
use this strategy in a prospective campaign in Ireland.
79
 Fighting men were also forcibly 
billeted on tenants from an enemy clan,
80
 and indeed in supposedly „friendly‟ territory in 
the Lowlands. Spy reports from 1542 claim that the Highland troops stationed in the 
Lowlands before the battle of Solway Moss „dystroyed as moche corne and other goodes, 
withoute paynge any thynge therefore, as the army of England dyde within Scotland, 
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wherof the comonaltye of Scotlande complayne varay sore‟.81 Similarly, in 1547, before 
the battle of Pinkie, Argyll‟s Highlanders caused controversy because they „waist and 
distroyis all menis gudis quharever thay cum‟.82 These reports suggest that Highland 
armies probably did not travel with substantial baggage trains, with the soldiers instead 
living off the land they travelled through to maintain speed and mobility.
83 
Perhaps more problematic was supplying an army on home turf for an extended 
length of time. Many chiefs maintained a core bodyguard, traditionally twelve men,
84
 the 
lèine-chneis, and these men depended upon the food rent from their chief or hospitality 
from the wider clan. As noted by „The Description‟, the people of Lewis were obliged to 
provide „Cuidichies [cuid oidhche], that is, feisting thair master quhen he pleases to cum in 
the cuntrie, ilk ane thair nicht or twa nichtis about, according to thair land and labouring‟.85 
Warriors outside of the elite retinue were maintained by the clan‟s tenants, a custom 
known to the government as sorning that, in Dodgshon‟s view, was much abused in the 
sixteenth century.
86
 On Islay, for every merkland owned, tenants were expected to 
…sustein daylie and yeirlie ane gentleman in meit and claith, quhilk dois na labour, 
but is haldin as ane of their maisters household men, and man be sustenit and 





In what may be a droll allusion to the burden and abuse of cuid oidhche, the report states 
that the chief has a right to „spend…ane nicht (albeit he were 600 men in companie) on ilk 
merk land‟.88 The government‟s attempted crackdown on this custom ostensibly aimed to 
unburden the „commonys‟ from one of a „panoply of parasites‟ that fed off the tenantry,89 
but the extent to which this social practice was truly resented by the tenants is debatable.
90
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In peacetime, these exactions may have been relatively sustainable, but with war came 
mass mobilisation of armed and hungry men. In 1595, Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of 
Sleat had mustered an army of around 3,000 men for service in Ireland, and after a few 
months, the army had „vrakit‟ his lands. With all their „victual and furnishing spent‟, „plain 
hunger‟ forced them to leave Scotland for Ireland. The tenantry may have refused to 
provide any more victuals or, even worse, were genuinely bled dry.
91
 At the same time, 
MacLean of Duart had raised his own army of between 500 and 600 men in anticipation of 
resisting MacDonald of Sleat‟s force. Although facing protests from his tenants, MacLean 
held his army together for three months, an „extraordinary‟ effort according to his servant 
Auchinross. Payment from Queen Elizabeth was not forthcoming and MacLean was forced 
to dissolve his forces.
92
  
Some particularly fertile areas appear to have been used as a breadbasket to supply 
the fighting men elsewhere in a lordship. According to „The Description‟, the island of 
Tiree was „callit in all tymes McConnells girnell [granary or storehouse]; for it is all teillit 
[tilled] land, and na girs [grass] but ley [arable] land‟. When the chief arrived to take cuid 
oidhche, the victual was reportedly „sa great‟ that the tenants were „uncertain…quhat…thai 
should pay, but obeyis and payis quhatevir is cravet be thair maister‟.93 Tiree‟s muster was 




Mercenary campaigns in Ireland required the flow of money almost as much as the 
flow of victuals. Cathcart has observed that in the Dòmhnall Dubh rising, the issue of 
wages was a crucial factor during negotiations between the Islanders and the English,
95
 and 
disagreements over pay may have resulted in the disbanding of the Hebridean army.
96
 
During the 1594 mercenary campaign, Ó Domhnaill was forced to abandon an active siege 
to ensure he obtained the Hebrideans‟ service, as they threatened to „turn back to their 
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country without dallying or delay‟ if he did not „immediately retain them as he had 
promised‟.97  
3.4: Army Composition 
As discussed in Chapter 1, military affairs were a major concern for clan chiefs and their 
immediate retinue. Those farther down the social scale, tenants and minor lairds, are less 
well represented in the sources, but some did participate in military activity. We have seen 
already from the government reports that around one-third of armies were composed of 
daoine uaisle, a ratio roughly supported by a muster of Grant of Freuchie‟s „heill kynne, 
freindis, and servandis‟ in February 1596. He raised 500 men of whom 300 were 
appropriately armed for the defence of his own lands, while only 80 were „weill armorit as 
effeiris to pas to the Kingis wyris‟.98 After their botched landing in 1595, Aonghas 
MacDonald of Dunivaig left his son, Aonghas, in Ireland with 600 men, but Lachlann Mòr 
MacLean of Duart noted that „three hundred are better than the six hundred, for there 
remained with him not a hundred of his father‟s men‟.99 This suggests that most of the elite 
retinue remained with the elder Aonghas, while his son was left with largely 
„unprofessional‟ soldiers. In the same year, MacLean of Duart‟s secretary John Auchinross 
claimed that most of the MacDonalds‟ army was composed of „householders, who will 
respect little their profit in Ireland besyid their loss in Scotland‟. MacLean planned to harry 
their lands, forcing them to abandon their campaign in Ireland and „seik for Scotland, every 
man to save his own house and dwelling‟.100 It is worth underlining the significant 
distinction between these „householders‟ and the „gentlemen‟ or daoine uaisle. Due to the 
custom of cuid oidhche and sorning, the „gentlemen‟ did not have to worry about these 
kinds of attack on personal property, and therefore they were afforded greater freedom to 
campaign. In contrast, „householders‟, who probably represented a considerable proportion 
of the large „redshank‟ armies, may have been unwilling to serve in Ireland or elsewhere 
for an extended period of time while their homes remained undefended and their lands 
neglected. 
 One stratum of society expressly prohibited from engaging in warfare was the 
„labourers of the ground‟: 
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And in raising or furthbringing of thair men ony time of year to quhatsumevir 
cuntrie or weiris, na labourers of the ground are permittit to steir furth of the cuntrie 
quhatevir thair maister have ado, except only gentlemen quhilk labours not, that the 
labour belonging to the teiling of the ground and wynning of thair corns may not be 
left undone, albeit thai byde furth ane haill zeir, as ofttimes it happins quhen ony of 
thair particular Ilands hes to do with Irland or neighbours, that the hail cuntriemen 
bides furth watching thair enemies ane zeir, half ane zeir, or thairby, as thai please. 
Not the les the ground is not the war labourit, nor the occupiers thairof are nather 
molestit, requirit, troublit, nor permittit to gang furth of thair awin cuntrie and Ile 




These individuals were essentially tasked with maintaining the land while the fighting men 
were away to ensure that the chief could raise food rents when he returned. Clans seem to 
have based estimated musters on the number of „gentlemen‟ or daoine uaisle that were 
available. Any accompanying men were incidental. For example, in June 1570 Iain Stewart 
of Appin promised to send Campbell of Glenorchy 18 men led by two named captains and 
„with als abill men of sa mony as beis in the cuntray‟.102 The evidence suggests that a 
proportionally small core of elite soldiers existed within each clan, and mustered armies 
(especially those for service in Ireland) were composed of a considerable number of 
middling householders and tenants. Armies raised for service in Ireland seem consistently 
larger than those mustered for internal feuds in Scotland. Men may have been attracted by 
the prospect of plunder, and clan chiefs probably encouraged broader participation to drive 




„Ordinary‟ clan members are (unhappily) often only recorded in death, and even 
then the records are not always helpful. For example, when the Campbell of Glenorchy 
history, The Black Book of Taymouth, describes the execution in 1604 of Alasdair Ruadh 
MacGregor of Glenstrae and seventeen of his close kinsmen at the „mercat cros‟ of 
Edinburgh, it states that „sundrie utheris [were] hangit thair and in uther places, quhais 
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names wer superfluous to wrett‟.104 Only nobility were mentioned by name. Immediately 
following this, the book describes a skirmish at „Bintoich‟ involving Donnchadh 
Campbell‟s second son, Raibeart, and a band of MacGregors, which culminated in the 
death of the „principallis of that band‟: Donnchadh Abrach MacGregor of Ardchyle and his 
son Griogair; Dubhghall MacGregor of Glengyle and his son Donnchadh; and Teàrlach 
MacGregor of Braiklie. Twenty of „thair compleissis slane in the chais‟ were not named.105 
Similarly, the disproportionately high number of deaths of the „common sort‟ at the battle 
of Glenlivet passes with little comment in comparison to the small number of nobility who 
were killed.
106
 Nevertheless, the actions of the earl of Argyll in the immediate aftermath of 
Glenlivet emphasise that, on a personal level, these losses were keenly felt. Argyll 
honoured the dead of „his people‟, around 500 men, by gathering and burying their bodies, 
and crafting makeshift monuments out of „bowes and pladds‟,107 a poignant tribute tied to 
his responsibility to protect the honour and integrity of his clan.  
3.5: Military Equipment 
What kind of military equipment did Highlanders and Islanders use in the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth century? As has been shown already, social status largely dictated the 
type of weaponry and armour available to a soldier. The classic accoutrement of the Gaelic 
warrior before 1500 consisted of a one-handed sword, a shield, throwing spears or „darts‟ 
(usually two), and a long mail coat (luireach) or aketon for armour. By the sixteenth 
century, the archetypal equipment of a warrior in the West Highlands and Isles was quite 
different. Mail coats remained popular among elite infantry,
108
 but sources overwhelmingly 
suggest that the two-handed claidheamh mòr („great sword‟) was wielded in tandem with 
the bow, and latterly the gun, by Gaelic warriors. This section will assess in turn swords, 
bows and spears, axes, firearms, and armour. 
The most celebrated weapon was the sword, which carried „symbolic value…as an 
attribute of nobility‟ and political authority.109 In poetry, it is repeatedly emphasised as the 
proper weapon for a warrior chief to wield and often acts as an extension of his physical 
strength.
110
 MacGregor has identified „three distinct phases‟ in the use of the sword. The 
one-handed sword remained popular until around 1500 when it was „supplanted‟ for the 
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remainder of the century by the two-handed sword. Government restrictions on the two-
handed sword heralded the return of the one-handed version around 1600, although it may 
have made a comeback as early as 1581.
111
 Changing trends in the design of monumental 
sculpture from the West Highlands reflect these different phases in the use of the sword. 
Two-handed sword motifs dominate sculpture from the sixteenth century, with outstanding 
examples including the effigies of Murchadh MacDuffie of Colonsay (d. 1539) and the 
MacLeod of Harris chiefs, Alasdair (d. 1547) and Uilleam (d. 1541/2).
112
  
The use of the sword by Highlanders and Islanders in the sixteenth century 
distinguished them from their counterparts in Ireland, the galloglass, as shown in a 
description of Turlough Ó Néill‟s entourage in 1557: 
 
…sixty grim and redoubtable gallowglasses, with sharp, keen axes, terrible and 
ready for action, and sixty stern and terrific Scots, with massive, broad, and heavy-
striking swords in their hands, ready to strike and parry, were watching and 
guarding the son of O‟Neill.113 
 
A description of the MacLeod and MacDonald soldiers who served with Ó Domhnaill in 
Ireland in 1594 states:  
Many of them had swords with hafts of horn, large and warlike, over their 
shoulders. It was necessary for the soldier to grip the very haft of his sword with 
both hands when he would strike a blow with it.
114
 
This description of the sword held on the shoulder is extremely reminiscent of the stance of 
the man second from the left in Albrecht Dürer‟s famous woodcut of „Irish‟ soldiers from 
1521. 
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Figure 3: Albrecht Dürer's wooduct, 1521 (Creative Commons) 
From this resting position, the sword could be swung to its fullest extent, and thus it was 
also a position of readiness.
115
 The main purpose of this stance however may have been as 
a suitably imitidating display when the soldiers were in the entourage of the Irish chiefs. In 
battle, the swords were probably sheathed in a scabbard and slung over the back, especially 
if the soldier was also using a bow. Although Irish commentators consistently 
differentiated the galloglass from the „redshank‟ mercenaries due to the visible differences 
in terms of equipment, their role on the battlefield was probably quite similar. The 
application of the claidheamh mòr on the battlefield was presumably as a space-clearing 
weapon: it would probably be swung in wide, broad strokes possibly directed at the more 
vulnerable lower torso and legs.
116
 These two-handed swordsmen acted as shock troops to 
clear a space for other warriors carrying smaller swords and dirks,
117
 and their application 
was therefore similar to that of the galloglass with their long-handled axes.
118
 The 60 
redshanks described in 1557 were clearly an impressive and physically imposing group, 
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with a reputation rivalling the famous galloglass. Prendergast has observed that 
contemporaries often remarked that the Irish were „slighter in build and shorter than their 
Scottish mercenaries‟.119 Wielders of the claidheamh mòr must have been very physically 
strong to swing these heavy swords for more than a few strokes, especially when wearing 
mail. 
A two-handed sword would have been more expensive than, for example, an axe 
due to the amount of iron required for the long blade, and some historians have therefore 
suggested that they were only affordable for the wealthy elite.
120
 However, at the massacre 
of Ardnaree in 1586, in which around 1,400 MacDonalds were driven into the River Moy 
and killed, the English recovered between 300 and 400 of „their long swords‟ from the 
riverbed.
121
 This strongly suggests that these swords were not exclusive items restricted for 
the elite, but were fairly common and widespread. The two-handed sword was not widely 
used elsewhere in Britain and Ireland, which made the Scottish Highlander and Islander a 
specialized soldier, as perhaps evidenced at the battle of Flodden.
122
 The adoption of the 
two-handed sword made shields superfluous, while heightening the usefulness of the 
bow.
123
 Near the end of the sixteenth century, the single-handed sword and the circular 
targaid, or targe, began to be favoured once again, perhaps in response to the increasing 





The bow was of unarguable importance in war, and Wiseman has argued that „bows 
were the weapon of choice…for warfare and hunting‟.125 This is certainly accurate with 
regards to the latter pursuit, but in warfare the inseparable combination of bow and sword 
was paramount. In Classical Gaelic poetry, descriptions of the bow are scarce, as the 
throwing spear was „invariably associated‟ with the elite.126 Poetic descriptions of battles 
indicate that throwing spears were discharged by both sides at the outset and often mid-
charge: 
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…ar lúth ar lámhach curadh 
 ag teacht go dula i gcaonnaig. 
 
…for vigour, for a champion‟s cast  




 …saoi nach sgreadach go lámhach…  
  
…the one is a hero who blenches not at spear-cast…128 
 
By the early seventeenth century, descriptions of spears recede in favour of bows and 
firearms, especially in vernacular poetry, perhaps reflecting a genuine shift in practice. The 
bow was now imbued with martial credentials that equalled the throwing spear, allowing it 
to be invoked as a sign of strength, skill, masculinity, and perhaps even virility.
129
 Yet the 
spear or „dart‟ may not have fallen into complete disuse. In John Elder‟s letter to Henry 
VIII in 1542/3, the „delite and pleasure‟ of the Highlander included the „thrawinge of 
dartis‟.130 One source for the battle of Glenlivet in 1594 claimed that MacLean of Duart‟s 
vanguard was composed of „bowmen and swordmen, with dartes and targets‟ and that for 
fifteen minutes the „daylight was palpably ecclipsed with the continwell clowd of darts and 
arrows that hung ouer the place‟.131 Some inconclusive references in the Annals of the 
Four Masters to the use of throwing spears or darts by Hebrideans in Ireland may in fact 
indicate their use of the bow. In 1534, the Annals record the death of Eoghan, son of Aodh 
Ó Néill, killed by a party of Hebrideans with „urchor do shaighitt‟, which has been 
translated as „a cast of a dart‟ but could also mean „a shot of an arrow‟.132 In the entry for 
1586 that details the massacre of Ardnaree, it is reported that the MacDonalds cast or shot 
„an cédna-saithe dia saighdibh‟ or „the first shower of darts‟.133 Both of these entries use 
the Gaelic term saighead, which can be translated as dart or arrow, and in particular saithe 
saiged is perhaps best defined as a „flight of arrows‟.134 Therefore, these references may 
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not indicate continuity in the use of darts but instead the prevailing use of the bow in the 
sixteenth century, further emphasising the distinctiveness of Scottish Hebridean soldiers 
when compared to the gallowglass in Ireland. The similarity in terminology between darts 
and arrows may derive from their similarity in function as throwing weapons. As observed 
by MacGregor, continuity in the Gaelic terms làmhach, from „spearcast‟ to „volley of 
gunfire‟, and urchair, from „slingshot‟ to „gunshot‟, suggests that the gun was „adapted to 
perform the role‟ of earlier throwing weapons, like the sling, dart, or bow.135 
 
As early as 1513, the permutation of the bow and the two-handed sword had been 
implemented with some success at the otherwise disastrous battle of Flodden:  
Hunttleis Hieland men witht their bowis and tua handit swords wrocht sa manfullie 
that they defait the Inglischmen bot ony slaughter on their syde.
136
 
Although this combination apparently saw little use by the Gaelic Irish,
137
 it remained 
popular and effective in Scotland, as shown at the battle of Glenlivet in 1594. In MacLean 
of Duart‟s vanguard of 3,000 men, around 1,000 wielded bows and swords,138 and the 
Hebridean mercenaries who served in Ireland in 1594/5 were described as carrying „bows 
of carved wood and sharp-pointed arrows, and long broad swords with two-peaked 
hafts‟.139 The enduring prevalence of this combination suggests a natural synergy had been 
achieved. Carrying both bow and sword provided flexibility, allowing Gaelic soldiers to 
adapt as the battle or skirmish developed. In March 1596, MacLean claimed that, if paid by 
Queen Elizabeth, he could raise an army of 2,000 men: 1,500 bowmen and 500 „fyremen‟ 
[gunners]. Yet these roles were not fixed or static, and MacLean goes on to say that if 
„battle be offered‟, he could „change some of our bowmen to use their two-handed swords 
the time of battle‟. 140 A 1596 report by Dioness Campbell, the Dean of Limerick, confirms 
this adaptability. The warriors of the Clan Cameron are singled out for their noted 
expertise with these weapons: 
They be verie stronge, valiant and comelie persons, well skilled in archerye and in 
the use of the two handed sword…141 
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Campbell continues, describing the Gaelic islanders as similarly adept: 
 
…theire bowmen are verie fitt and skilfull; for feats, assaults and handy blowes, 





There may have been some specialised troops within the ranks. In 1595, MacLean of Duart 
was maintaining an army of 300 „fyne‟ men to remain as his household guard in Duart: 100 
wore coats of mail, iron helmets, and wielded two-handed swords; 100 were „fyirmen‟ 
[gunners]; 100 were bowmen.
143
 Similar division was shown in Grant of Freuchie‟s muster 
in February 1596, in which 80 of his 500 men were deemed fit for the king‟s service: 40 
wore coats of mail, iron helmets, and wielded two-handed swords, while the other 40 wore 
only iron helmets and wielded bows, one-handed swords, and targes, „according to the 
hiland custowme‟.144 This suggests demarcation and specialisation within household troops, 
a scenario that may be evident in „dedicated units‟ of MacGregor bowmen at the battle of 
Glen Fruin in 1603.
145
 An account of the battle of Glenlivet claims that the islanders in 
MacLean‟s vanguard who wielded swords and Lochaber axes were „protected by coats of 
mail; but the archers had none, according to custom, for lightness‟.146 A core grouping of 
elite heavy infantry wielded swords and wore mail coats from the outset of battle, while 
lightly armoured archers primarily had a skirmishing and ambush role, but could switch to 
swords for close-quarters fighting. Some engagements were apparently conducted 
exclusively with the bow. For example, Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart complained that 
some of Argyll‟s men had raided his lands with „bowis, dorlochis [quivers], [and] 
haberschonis‟. Two of Lachlann‟s servants were killed.147 In raids of this nature the onus 
was on speed, deadly accuracy, and the avoidance of close-quarters fighting.
148
 It should be 
noted however, that the raiders actually wore heavy armour (haubergeons) and may still 
have been armed with swords as secondary weapons, perhaps slung over their backs. Not 
all archers were necessarily armoured, as indicated by a 1598 report that stated 100 „naked 
Scots with bows‟ were in Ireland under the command of the earl of Tyrone.149 Overall, 
there appear to be two groups or tiers of warrior: armoured men with bows and swords, 
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and unarmoured men with bows and swords, or just bows. Use of the bow is notable across 
both tiers, and these groupings were presumably defined primarily by the individual‟s 
social status (i.e. his propinquity to the chief) and to a lesser extent his ability to pay for his 
own equipment. 
Axes were used in sixteenth-century Gaelic Scotland, although the long-handled 
axe variant is more immediately associated with the galloglass in Ireland, and previously 
the Norse.
150
 John Dymmok, Elizabeth I‟s lord lieutenant in Ireland, states that the 
galloglass were armed with „a batle axe, or halberd, six foote longe, the blade whereof is 
somewhat like a shomakers knyfe, and without pyke; the stroake whereof is deadly where 
yt lighteth‟.151 The signature weaponry of both soldiers – the Highland Scots‟ claidheamh 
mòr and the galloglasses‟ long-handled axe – enjoyed liberal use on either side of the Irish 
Sea.
152
 A clear point of divergence was the veneration of the sword in Scotland, yet the axe 
was still considered a worthy weapon for the elite.
153
 The tomb of Alasdair Crotach 
MacLeod of Harris in St Clement‟s Church in Rodel features a hunting scene with Alasdair 
in full armour, holding a long-handled axe in one hand and a claymore in the other.
154
 A 
sculpture of Raghnall, progenitor of the Clanranald, features the chief holding a long-
shafted „sparr‟ or „Danish‟ axe.155 
John Mair in A History of Greater Britain (1521) describes the weaponry of the 
medieval Highlander as including a „small halbert‟.156 Later, Mair claims that the Clan 
Chattan and Clan Cameron wielded „halberts of great sharpness, for their iron ore is 
good‟.157 These „halberts‟ probably refer to a unique Highland axe variant known as the 
Lochaber axe; in 1501, James IV ordered „ane batale ax maid of Lochabir fasoun‟.158 
Caldwell has argued that the Lochaber axe may have had a substantially longer blade or 
could be another term for a long-handled „Danish‟ axe.159 The axe was still used as late as 
1594, as according to Calderwood, MacLean of Duart „played…valientlie‟ with the 
weapon against Huntly‟s horsemen at the battle of Glenlivet.160 This confirms that the axe 
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could be an elite weapon, but it had specific practical application against cavalry: axe-men 
on foot were capable of killing horses with ease,
161
 and the lower part of the axe-blade 
could be used to „hook‟ horsemen from their mounts. The relative absence of the horse in 
warfare in the Highlands, certainly in comparison to Ireland, perhaps explains the apparent 
favour shown to the two-handed sword over the axe. According to the eleventh-century 
Irish prose text Cogadh Gaídhel re Gallaibh („The War of the Gael against the 
Foreigners‟), the axe was the ideal weapon for cutting through coats of mail,162 a special 
function that retained relevance in the sixteenth century Highlands where this form of 
armour remained prevalent. 
Throughout medieval Europe, the axe was depicted as a „particularly bloodthirsty 
weapon‟, often wielded by demonised and barbaric people, perhaps because of its specific 
application against cavalry. The axe, like the crossbow, made the mounted knightly class 
feel vulnerable; essentially, it was a social leveller and thus maligned by the elite as a 
weapon for brutes.
163
 These negative connotations did not prevent the use of the axe in the 
West Highlands and Isles even by the elite, yet they may explain why the axe was not 
venerated in poetry, unlike the sword. 
 
The sword and bow, and to a lesser extent, the axe, remained the main weapons of 
choice for the Scottish Gael, but the „newer weapons‟ – firearms of many types – were 
„gaining ground‟ by the middle of the sixteenth century.164 In the first-half of the sixteenth 
century, before they became more widespread, firearms were exotic weapons capable of 
enhancing a chief‟s prestige. In 1553, Alasdair Ross of Balnagowan seems to delight in the 
order of „ane Culvering yat beis rycht fyne‟ and „four ferynks [firkins] of fine culvering 
poudyr‟.165 An English observer noted that the Highlanders involved in Dòmhnall Dubh‟s 
rebellion in 1545 had „few guns‟.166 In 1555, Aodh, the son of Phelim Ó Néill,167 was 
„killed by the Scots, with the shot of a ball‟.168 Guns had clearly made significant inroads 
by the end of the century, as accounts of the battle of Glenlivet in 1594 record that in 
MacLean‟s vanguard of 3,000 men „2000 wer hagbutters, the third made up of bowmen 
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and swordmen‟.169 As mentioned, a single warrior could carry a bow and sword, and 
switch between them at will. Gunners were apparently less flexible and are rarely 
described as filling multiple roles on the battlefield, perhaps due to the cumbersome weight 
of their weapon. In this period, firearms were not uniformly superior to the bow. Clear 
downsides included their relative inaccuracy, slow fire-rate, and higher cost. Furthermore, 
their efficacy in penetrating plate armour was of limited importance in the Highlands and 
Isles of Scotland where lighter armour predominated.
170
 
Firearms were used in warfare with increasing regularity by the end of the sixteenth 
century, but the bow was never displaced entirely, and the two missile weapons could be 
used in tandem. At the battle of Glenlivet in 1594, Huntly‟s horsemen suffered grisly 
wounds from Argyll‟s army: the earl of Errol was shot in the arm by a bullet and took an 
arrow to the thigh.
171
 In 1601, MacDonald of Glengarry‟s galley was capsized by a „salvo 
of musketry and arrows‟.172 By the 1630s, the role of firearms in warfare had become so 
ingrained that they began to be extolled in contemporary poetry. The MacLean poet 
Eachann Bacach vividly described his clans‟ guns: 
 
An dùirn laochraidh gun leòn 
Cuilbheir caol cruaidh gorm, 
Fuaim shradaidh nan òrd toirt lasain dhaibh. 
 
Slender, hard, blued muskets in the hands of warriors  
who never suffered wounds, as the sound of the  




Extensive use of handguns is noted during the „Islay Rising‟ of 1615, with the besieged 
MacDonalds shooting at Campbell of Cawdor‟s men from the walls of Dunivaig Castle.174 
Relatively few clans appear to have had access to artillery meanwhile, and as discussed in 
Chapter 4 these weapons were rarely used in warfare.
175
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Monumental sculpture provides our clearest vision of the armour worn by the 
militarised elite in Gaelic society. Effigies of chiefs generally depict the individual clad in 
a luireach or haubergeon/hauberk (coat of mail) or a cotún or aketon (a padded coat). 
Protective headgear was almost uniformly a bascinet (known in Gaelic variously as a feilm, 
clogas, or ceannbheart and in the Lowlands as a „steilbonet‟ or „knapscal-bonnet‟) worn 
over a mail coif or aventail (sgaball).
176
 Various literary sources confirm that the image of 
the West Highland warrior depicted in sculpture roughly aligned with reality.
177
 The 
government expected Highland armour to be distinctive from the rest of Scotland, as 
shown by „wapinschawingis‟. These were held by successive Scottish monarchs and 
regents to review the country‟s military preparedness and capability. In the 1575 
„wapinschaw‟, all of the „lawer rent and degre‟ in Scotland were expected to wear 
 
…brigantinis, jakkis, steilbonettis [and] slevis of plait or mailye… 
 
In the Highlands, the requirements were different:  
 
and in the hielandis, habirschonis, steilbonettis [and] hektonis…178 
 
This suggests that coats of mail remained in vogue in the Highlands, while in the Lowlands 
the brigandine or jack (defensive coats similar to aketons but reinforced with metal plates) 
were more popular.
179
 This pattern is further confirmed in an intelligence assessment of the 
Isles c. 1595, which stated that one-third of men eligible for military service in the Isles 
were to „be cled with attounes and haberchounis, and knapshal bannets, as thair lawis 
beir‟.180 Plate armour was never a marked feature of Gaelic military equipment in Scotland, 
although it is depicted on some grave-slabs,
181
 as it was ill-suited to the type of warfare 
conducted in the Highlands and Isles, which prioritised mobility and speed over defence. 
In extreme situations in which extra protection was needed, soldiers may have worn 
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multiple armoured coats – according to Calderwood, MacLean of Duart wore two 
haubergeons and one jack at Glenlivet in 1594.182 
In summary, sixteenth-century warriors from the West Highlands and Isles were 
heavily outfitted infantry who wore coats of mail and bascinets, and wielded various 
weapons, including two-handed swords, axes, bows, javelins, and firearms. In this period 
at least, the combination of the two-handed sword and bow predominated. Lower down the 
social scale, the warriors may have been less well-armoured, perhaps wearing only padded 
coats (cotún or aketon), but they still had access to, and were proficient with, two-handed 
swords, bows, and axes. This two-tiered system of heavy and light infantry based on social 
status and the individuals‟ ability to afford expensive accoutrements is somewhat 
reminiscent of the galloglass and cethern (or „kern‟) groupings in Gaelic Ireland.183 The 
weaponry and armour used in the West Highlands and Isles was significantly different 
from the rest of Scotland, not because of a lack of awareness of other military options but 
because of practical constraints. The role played by the two-handed sword and the bow 
was much more pronounced, and the tandem use of these weapons may have been unique 
to the West Highlands and Isles. Furthermore, there was an absence of spears or pikes, a 




The military capacity of the Highlands and Isles has been described as „remarkable‟ and 
there is no doubt that society was significantly geared towards war.
185
 The scale of military 
activity was not unbounded however and the notion that there were 35,000 Hebridean 
fighting men in Ireland effectively presents the Western Isles as a source of unlimited 
manpower. The Hebrides, and indeed the West Highland and Isles in general, simply could 
not support armies of that size. Depending on the clan, forces of between 500 and 3,000 
men were considered „extraordinary‟ and could not be maintained for more than a few 
months. The total amount of fighting men in the West Highlands and Isles, if they were all 
under one „commandement‟, was probably c. 10,000 men.186 The majority of these soldiers 
were „householders‟ or „ordinary‟ clansmen, and only a small proportion (around 3,000) 
were „gentlemen‟ or daoine uaisle. Thus, despite some overstatements in recent years, the 
military capacity of the region was still clearly considerable. 
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Beyond the sheer numbers they could muster, the flexibility and adaptability of the 
Highlands and Islanders in war was probably the main reason that they were in demand as 
mercenaries in Ireland. Conservatism may have encouraged the slow adoption of new 
military technology, but the „old‟ forms of warfare remained undeniably effective, and the 
enduring use of „traditional‟ equipment, considered antiquated on the continent, cannot be 
explained by the „relative isolation‟ of the West Highlands and Isles.187 Approaches to 
warfare are largely shaped by the immediate environment and topography of the locality. 
The synergy achieved by the combination of the two-handed sword and the bow in the 
sixteenth century is mirrored by the inherent suitability of this weaponry in the landscape 
of the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland.
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Chapter 4: Conduct of Warfare 
Warfare in the Highlands has long been viewed as „hideously brutal and destructive‟ on a 
scale that far outstripped the norms of contemporary Scottish society, even in the allegedly 
„wild country‟ of the Borders.1 Ancient portrayals of Highland savagery may endure in 
modern historiography through descriptions of „wild‟ Highland armies behaving akin to a 
„mob‟ or a „rabble‟.2 Although the pivotal role played by the Highland soldier during the 
Wars of the Three Kingdoms has slowly been acknowledged,
3
 studies of earlier periods are 
quick to fall back on overused stereotypes. Recent revisionism by MacGregor, partly in 
reaction to these stereotypes, presented a more nuanced view of Highland warfare, 
although its constrained length inhibited thorough consideration of specific issues, such as 
the realities of battles or sieges. Moreover, while MacGregor‟s claim that there was a 
„presumption against indiscriminate slaughter‟ is more representative than previous views,4 
it nevertheless risks eliding the occasionally brutal nature of warfare. Overall, it is difficult 
to make generalisations about the conduct of warfare in the late medieval and early modern 
West Highlands and Isles. This chapter will analyse the conduct of warfare in the West 
Highlands and Isles through assessment of a series of themes: raids, battles and skirmishes, 
massacres, castles and sieges, and naval warfare. An underappreciated aspect of Highland 
warfare, namely the participation of Highlanders and Islanders in royal armies, will also be 
discussed, following Boardman‟s work on this theme up to 1513.5 
4.1: Raids 
The most common form of Gaelic warfare during this period was the creach, the cattle 
raid.
6
 Cattle represented the main source of wealth in the Highlands and Isles, and the 
primary goal of these „hit-and-run‟ raids was the „positive capture of resources‟.7 This 
economic motive may have mitigated bloodshed,
8
 and MacGregor has argued that the raids 
were generally „tit-for-tat‟, a careful choreography that allowed for the „preservation of 
life‟.9 Elements of ritual may have been present in these raids as outlined by Martin 
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 with a widely held understanding that the incursion would be reciprocated to 
redeem the honour of the clan. Cattle raids required tight discipline to prevent bloodshed, a 
generally undesirable outcome for both clans as it demanded retaliation and raised the 
spectre of extended bloodfeud. Although there was little tactically innovative about the 
cattle raids, they were generally conducted with a considerable degree of restraint. Some of 
the more destructive raids however, even if they did not directly target clan members, may 
have caused death through starvation and poverty. 
The raiding culture of the Highlands and Isles was not unique. Raiding was a 
ubiquitous form of warfare in medieval Europe and beyond,
11
 and falls under the umbrella 
of the „small war‟.12 Closer to home, cross-border raiding between Scotland and England 
was endemic until the end of the sixteenth century,
13
 and this approach to warfare strongly 
resembles Ireland before and after the Tudor period. Although the nature of war in Ireland 
adopted newfound intensity and scale in the sixteenth century, there was congruence with 
the Scottish experience in terms of cattle raiding, as Simms has observed that the killing of 
the enemy was „not the object…but only an incidental necessity‟.14  
The plunder taken during raids was variable, possibly fluctuating depending on the 
season in which the raid was conducted. Some raids were extremely successful, 
dramatically enriching the raider while impoverishing the aggrieved. A raid on the Grants‟ 
Urquhart castle in the summer of 1546 saw the MacDonalds of Glengarry and the Clan 
Cameron steal c. 100 cows, 100 calves, 40 young cows, 10 bullock, 140 ewes, 100 lambs, 
8 horses, 4 mares, and 4 foals. Gaining entry to the castle itself, they stole everything that 
was not tied down, including the „kyst‟ [chest] which held £300, kitchen utensils, and even 
„tuelf feddir beddis‟.15 The Clan Gregor perhaps made the most extraordinary gains in 
cattle rustling in the early seventeenth century. One raid on Glen Isla in August 1602 saw 
the MacGregors, the MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the Clan Chattan carry off 2,700 cattle 
and 100 horses belonging to the Robertsons of Straloch and other families.
16
 Another 
MacGregor raid in December 1602 saw the theft of 846 ewes, 578 cows, 527 goats, 16 
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mares, and 2 horses from the Colquhouns.
17
 By way of contrast, a more modest spoil of 




Cattle raids mainly took place in the summer months, yet some were conducted in 
the winter. In November 1602, Campbell of Auchinbreck plundered the lands of Stewart of 
Ardmaleish, the sheriff of Bute.
19
 On 17 December 1602, the MacGregors raided the 
Colquhoun lands of Glen Finlas, looting houses and stealing hundreds of cattle, sheep, and 
other livestock.
20
 Raids of this nature were a potential death sentence for the victims. When 
the harvest was collected in September and October, stockpiles of grain and livestock had 
to last through the long winter months, and destruction or theft of these supplies made 
starvation a very real possibility. Raids in the winter may have represented a deliberate 
escalation of warfare, aimed at causing starvation, yet equally, the attackers could have 
been motivated by desperation due to the scarcity of their own supplies. Even boredom and 
idleness among professional warriors during the long winter months may have initiated 
some of these incursions. 
 
In the maritime world of the West Highlands and Isles, the sea was far from an 
impassable barrier, and although clans often campaigned as mercenaries across the Irish 
Sea, the coast of Ireland was also targeted by more predatory incursions. The MacNeills of 
Barra were particularly infamous for their piratical activities in this period,
21
 especially for 
their raids on the coast of Connacht in Ireland.
22
 In 1589, it was reported to the English 
Privy Council that: 
Four hundred Scots of the sept of the Barrones invaded Irris [Erris in Country 
Mayo], killed 600 cows, freighting their gallies with the spoil, and 500 cows 
besides they carried to an island and there killed them and took away the hides and 
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This raid, apparently conducted by the MacNeills of Barra („Barrones‟), answers a 
lingering question posed by Morgan‟s review of The World of the Galloglass, namely 
whether galleys were able to „carry away live cattle or just their hides‟.24 Clearly, they 
could do both. Depending on their size, bírlinnean or galleys could carry anywhere 
between 36 and 72 men and were still seaworthy if undermanned, as indicated by the 
MacLeods of Lewis‟ raid on the merchant ship in 1598, performed by two ships of 20 
men.
25
 Thus the 400 strong MacNeill force could have sailed in a fleet of anywhere 
between 5 and 20 vessels, but it was probably closer to the latter, as undermanned ships 
left more room for cattle and other spoils. Seaborne cattle raids within the Hebrides were 
probably quite common. In 1601, the MacLeods of Harris raided North Uist, carrying off 
livestock that probably would have been transported (dead or alive) via galleys had they 
not been ambushed by a small MacDonald force before reaching the coast.
26
  
Although enrichment was the primary objective of raids, killings were not 
uncommon when the invaded party mounted a physical resistance to the incursion. As 
already shown, in 1589 the MacNeills of Barra were attacked by the Burkes after a raid 
with „some‟ losses on both sides.27 Additionally, following the cattle raid on Glen Isla in 
August 1602 by the MacGregors, the MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the Clan Chattan, the 
Robertsons of Straloch convened with other aggrieved families to track down the raiders 
and recover their stolen property. Soon, they were ambushed by the cattle raiders: 15 or 16 
„speciall gentilmen‟ from Glen Isla were killed, and „a grite nowmer‟ of others were 
„woundit to the deid‟. The raiders, presumably having taken casualties, were anxious to 
escape, but knew they could not „guidlie get the saidis guidis caryit away with thame‟ as 
they had stolen an unmanageable number (over 2,000) of cattle. In a cynical move, the 
raiders killed the „maist part‟ of the stolen animals, unburdening themselves for an escape, 
while denying both sides the valuable property. Although the hides and tallow of the cattle 
could still be recovered, this was little consolation for the Robertsons who declared the 
slaughter „to the grite hurte and prejudice of the commoun wele‟.28 Outright rustling was 
the most common form of creach, but some cattle raids involved the maiming or killing of 
livestock, an act aimed at diminishing the wealth of rivals and perhaps coinciding with 
general attacks on property.
29
 Indeed, some raids seem more reminiscent of scorched-earth 
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tactics or the chevauchées conducted during the Hundred Years War, which aimed to 
weaken the enemy by pillaging and destroying his land.
30
 During the conquest of Ireland, 
the English and Irish alike attempted to starve their opponent into submission.
31
 
Comparably severe tactics were seemingly employed by both participants in the feud 
between the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Harris in 1601. These raids 
outstripped the creach in severity, and their intention was presumably to force a 
submission or provoke a battle, which in this case did eventually occur, as shown in 
Chapter 6. On rare occasions, raids directly targeted tenantry. In 1588, a raid on the Small 
Isles by MacLean of Duart was allegedly indiscriminate, according to a government report: 
 
…[MacLean] accumpanyed with a grite nowmer of thevis, brokin men, and 
sornaris of Clannis…come, bodin in feir of weir, to his Majesteis propir ilis of 
Canna Rum, Eg, and the Ile of Elennole [Muck?], and…thay tressonablie rased fyre, 
and in maist barbarous, shamefull and cruell maner, brynt the same Illis, with the 
haill men, wemen and childrene being thairintill, not spairing the pupillis and 
infantis…32 
A raid of this nature could have been intended to demoralise and terrorise the local 




4.2: Battles and Skirmishes 
Pitched or „set piece‟ battles were relatively infrequent in the West Highlands and Isles 
between 1544 and 1615. As argued by MacGregor, there was a „very powerful 
predisposition against large-scale and head-on confrontation‟.34 Due to the generally self-
contained nature of a clan‟s military capacity (in contrast to the reliance on mercenaries in 
Ireland), the carnage of battle came with a heavy human cost that struck directly at the 
heart of the clan‟s strength, with its limited pool of elite warriors. A vivid example of the 
risks of full-scale battle was the near annihilation of the Clan Fraser at Blàr nan Lèine in 
1544.
35
 Clans weakened by battle became prime targets for further incursions by 
opportunistic rivals. As a result of these concerns, few clans engaged in more than one 
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major battle in Scotland between 1544 and 1615, as they were loath to repeatedly risk the 
lives of their fighting elite in large-scale combat.
36
  
The Dean of Limerick‟s report in 1596, which recommended the Hebridean clans 
for service against Tyrone in Ulster, provides a vision of the warfare waged by the 
Highlanders and Islanders: 
 
…the hope of the ennemy in the streingthe of theire parts may be taken away by the 
ilanders service in this, that the army marchinge throwe the same, theire light men 
may be guided by good guydes throughe bogges and woods to assaulte them behind 
theire backs with swords and arrowes, so as the army may securelie goe throwe. 
Moreover, they be lustie curragious and forward in theire manner of fight and 
weapon, if they have a good leader...
37
 
Mobile skirmishing is clearly singled out as the core strength of the islanders, who were 
perhaps best employed to harass or ambush larger armies. Nevertheless, the islanders were 
not averse to close-quarters combat for „feats, assaults, and handy blowes‟.38 This chimes 
with MacLean of Duart‟s claim that his men could switch from bow to sword when 
necessary.
39
 The main skillsets of the islanders were particularly desirable in Ireland as it 




Their flexibility also proved useful in other theatres of war. In July 1548, as part of 
the „Rough Wooing‟, a coalition of Scottish and French troops besieged Haddington in 
Lothian which had been occupied by the English. Jean de Beaugué, a French soldier who 
served with the Scottish army at the time, was impressed by the Highlanders‟ performance:  
 
There was not one of them, who gave not convincing Proofs, that they stood in no 
Awe of the English, they beat off their advanc‟d Guards in a Minute, with a Volley 
of Arrows and then with Sword in Hand advanc‟d upon 5 or 600 that were posted 
between the Port and the Barriers…41 
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With bow and sword in perfect synchronicity, the Highland troops harassed and drove off 
the advancing English line that aimed to silence the Scottish cannons. Stevenson has 
argued that the „Highland charge‟ was a tactical innovation by Alasdair MacColla in the 
1640s, in which the Highlander soldiers advanced within musket range of the enemy ranks, 
fired one volley, and then cast aside their muskets to charge the enemy with their swords 
and targes.
42
 De Beaugué‟s description provides further persuasive evidence that the 
„Highland charge‟ had „earlier origins‟, as already argued by Caldwell and MacGregor.43 
The ranged weaponry may have changed from bow to musket by the 1640s, but the 
underlying tactics remained essentially identical.  
Hill, following Hayes-McCoy,
44
 has argued that „Gaelic‟ armies only adopted 
guerrilla and skirmish tactics when faced against the militarily superior English, and „when 
fighting among themselves, Gaelic generals…slugged it out using heavy infantry armed 
with blade weapons‟.45 The focus of Hill and Hayes-McCoy on Ireland in the late sixteenth 
century may explain the divergence found in Highlands and Isles of Scotland where small-
scale skirmishing was the main component of warfare. Ambushes were especially 
prevalent in warfare between clans in the Highlands, indicating an avoidance of „head-on‟ 
pitched battles. Notable examples include the waylaying of the Frasers by the Clanranald at 
Laggan in 1544,
46
 and Ailean Cameron of Lochiel‟s ambush of his own kin in 1614.47 In 
the former example, the ambush by the Clanranald was successful, but the Frasers 
managed to marshall a stout defence.
48
 Nonetheless, Hill‟s comment that armies „slugged it 
out‟ does evoke the intensity and vigour of some pitched battles fought in Scotland, many 
of which lasted for several hours before a victor emerged. At Blàr nan Lèine in 1544 for 
example, the fighting continued until night fell,
49
 at Blàr Traigh Ghruinneart in 1598 the 
battle was „foughten a long tyme on either syd‟,50 and at Blàr Coire na Creiche in 1601, 
the MacLeods of Harris fought the MacDonalds of Sleat „all the day long‟.51 
 
Before battle was given, Highland troops may have used music and poetry to boost 
morale and prepare for combat. A MacGregor song possibly related to the battle of Glen 
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Fruin in 1603 describes a feast which had „pìob ga spreigeadh/pipes inciting‟ the 
MacGregor leader and his followers.
52
 Jean de Beaugué claims that a contingent of the earl 
of Argyll‟s Highlanders, „les Escossois sauvages‟, were „provocquoyent aux armes par les 
sons de leurs cornemeuses‟ („provoked to arms by the sound of their bagpipes‟) when 
battle with the English appeared imminent at Musselburgh.
53
 Similarly, poets used the 




As already observed in Chapter 2, mediation between leaders could take place 
before fighting began, as shown at Blàr Tràigh Ghruinneart in 1598, and these pre-battle 
negotiations can be seen as a last attempt to prevent bloodshed. With the armies assembled 
and ready for battle, the likelihood of a peaceful settlement was slim at such a late stage, 
and instead these negotiations may have been a pretence designed to fail, a pre-battle ritual 
demonstrating to both sides that the dispute could now only be settled by force of arms. 
Moreover, an offer of talks may simply have been the proper and polite way to initiate 
combat, as it provided a chance, however unlikely, for bloodless resolution. When the 
terms of the negotiations were patently unworkable, as they were in 1598 between the 
MacDonalds of Dunivaig and the MacLeans of Duart, they may even have provoked one 
side to attack. 
 
Highland soldiers have often been portrayed as „wild‟ and unruly, a view that 
reached a nadir with Stuart Reid commenting that Highland armies, even in the 
seventeenth century, were a „half-armed, undisciplined mob‟.55 In contrast, a high premium 
was placed upon the rigorous discipline of the soldiery in bardic poetry, even when the 
chief was extolled for his personal bravery. This is shown in a poem to Campbell in 
Lawers from The Book of the Dean of Lismore in which his army is unified as a „company‟, 
a „host‟, a „valorous band‟, and a „troop that scatters not‟.56 Furthermore, heraldic banners 
may have been unfurled in battle to maintain discipline and increase morale. Heraldry was 
a common facet of medieval warfare in Europe, with heraldic designs emblazoned on 
banners, armour, or shields to allow allies and enemies to be easily distinguished, and it 
certainly existed in the West Highlands and Isles.
57
 The poem to Campbell of Lawers 
references banners in relation to Lawers‟ mooted participation in the battle of Flodden in 
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1513, or a hypothetical revenge attack on the English.
58
 Likewise, a poem composed for 
Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig (d. 1626) encourages him to „display [his] banner as a 
satin beast‟.59 Poetry written for MacLean chiefs in the first half of the seventeenth century 
repeatedly references the use of banners, which may indicate continuing use at this time.
60
 
These banners are specifically mentioned as helping to maintain unit cohesion: 
 
 Bhiodh fir Mhuile mud‟ bhrataich, 
 ‟S ann mud‟ ghualainn gum faight‟ iad; 
 Bu nì duilich am fasdadh ‟s do leòn. 
  
The men of Mull would be around your banner, they 
 would be found at your shoulder: it would be a 




Other than examples from poetry, Hugh MacDonald claims that MacLean of Ardgour 
„displayed his colours in his galley‟ at the battle of Bloody Bay c. 1481,62 and the Fraser 
history states that the Clanranald displayed seven banners at Blàr nan Lèine in 1544.
63
 As 
this lattter engagement was an ambush that progressed into a full-scale battle, it seems 
surprising that they would announce their arrival in such a way, but they may have 
unfurled their banners when the Frasers had already been trapped.  
 
„Gaelic‟ warfare has been characterised as possessing an „emphasis on the attack‟, 
epitomised by the „Highland charge‟.64 The approach to battle in the Highlands and Isles 
defies such simple generalisations as each engagement and each commander was different. 
Not all battles were won by an initial offensive charge, and in fact, a considerable number 
of battles involved defensive strategies. For example, according to one account of Blàr 
Traigh Ghruinneart in 1598,
65
 Sir Seumas MacDonald feigned a retreat to outmanoeuvre 
his opponent, MacLean of Duart: 
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…in the beginning, caused his vanguard make a compass in fashion of a retreat, 
thereby to get the sun at his back, and the advantage of a hill which was hard by. In 
end, Sir James having repulsed the enemies vanguard, and forcing their main battle, 
Maclean was slain courageously fighting…66 
 
Seumas baited his enemy to attack his elevated position and once MacLean‟s presumably 
tired vanguard was „repulsed‟, only then did he launch a downhill charge on the „main 
battle‟. He clearly employed a premeditated strategy to exploit the surrounding terrain and 
mitigate his numerical disadvantage. This kind of manoeuvring in the face of the enemy 
again emphasises the importance of discipline and strong leadership in Highland armies. 
At other battles, the numerically inferior force typically adopted a defensive position on 
high ground, as shown during the MacDonald/MacLeod feud in 1601, firstly at Carinish 
and then at the climactic Blàr Coire na Creiche.
67
 Even with a numerical advantage, a 
defensive strategy could be used, as shown at Glenlivet in 1594, where Argyll‟s army 
repulsed waves of cavalry charges by Huntly. By fighting from the high ground, an army 
could force an overconfident enemy to risk a potentially costly charge uphill. Although 
Huntly‟s cavalry eventually punched through Argyll‟s lines at Glenlivet, his men initially 
took heavy casualties from withering volleys of arrows and musket balls as they charged 
up the hilltop. 
 
The early phases of battle could be carefully orchestrated, but the onset of close 
combat probably ushered generalised chaos. As the battle wore on and formations 
gradually disintegrated, identification of friend from foe must have become increasingly 
difficult.
68
 Verbal communication through shouted commands and rallying cries was 
presumably used to keep combatants organised during battle. A natural rally point would 
have been the clan chief himself and his retinue. Leaders may have wielded or worn 
ornamented equipment to be distinguished from the rank and file,
69
 thus operating as a 
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personified banner that clansmen could look to for organisation and inspiration during the 
fighting.
70
 Phillips has asserted that Highland warfare was characterised by a „high degree 
of weapon skill‟ rather than „unit cohesion‟.71 Based on accounts of the best documented 
battle of the period, Glenlivet in 1594, this appears to be a relatively accurate description 
of the ensuing mêlée, although this conflict may be a relatively chaotic and atypical 
benchmark.
72
 It was reported that many of the MacLeans on Argyll‟s side, in emulation of 
the kind of suicidal obstinacy made famous by the galloglass in Ireland,
73
 fought to the last 
man even when hope for victory was lost: 
 
They stood singly, and rather suffered themselves to be killed, than ask quarter: nay, 
we saw many, individually surrounded by horse, refuse to yield, and meet death 




By this point in the battle, a second charge by Huntly‟s horsemen had succeeded in 
disrupting Argyll‟s formations, and the frontlines were in disarray.75 The above source 
strongly implies that individual MacLean warriors engaged in single combat with Huntly‟s 
horsemen.
76
 This may indicate a genuine desire, especially among the chiefs and clan elite, 
to conduct themselves bravely even in the face of certain defeat. The MacLean chief, 
Lachlann Mòr, also „rushed into the thickest of his enemies‟ to fight alongside his men.77 
Calderwood notes: 
 
Macklaine hath played one of the most valiant men that ever Heeland man played. 
For in the coming to of Huntlie‟s stale oast, after the first course was past, he 
having a jacke upon him, two habergiouns, with a murrioun [morrion], and a 
Danish axe, he perceiving Huntlie‟s standard, played so valientlie with the axe, that 
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he slue foure or five, untill the tyme he came to Huntlie‟s standard, and sticked the 
horse whereupon the bearer raid, and nixt cutted himself in two at the waste, and 




As the warrior chief was so venerated by clan society, the presence of Lachlann Mòr would 
have compelled his followers to stand their ground, and his immediate retinue may well 
have regarded it as a matter of honour to remain on the field to protect their chief, since he 
„embodied the military worth of his kindred‟.79 The importance of individual leaders is 
shown elsewhere at Glenlivet when a notable warrior, probably the brother of MacNeill of 
Barra, was killed by cannonfire in the opening moments, causing many to flee.
80
 One 
source claimed the islanders‟ reaction was akin to „herds of wild beasts‟:  
 
…they tooke his death as a thing ominous (for to this kynd of superstition the 
Hielanders generally are of all men most addicted), and were seen thereupon to 
stagger and reel to and fro in great disorder.
81
 
While this statement is loaded with prejudice, it may reflect the shocked reaction of 
clansmen witnessing the sudden death of their leader, who in this instance was credited as 
„one of the most valiant men of that party‟.82 The capture or death of a chief in battle 
generally signalled defeat and several engagements appear to have climaxed with the death 
of the warleader or chief (MacDonald of Sleat at Eilean Donan c. 1540;
83
 MacLean in 
1598;
84
 MacDonald of Glengarry‟s son in 1602/3) or his capture (MacLeod of Harris‟ 
brother in 1601).
85
 According to Gregory, when Alasdair MacGorrie was surprised and 
killed by the MacKenzies, the „loss so disheartened the MacDonalds [of Glengarry] that 
they returned home without performing any action of consequence‟.86 
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The siege of Haddington in 1548 provides another interesting anecdotal example of 
a Highland soldier‟s strong desire to win renown on the battlefield. According to Jean de 
Beaugué, one Highlander from Argyll‟s contingent charged a group of English soldiers in 
combat with his French allies 
 
…and with incredible Celerity Seizing one of them, in spite of Opposition trus‟d 
him upon his Back, and in this Plight brought him to our Camp; where we observ‟d 
that the Enrag‟d Captive had Bit his Shoulder after so Butcherly a manner, that he 




For this feat of personal bravery, the French commander André de Montalembert (Seigneur 
d‟Essé) rewarded him with a coat of mail and 20 crowns, which the unknown Highlander 
„receiv‟d with all imaginable Demonstrations of Gratitude‟.88 Overall, there was a stong 
emphasis placed on discipline in Highland armies, but there was scope, where appropriate, 
for impetuous action by the individual. 
 
As battles continued and casualties climbed, morale would falter, and usually one 
side would flee the field. This did not signal the end of the fighting, but instead initiated 
another phase of combat: the rout (ruaig) and pursuit (tòir).
89
 Poetry celebrates the pursuit 
because it represented victory,
90
 but it may have been when the most brutal violence 
occurred. At the battle of Langside in 1568 during the Marian Civil War, the MacFarlanes, 
fighting on the side of Regent Moray against Queen Mary, „made great slaughter, thought 
not the least to achieve victory‟,91 and some historians have, probably justifiably, identified 
the MacFarlanes with the infantrymen that pursued Mary‟s retreating forces, until Moray 
called them off.
92
 In 1604, a skirmish at „Bintoich‟ between 60 MacGregors and 200 
Campbells and their allies apparently ended with fairly minimal casualties: two dead 
MacGregors and seven dead Campbells.
93
 When the MacGregors retreated however, they 
were pursued by the Campbells and around 20 MacGregors were run down and killed.
94
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These killings were probably of the „hot-blooded‟ variety, regarded by contemporaries as 




Other post-battle incidents were of a different order and involved the cold-blooded killing 
of defenceless or disarmed prisoners. Marion Campbell‟s song for her husband MacGregor 
of Glenstrae apparently describes the skirmish at Killiecrankie on 7 December 1562 in 
which eight Campbells were killed by a MacGregor raiding party. According to Marion, 
the MacGregors showed little mercy to the defeated Campbells: 
…Agus ògan deas innealt‟ 
Dhan gheàrr thu ‟mhuineal mu ‟chòtan. 
 
Gum meal thu ‟n cuid aodaich… 
 
…and many an elegant, fashionable youth 
Whose throat you cut along the line of his coat. 
 
May you have the profit of their garments…96 
 
This skirmish may have evolved into a small-scale massacre as the Campbells whose 
throats were cut were probably wounded or in captivity, and therefore defenceless.
97
 
Ronald Black has suggested that the line „Dhan gheàrr thu ‟mhuineal mu ‟chòtan‟ implies 
that the „throat was targeted in order to avoid spoiling the coat‟.98 At this skirmish, the 
Campbells wore silk shirts, coats, and boots – all valuable goods that could be traded and 
sold by the fugitive MacGregors.
99
 Similar tactics were probably used to avoid puncturing 
coats of mail or aketons, and stripping the corpses of soldiers killed in battle would have 
been an immediate form of plunder for a victor.
100
 Captured soldiers too could have their 
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armour and weapons confiscated.
101
 At the trial of MacGregor of Glenstrae, it was alleged 
the MacGregors „crewallie slew‟ most of their Colquhoun captives after the battle of Glen 
Fruin in 1603,
102
 a claim reiterated in more specific detail in 1609, when Ailean Òg, one of 
Glenstrae‟s followers, was apprehended for killing „fourty poore personis quho wer naiked 
and without airmour‟ after the battle.103 Judging from Ailean Òg‟s charges, these men were 
presumably stripped of their armour and then executed. 
This period certainly has a reputation for extreme violence in the Highlands and 
Isles, but the most infamous incidents may be apocryphal.
104
 An atrocity that 
unquestionably took place was the massacre of MacLean prisoners held by Aonghas 
MacDonald of Dunivaig in the summer of 1586. The MacLean chief, Lachlann Mòr, was 
eventually released, but between 40 and 80 of his followers were beheaded by Aonghas‟ 
brother, Colla.
105
 Reportedly the prisoners were executed „by coupls‟ (i.e. two killed per 
day) in MacLean‟s „awin sight‟.106 This act of cold-blooded mass-murder, motivated by a 
desire for vengeance, shocked the government. In apparent response to this massacre, 
parliament passed legislation on 8 July 1587 that made all future „murthour or 
slauchter…quhair the pairtie slane is under the traist credite, assurance and power of the 
slayer‟ a treasonable offence.107 Macinnes has pointed out that after this incident there was 
no major „cold-blooded incident involving the massacre of clansmen in the guise of 
slaughter under trust…between the 1590s and the 1640s‟.108 Precursors of this magnitude 
are difficult to find and therefore it can be seen as fairly anomalous in Highland warfare.  
 
Contextualising this violence is important. European warfare in the sixteenth 
century was pervaded by a culture of massacre, and the situation in Ireland was of 
particular relevance to the Highlands and Isles. Historians of early modern Ireland have 
recently downplayed the violent nature of the English conquest in the sixteenth century, 
preferring instead to focus on the administrative „reform‟ of the country, and even blaming 
the Gaelic lords for the violence that ensued. However, Edwards has argued that an 
escalation of violence on both sides of the conflict reached unprecedented levels of 
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brutality by the 1560s and only worsened thereafter.
109
 The involvement of the Hebridean 
clans in this conflict in Ireland may have hardened their approach to warfare at home and 
abroad, and MacGregor has suggested that the overall intensification of warfare towards 
the end of the sixteenth century was in step with the situation in Ireland.
110
 Even elsewhere 
in Scotland, mass killings were perpetrated during the Marian Civil War. The conduct of 
those wars escalated as they dragged on, as shown by the hanging of the 150-man garrison 
of Brechin in 1570. Allegedly, Regent Morton began executing prisoners to hasten the 
conclusion of the conflict.
111
  
There is of course one key difference between the killings in the Highlands and 
those conducted during the Marian Civil War: the violence perpetrated in the Highlands 
was private and unlicensed by the crown, whereas Morton was invested with royal 
authority that allowed him to execute these men as traitors. Although the Highlands should 
be judged by the same standards as elsewhere in Scotland, the identity of the individual 
committing violence was paramount in the sixteenth century. These isolated incidents of 
extreme bloodshed in the Highlands may have been shocking because they presented a 
clear challenge to the government‟s monopoly on violence. It should be emphasised that 
the massacre of the MacLeans in 1586 for example may have appeared to outside 
observers as sudden and unprompted, but the two clans‟ feud over Islay had been brewing 
for decades, and had escalated the year before when MacLean either captured 
MacDonald,
112
 or propagated anti-MacDonald songs.
113
 These clans essentially existed in a 
state of war equivalent to the civil wars that wracked the country between 1568 and 1573, 
with all the associated potential for escalation of conduct. 
 
There was no codified guide of the „right‟ way to wage war in the Highlands and 
Isles, apart from the abstract and sometimes contradictory vision of bardic poetry.
114
 In war, 
even supposedly binding codes of conduct and honour, such as chivalry in medieval 
Europe, were abandoned depending on the situation.
115
 Regional differences and 
contingent circumstances made conflicts unique, and military leaders were complex 
individuals. For example, Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart‟s career contains flashes of 
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brutal violence, such as his beheading of his uncle, MacLean of Coll, in 1578,
116
 yet he 
could exhibit mercy and restraint, as when he released hundreds of MacDonald captives 
into their own lands in 1595.
117
 Circumstances and political expediency influenced conduct 
and overall, massacres were an extraordinary occurrence in the warfare of the Highlands 
and Isles. Those that did occur should be properly contextualised, both within broader 
trends and their immediate political background. 
4.4: Highlanders and Islanders in Royal Armies 
As noted by Boardman, there is a „general tendency to downplay or ignore the contribution 
of Gaelic-speaking areas of the kingdom to royal armies in the medieval period‟,118 and the 
same is true of the late medieval and early modern periods. In the sixteenth century, 
substantial bodies of men from the Highlands and Isles fought under the royal banner at 
Flodden in 1513, Solway Moss in 1542, Pinkie in 1547, and Glenlivet in 1594.
119
 Many 
died for the cause, with notable casualties, including the second earl of Argyll, falling at 
Flodden in particular.
120
 In terms of commitment, the contribution of Scottish Highlanders 
and Islanders in royal armies cannot easily be faulted,
121
 and at some battles they were the 
decisive element. In 1568, the MacFarlanes turned the tide of the battle of Langside in 
Regent Moray‟s favour by charging Argyll‟s western flank when the two armies became 
bogged down by the interlocking sheaves of pikes along the front-lines.
122
 Sixteenth-
century historians like Buchanan, Pitscottie, Lesley, and Calderwood, all highly esteemed 
the martial skill of the Highland soldier, to the extent that accounts of chiefs battling 
valiantly to salvage victory from the jaws of defeat became a well-worn trope by the end of 
the century.
123
 Perhaps drawing from the well of ancient stereotypes of the warlike Gael,
124
 
these evocative accounts may seem embroidered, but their recurrence suggests a basis in 
historical fact. While Lowland Scots may have generally welcomed the contribution of 
                                                          
116
 RPC, Vol. III, 132-5; Maclean-Bristol, Murder Under Trust, 67. 
117
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 661, 667-8. 
118
 Boardman, Campbells, 332; Boardman, „Highland Scots‟, 231-53, esp. 233. C.f. Julian Goodare, State and 
Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999), 231. 
119
 At Pinkie for example, there may have been around 4,000 archers from the Highlands, representing just 
under one-fifth of the total Scottish army of c. 23,000 men. See David Caldwell, „Pinkie‟, 73-5. 
120
 Boardman, Campbells, 334-5. 
121
 Although island clans like the MacLeans of Duart and the MacNeills of Barra were found in royal armies, 
others like the MacDonalds of Sleat and MacLeods of Harris rarely heeded the call (although MacDonald of 
Lochalsh was at Flodden). Difficulties in recruitment were not just limited to the Highlands. Especially after 
the battle of Pinkie, the Scottish levy was increasingly reluctant to serve for more than two weeks, and often 
refused to cross the Border into England. See Caldwell, „Pinkie‟, 74; Cathcart, „A Spent Force?‟, 258; 
Phillips, „In the Shadow of Flodden‟, 165-6. 
122
 CSPS, Vol. II, 406-7; Melville, Memoirs, 201-2. 
123
 Buchanan, History, 368; Pitscottie, Historie, Vol. I, 274-6, 270-1; Calderwood, History, Vol. V, 350.  
124
 MacGregor, „Gaelic Barbarity‟, 23. 
123 
 
their Highland countrymen, on other occasions there was considerable tension between the 
Lowlanders and their Highland allies.
125 
A broad view of the performance and conduct of the Gaels in set-piece battles may 
suggest discomfort when artillery was involved, which was not a regular feature of warfare 
in the Highlands and Isles. This unfamiliarity, coupled with the sudden and horrific injuries 
it could wreak, made it an understandably recurrent reason for flight. Even when cannons 
were used by allies, Highlanders could exhibit serious unease, as shown at the siege of 
Haddington in 1548. Jean de Beaugué notes that a large group of Highlanders were 
charging the English lines when 
…the Noise of the [Scots‟] Artillery, with which they had not been acquainted, 
soon quell‟d their Courage: The Highlanders shut their Ears, and threw themselves 
on their Bellies at each Shout of the Cannon.
126
 
Rather than falling to the ground from fear however, it is possible that the Highlanders 
were deliberately lying prone to avoid the cannonballs and covering their ears to muffle the 
loud noise. That said, at both Pinkie in 1547 and Glenlivet in 1594, an artillery barrage 
caused Highlanders and Islanders to flee the field en masse.
127
 According to William 
Patten, who accompanied the English army at Pinkie, a 
…galley shot…slewe the Master of Greym with a fiue & twenty nere by him, and 
thearwith so skarred the iiii. thousand Irish archers brought by the Erle of Arguile, 
that whear…they shoulde haue bene a wyng to the forewarde, thei coold neuer after 




The „Irish‟ under Argyll‟s command were allegedly the first to flee at Pinkie,129 but they 
bore the brunt of the cannon barrage, and the whole army appears to have disintegrated 
into a mass rout almost simultaneously.
130
 However, at Glenlivet the decapitation of the 
MacNeill leader by a cannonball caused disarray within Argyll‟s army, with many 
hundreds fleeing.
131
 As was the case with most late medieval or early modern armies, there 
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would have been many unprofessional soldiers filling out the ranks who lacked the 
discipline of the elite. At both Pinkie and Glenlivet, a core grouping of soldiers from the 




4.5: Castles and Sieges 
As discussed in Chapter 1, castles were not understood as purely military structures and in 
the poetic vision of warfare, sieges were not venerated. In reality however, various castles 
were besieged or assaulted in the sixteenth century. The traditional siege was the tactical 
antithesis of the highly mobile, skirmish-warfare generally employed by Highlanders and 
Islanders. As the primary objective of the creach was not permanent occupation but the 
capture of resources and booty, direct contact with heavily fortified structures was 
typically avoided. Townships or farms were a more vulnerable and tempting target. Yet 
transitory cattle raids were also a direct challenge to the chief‟s ability to rule and 
demanded swift retaliation. Failing to respond would undermine a chief and signalise 
weakness to predatory rivals, increasing the likelihood of a follow-up attack on his 
stronghold. Therefore, the siege and capture of a clan‟s seat was an escalation of warfare: a 
statement of long-term ambitions by the attacker, and a politically loaded action that struck 
at the heart of the incumbent chief‟s authority and legitimacy. This further explains why 
chiefs were expected to avenge raids on their territory, beyond the recovery of resources 
and honour. The measurable damage of raids could be variable, but all carried the threat of 




For the attacker, an assault on castle walls presented a considerable risk, 
exacerbated by the fact that relatively few clans had the siege equipment necessary to 
effectively reduce a fortified castle.
134
 In c. 1540, Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat 
was killed in an attempt to capture Eilean Donan castle from the MacKenzies.
135
 Drawing 
upon natural defences, some castles were located on coastal sites, or near peninsulas and 
lochs, which limited an attacker‟s accessibility and angle of approach.136 According to 
„The Description‟, written c. 1595, the castle of Breachacha on Coll was of „great strenth 
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be reason of the situation thairof verie neir to the sea, quhilk defendis the half thairof, and 
hes three walls about the rest of the castell‟.137 The Clanranald‟s Castle Tioram, the 
MacLeods‟ Dunvegan Castle, the MacLeans‟ Duart Castle, and the Glenorchy Campbells‟ 
Kilchurn Castle are other examples of strongholds situated at defensible locations. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, castle garrisons were generally very small, often numbering a 
handful of men. Such small numbers could leave the castles vulnerable to sieges or raids, 
as shown during the „Islay Rising‟, when Dunivaig Castle, garrisoned by only four men, 
was captured by the MacDonalds.
138
 
   
Protracted sieges were a rare occurrence in Gaelic warfare, and in some cases the 
capture of a castle appears to be the opportunistic extension of a transitory cattle raid. After 
the battle of Flodden in 1513, Sir Dòmhnall MacDonald of Lochalsh led an uprising to 
recover his father‟s lands and restore the Lordship of the Isles with himself at the head. 
Lochalsh raided the lands of Iain Grant of Freuchie, seizing Grant‟s recently acquired 
castle at Urquhart.
139
 The castle garrison was expelled and the surrounding lands were 
looted, before being occupied by the MacDonalds for three years.
140
 Another raid on 
Urquhart Castle conducted in 1546 saw the looting of the castle by the Camerons in very 
similar circumstances, as discussed in Chapter 5. In both 1513 and 1546, the castle 





These raids show that West Highland castles were far from impenetrable, but they 
could still be extremely difficult to capture, especially if the attackers lacked the crucial 
element of surprise. This is shown in 1570, when a long struggle flared up between the 
Munros and the MacKenzies over competing claims to the castle and lands of the 
Chanonry of Ross.
142
 According to Sir Robert Gordon, the Munros defended the castle for 
three years (presumably intermittently) „with great slaughter on either syd‟ before the 
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castle was finally „delyvered‟ to the MacKenzies by the „act of pacification‟.143 A strong 
sense of the impenetrability of castles pervades genealogical histories, which feature 
various stories of invincible castles captured only by the clever stratagem of a heroic figure, 
or the timely defection of the garrison.
144
 A genuine case of the latter was the MacKenzies‟ 
capture of Strome in 1602, taken „by treason of the captain unto whom Glengarrie had 
committed the custody thereof‟.145 
 
The advent of new siege technology made castles look decidedly more fragile as 
early as 1505/6 with the gunpowder-assisted siege and capture of Stornoway castle by 
Huntly.
146
 The introduction of the cannon to the region did not constitute a total revolution 
in siege warfare however, as the majority of nobles in Scotland, Gaelic or otherwise, had 
little access to such weaponry for most of the sixteenth century, leaving the government 
with effective monopoly of their use. Dawson has argued that the pre-eminent status of 
Gilleasbuig, the fifth earl of Argyll, was due in large part to his unmatched control of 
powerful field artillery.
147
 The effectiveness of artillery could be limited. In October 1588, 
Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart besieged Mingary castle, the stronghold of his enemy 
MacIain of Ardnamurchan, whom he had captured earlier that year.
148
 In September, 
Lachlann enlisted the unlikely help of „ane hundredth spanyeartis‟ from the Spanish 
Armada, whose galleon had blown off course, landing in Tobermory Bay in Mull. These 
Spanish troops provided MacLean with two small cannons from their ship, and this 
makeshift coalition used „all kind of hostilitie and force, baith be fyre and swerd, that 
mycht be had for recovery‟ of Mingary. With the help of the Spaniards and with MacIain 
already in his custody, Lachlann may have felt confident of success. However, after laying 
siege to the castle for the three days, Lachlann‟s army was driven off and the garrison at 
Mingary relieved by „his Majesteis gude subjectis‟.149 The relatively small Spanish 
cannons, presumably designed to breach wooden ships not stone castles, were not powerful 
enough to reduce the walls. 
 
The ubiquity of the castle across the western seaboard, with most major clans 
possessing at least one fortification, meant that kindreds were not easily dislodged from 
their territory. Even after defeat in battle, clans could retreat to their stronghold to regroup. 
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This basic function of the castle coupled with the weighty symbolism infused within their 
walls could provoke an extreme response, as exemplified in the feud between MacKenzie 
of Kintail and MacDonald of Glengarry. Castle Strome, the last fortress of the MacDonalds 
on the western mainland seaboard, was first captured and then blown up by Kintail in 
1602/3.
150
 The destruction rather than occupation of the castle was an act that spoke louder 
than words: it signalised the termination of MacDonald lordship on the west coast. 
Similarly, following a sequence of damaging sieges during the „Islay Rising‟ in 1614 and 
1615, Dunivaig Castle was abandoned by Sir Seumas MacDonald, and afterwards its 
destruction was much debated by the government.
151
 Motives for such drastic action are 
obvious. Demolition severed the continuity of land possession, the desolate castle serving 
as a constant reminder of the dissolution of the former lord‟s legitimacy. As the „Islay 
Rising‟ demonstrated, the ancestral fortress of the ousted clan was a natural focal point for 
unrest or rebellion by the previous owners. If retaken, it could serve as a base of operations 
for future counter-attacks against the new occupants. Reducing the castle made reclamation 
impossible, and in terms of imagery it was tantamount to sowing the earth with salt.
152
  
4.6: Naval Warfare 
Contrary to the maritime image projected by the Highlands and Isles, there was almost a 
complete dearth of large-scale naval warfare in this period, although small-scale violence 
and raids were fairly common. The young chief of the MacDonalds of Glengarry was 
killed in 1601 when a „volley of musketry and arrows‟ caused his galley to capsize.153 
During the „Islay Rising‟ in 1615, Colla Ciotach was forced to run aground his galley when 
the hull was breached by musket fire from Cawdor‟s men, and later he was ambushed near 
Gigha, where four of his vessels were captured.
154
 However, in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century, nothing approached the scale of the battle of Bloody Bay, fought c. 
1481 near Tobermory between Eoin, the last Lord of the Isles, and his son, Aonghas Òg.
155
 
Indeed, by the early seventeenth century and perhaps even earlier in the sixteenth century, 
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the Scottish galley or bírlinn was largely „reduced to a transport rather than a strike role‟, 
i.e. they served as troop transports for raids or campaigns in Scotland and Ireland.
156 
The English „Ulster patrol‟ which policed the Irish Sea eventually became a strong 
deterrent for clans seeking to engage in the mercenary trade with Ireland.
157
 In December 
1582, it was reported that a group of islanders „that had taken a prey‟ were driven out of 
Ulster and forced to embark upon their galleys during a storm, during which „140 of them 
were drowned‟.158 In August 1584, it was reported that after a summer campaign an army 
of islanders returned to Scotland and „six gallies were taken or drowned by the Queen‟s 
ship‟.159 The often overlooked defeat of the Clan Donald at the Copeland Isles in 1595 was 
a significant moment in the sixteenth-century Irish Sea world.
160
 A sizeable fleet of 
bírlinnean, carrying around 1,500 men, was ambushed by two English warships, HMS 
Popinjay and HMS Charles. At least two bìrlinnean were sunk, although one report claims 
that five were sunk and two more were captured,
161
 and „many‟ men were killed.162 Not 
only was this humiliating for the MacDonalds, but it provided another vivid demonstration 
of the relative strength of the Hebrideans when squared against the English military. 
Bìrlinnean were fast and capable of outpacing the larger English ships,
163
 but in an open 
naval battle they were now hopelessly outmatched. A report from 1594 shows that the 
English government knew exactly how to deal with the Scottish galleys: 
To cut off all succours from the Isles or the Main of Scotland is most easy, by 
sending small shipping to lie up and down abouts Lough Swillye, Lough Foile, the 
mouth of the Banne, the Raughlins, and Glanarum, to impeach the landing of any 
Scots, who are never better provided to pass the seas than in small boats, which 
they call galleys, vessels of no defence to maintain any fight; to accomplish which 
service four or five of the Queen‟s small pinnaces were most convenient.164 
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Another death knell of the Hebridean galley was the „Islay Rising‟ in 1615, in which the 
MacDonalds of Dunivaig were outmanoeuvred and outgunned by James VI and I‟s navy, 




Warfare in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland was conducted according to a limited 
range of tactics and strategy, and yet there are inherent problems in generalising the 
conduct of warfare or the level of violence in the region. The predominant mode of warfare 
was the cattle raid, which was mainly aimed towards enrichment but could involve direct 
bloodshed. More serious engagements – skirmishes or battles – were less common, and 
tended to be the culmination of a series of smaller incursions. In terms of battle tactics, 
perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the attack-minded approach to „Gaelic‟ 
warfare, as many of the most prominent battles in this period involved defensive tactics. 
There is considerable evidence that armies in the West Highlands and Isles exhibited a 
high degree of discipline, while also allowing for individuals to win renown in battle 
through feats of courage and bravery. Close combat could be brutal especially in regards to 
the ruthless violence perpetrated during the rout and pursuit of a defeated enemy, which 
was probably considered an intrinsic aspect of warfare. Massacres of prisoners or civilians 
may have taken place on occasion, but not with the regularity, or on the scale, that has 
generally been assumed. Castles were the hub of the military class and potent symbols of 
lordship that were occasionally targeted by military incursions. Large-scale sieges, as 
found elsewhere in Britain, Ireland, and the European mainland, were not practised by 
Highlanders and Islanders, with most castles captured by stratagem or surprise. Although 
the sea power of Gaeldom was on the wane in this period, small-scale piracy continued in 
the Outer Hebrides, and the bírlinn remained indispensable for speedily navigating the sea-
lanes of the west coast and transporting huge bodies of troops across the Irish Sea.
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Chapter 5: The Clanranald, 1544-77 
The battle of Loch Lochy on 15 July 1544, more commonly known as Blàr nan Lèine or 
„The Battle of the Shirts‟, has attained iconic status in the history of the Highlands.1 A 
resounding defeat for the Clan Fraser at the hands of the Clanranald, it is perhaps best 
remembered for the memorable detail, first reported in the Chronicles of the Frasers, that 
the weather was so oppressively hot during the battle that combatants from both clans 
discarded their coats of mail and fought wearing only their shirts or lèintean.
2
 Some 
contemporary documentary evidence of the battle survives, but a detailed reconstruction is 
reliant on later genealogical histories. All of these sources portray the battle according to a 
specific agenda and were not written in a vacuum. One of the more modest accounts of 
Blàr nan Lèine is actually provided by the victors, the Clanranald, in their clan history the 
„Red Book of Clanranald‟, written in the late seventeenth century: 
[Iain Muideartach] gained a battle over Fraser of Lovat at Loch Lochy Head, which 
is called Blar Lèine, about the year of the age of Christ 1545.
3
 
The author Niall MacMhuirich deliberately downplays the significance of the battle in Iain 
Muideartach‟s career, choosing instead to emphasise his piety and generosity in refutation 
of George Buchanan‟s portrayal of the Clanranald chief in Rerum Scoticarum Historia as a 
cruel warmonger.
4
 In marked contrast, the history of the kindred that suffered calamitous 
defeat at the battle provides a detailed and undoubtedly embroidered description of the 
background politicking and bloody mêlée itself. Written between 1666 and 1699,
5
 the 





 and to a lesser extent Gordon,
8
 with added narrative flourishes, such as a final 
speech by Fraser of Lovat before the battle.
9
 As a result, the battle is transformed from 
decisive defeat to heroic last-stand: 
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Cross-comparison of these histories in tandem with other contemporary evidence can 
scrape away accreted embellishments to reveal core details consistent across all accounts. 
This case study will firstly focus on the political background to Blàr nan Lèine, before 
tracing the political and social ramifications of the battle over the following 30 years. A 
government campaign led by the earls of Huntly and Argyll in 1554 and 1555 against the 
Clanranald will be placed in the spotlight, followed by a small-scale local feud in 1576 and 
1577 between the Clanranald and the MacLeods of Harris over the lands of Glenelg. The 
aftershocks of Blàr nan Lèine were not limited to the immediate participants, the 
Clanranald and the Clan Fraser, but also affected proximate clans like the Camerons, the 
MacDonalds of Keppoch, the MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the MacLeods of Harris. 
The Dòmhnall Dubh rising of 1544 and 1545, which runs parallel to the upheaval 
surrounding the Clanranald, has been highlighted by contemporaries and modern historians 
alike as a consequence of the power vacuum caused by the sudden death of James V in 
1542.
11
 The „strong rule‟ of James V towards the Highlands and Isles, encapsulated by his 
expedition in 1540, was admired by contemporaries such as John Elder and John Lesley,
12
 
as well as later historians like Donald Gregory.
13
 However, the king‟s „daunting of the Isles‟ 
had deleterious effects on the „greit quietnes and obedience‟ of the Highlands and Isles.14 
During the tour, James received the submission of most prominent clan chiefs, including 
MacLeod of Harris, MacLeod of Lewis, MacLean of Duart, MacDonald of Dunivaig, 
MacDonald of Sleat, and „Johne Moydert‟ or Iain Muideartach, the Clanranald chief. 
According to Lesley, the „principallis of thame wes keipit in warde‟, but as argued by 
Gregory, only some of the „principallis‟ were actually detained and Iain Muideartach was 
among them.
15
 These clans were therefore left temporarily leaderless, a situation that 
affected the Clanranald most profoundly due to the existence of another claimant to the 
chiefship. The Fraser history states that Ùisdean Fraser, Lord Lovat: 
 
…entered his nephew, Ranald Mackdonel, into the peaceable possession of Mudard 
[Moidart], being the true heir male of that estates. This, among other gums and 
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picks harboured against the Lord Lovat, exasperated the Mackdonalds further, 
which brought them together in a body marching another way to obviat Lovat…16 
 
The Clanranald history does not directly mention this takeover, but acknowledges Raghnall 
Gallda („Foreigner‟ or „Stranger‟) as the youngest son of the Clanranald chief, Ailean (d. c. 
1509) and his second wife, the daughter of Fraser of Lovat.
17
 When Ailean died, the 
chiefship passed to his eldest son Raghnall (born of his first marriage to the daughter of 
MacIain of Ardnamurchan), who died in 1514 and was succeeded by his son Dubhghall. 
Upon Dubhghall‟s death, killed by his cousins according to the Sleat history,18 his uncle 
Alasdair, another son of Ailean (d. c. 1509) succeeded, and he was eventually followed c. 
1531 by his son, Iain Muideartach.
19
 
The main pretence for Raghnall‟s challenge was probably Iain Muideartach‟s 
illegitimacy. The Sleat history calls him a „natural brother‟ who took possession of the 
chiefship „in an unlawful manner‟,20 and Sellar has suggested that his mother Dorothy 
(Dìorbhail) may have been of low social status.
21
 Yet this does not seem to have adversely 
affected his standing within the clan. Although Hugh MacDonald was speaking from 
hindsight when he remarked that Iain was „without doubt…a man truely worthy of the 
preferment‟,22 his strong personality may well have marked him out as a clear leader from 
the outset. Any doubts about his chiefship caused by his illegitimacy were arguably 
quashed when he was legitimised at Stirling on 15 January 1531/2.
23
 One month later on 
11 February 1531/2, James V granted him a charter for the 27 merklands of Moidart.
24
 
By 1540 however, the crown backed another candidate, Iain‟s uncle Raghnall 
Gallda, who disputed Iain‟s chiefship. During Iain‟s imprisonment, the king received 
unspecified „informatione‟ about his chiefship and revoked his claim to the lands.25 The 
nature of this information is not clear, although it is unlikely to have been related to Iain‟s 
illegitimacy due to his legitimation in 1531. Regardless, on 14 December 1540, Raghnall 
Gallda was granted the 28 merklands of Moidart and the 24 merklands of Arisaig in the 
                                                          
16
 Chronicles of the Frasers, 134. 
17
 Reliquiae Celticae, Vol. II, 168-9; RSS, Vol. II, 590. 
18
 HP, Vol. I, 64-5. 
19
 Reliquiae Celticae, Vol. II, 166-71; Monro’s Western Isles, 93-4. The Clanranald genealogy is shown in 
Appendix 2.1. 
20
 HP, Vol. I, 64-5. 
21
 W.D.H. Sellar, „Marriage, Divorce and Concubinage in Gaelic Scotland‟, TGSI, 51 (1978-80), 482. 
22
 HP, Vol. I, 65. 
23
 RSS, Vol. II, 146. 
24
 NRS: GD201/1/1; GD201/1/2; RMS, Vol. III, 247. 
25





 Then on 12 March 1541, the crown bestowed further territory 
on Raghnall: the 21 merklands of Eigg.
27
 It is somewhat difficult to determine the nature of 
Raghnall Gallda‟s rise to power. The Frasers, Raghnall‟s mother‟s clan, certainly had an 
obvious interest in his claim to the chiefship, and their participation in the eventual battle 
stems from their continued sponsorship of him.
28
 At this juncture, Lovat and perhaps even 
his overlord Huntly may have vouched for Raghnall to secure his confirmation in the 
Clanranald estates. 
The sudden death of James V on 14 December 1542 initiated a power struggle 
among the leaders of the Scottish political community, and the incarcerated Highland 
chiefs were used as political pawns. At some point before August 1543, perhaps as early as 
June,
29
  Regent Arran, with the advice of the earl of Glencairn,
30
 released „certain Irish, 
which have been long in ward‟ to stir up trouble in the Highlands and Isles for Argyll and 
Huntly, thereby depriving his rival, Cardinal Beaton, of their support.
31
 Iain Muideartach 
was almost certainly among these „Irish‟ and Dòmhnall Dubh may have been released at 
the same time, although as shown by Boardman and Cathcart, reports about Dòmhnall 
Dubh‟s release are conflicting and confusing.32 
Political uncertainty stemming from Arran‟s leadership, and perhaps the release of 
the islanders, prompted Huntly to accept a bond of manrent from Ùisdean Fraser, Lord 
Lovat, on 2 May 1543, one of a flurry of similar contracts arranged in that month by 
Huntly with other clans, including the Clan Cameron and Clan Chattan.
33
 Huntly was 
buttressing his support with clans within and adjacent to his Badenoch heartland in the 
central Highlands and his tendrils spread further west through an „equale bande‟ with the 
earl of Argyll on 1 August 1543, in which the two earls pledged to protect or avenge the 
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The movements of Iain Muideartach until July 1544 are unknown, but it seems 
plausible that he convened with Dòmhnall Dubh, assuming they were indeed released 
simultaneously. By the summer of 1544, Iain had rallied enough military support to viably 
challenge Raghnall Gallda‟s grip on the chiefship, perhaps by drawing upon Dòmhnall 
Dubh‟s resources.36 It has generally been assumed that he mustered support from his own 
kindred: through the consensus of the clan, the unpopular Raghnall Gallda was expelled 
and Iain reinstated as the rightful chief.
37
 Some accounts indicate that Iain had indeed 
retaken his chiefship by the time of the battle.
38
 Although Raghnall‟s epithet „Gallda‟ 
(„Stranger‟) was not intrinsically pejorative, it may nevertheless convey that in this case his 
upbringing among the Frasers had alienated him from the Clanranald. His installation was 
ostensibly made at the behest of his mother‟s clan, but Huntly may well have been 
orchestrating the takeover behind-the-scenes with a view to extending his own 
overlordship in the west. Either way, this was an unacceptable imposition upon the clan 
Raghnall Gallda hoped to lead. The situation must have been a source of widespread 
resentment within the Clanranald, and the release of Iain Muideartach, a man of evident 
ability and experience in leadership, could well have instigated Raghnall Gallda‟s 
deposition.
39
 This interpretation is supported by a letter written in August or September 
1545 by Dòmhnall Dubh‟s commissioners during their negotiations with Henry VIII, 
which claims that Iain Muideartach‟s actions were purely defensive, and portrays the 
eventual defeat of the Frasers as a rare victory among the many „cruelties‟ committed by 
the crown and its adherents against the Highlanders and Islanders.
40
 From the perspective 
of the Clanranald and their supporters, the battle was regarded as a necessary act in defence 
of a legitimate chiefship. Solidarity with Iain‟s undertaking is evidenced by the coalition of 
clans that supported him at the battle, which included the Camerons, the MacDonalds of 
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Keppoch, and the MacDonalds of Glengarry.
41
 Raghnall Gallda‟s installation may have 
been regarded as a dangerous precedent that demanded a strong response. 
A principal point of contention among the histories is the role played by Huntly and 
whether he defended the Frasers or conspired in their downfall. Throughout Rerum 
Scoticarum Historia, Buchanan portrays the Gordons as untrustworthy rebels, and claims 
that in this instance Huntly engineered the destruction of the Frasers by forewarning the 
Clanranald about their route homewards. According to Buchanan‟s somewhat puzzling 
account, Huntly „indulged a secret hatred against them, because of all the adjacent tribes 
they alone refused to acknowledge his superiority‟.42 Unsurprisingly, this notion was 
vehemently refuted by Sir Robert Gordon of Gordonstoun: 
…[this] is notoriouslie knowen to be manifestlie and notoriouslie 





Gordon follows Lesley whose pro-Catholic account unsurprisingly differs from Buchanan 
in its more positive portrayal of Huntly and its description of the immediate circumstances 
before the battle. Lesley claims that the Clanranald and the Clan Cameron had harried and 
occupied the Frasers‟ lands of Abertarrf and Strathglass, and (in a probable conflation with 
the 1545 attacks discussed below) the Grants‟ lands of Urquhart and Glenmoriston. These 
encroachments prompted an armed response from Huntly: 
…the Erle marching forduart with his cumpanie maid thame sone to dislodge, and 
to flie in thair awin cuntrey apoun the west seis, quhair Lawland men culd haif no 
acces unto thame, and so placed the Lorde Lovat and the laird of Grant in thair 
awine landis of Urquhat, and Abirtarf, and Stragalshe; and the Erle sua haiffing 
done for the moist parte that thing he come for, returnit; bot the Lord Lovat 
returning to Lovat be ane uther way, accompaneit online with his owin kyne of the 
Fresers, be chaunce forgadderit with his ennemeis, quhair none of the parteis culd 
abstene from battell…44 
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Lesley may be eliding the real reason for Huntly‟s western incursion – supporting Raghnall 
Gallda‟s chiefship – in favour of presenting him as acting defensively on behalf of his 
subordinates. Other evidence chimes with the idea of a close alignment between Huntly 
and Fraser in 1544. As already shown, they had exchanged a bond of manrent in 1543, but 
both were members of the Guise faction at court. On 3 June 1544, the Regent Arran was 
removed from office by Guise‟s „party‟, including Huntly and Argyll,45 and on 10 June, 
Fraser of Lovat was recorded as another supporter of Guise.
46
 Therefore, a conspiracy by 
Huntly against his allies and vassals seems rather unlikely.
47
  
Factionalism in the Scottish court ultimately exerted little influence over political 
affairs in Moidart and Lochaber. Violence was probably initiated when Iain Muideartach 
reclaimed his chiefship with the assent of most of his kin and with assistance from allies 
like the Camerons. To underline his control, he may have raided the Frasers‟ lands of 
Abertarrf and Strathglass,
48
 prompting an armed response from Huntly and the Frasers 
(with Raghnall Gallda), which the Clanranald circumvented and out-manoeuvred. One 
source claims that the Clanranald and Frasers had arranged a „tryst‟ that descended into 
slaughter,
49
 but accounts of the battle generally agree that the Clanranald ambushed the 
badly outnumbered Frasers at Laggan
50
 on the northern banks of Loch Lochy.
51
 Marching 
from Moidart, the Frasers had two main routes home to Abertarrf: through the hillier 
terrain north of Loch Arkaig, moving east between Loch Garry and Loch Lochy, or the 
flatter southern route, following Loch Arkaig east and then swinging north-east at the 
southern banks of Loch Lochy. The Fraser history implies that they took the latter route, 
„directly down the south side of Lochy Lochy‟, and mentions that the host marched past 
Letterfinlay on the east bank of the loch.
52
 Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the Frasers travelled via the southern route, while the Clanranald took the hillier northern 
path to ambush the Frasers at Laggan. 
                                                          
45
 Merriman, Rough Wooings, 157; Franklin, Scottish Regency, 124. 
46
 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, XIX.I, 415-6. 
 415-6. 
47
 There may be a feasible argument that Regent Arran compelled the Clanranald to attack the Frasers, as he 
had more to gain from such disorder, but there is no direct evidence for this.  
48
 Lesley, History, 184. 
49
 A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents, ed. Bannatyne Club (Edinburgh, 1833), 34. This source is 
problematic however, as it erroneously claims that the earl of Bothwell was en route to mediate this „tryst‟ 
when he discovered the aftermath of the battle. Gregory has suggested that Bothwell was an error for Huntly. 
See Gregory, History, 160-1, n.1. 
50
 NGR: NN 53594 89615. 
51
 Buchanan, History, Vol. II, 348; Chronicles of the Frasers, 136-7; Earldom of Sutherland, 110. Lesley 
does state that the two armies encountered each other „be chaunce‟. See Lesley, History, 184. 
52




Figure 4: Possible army movements before Blàr nan Lèine, 1544 
The high casualties sustained by the Frasers perhaps indicate that they had no means of 
escape once fighting ensued. Therefore, the case could be made that they actually travelled 
along the northern route, perhaps taking to the hills because they suspected something 
untoward, and when the Clanranald ambushed them at Laggan they were trapped against 
the southern banks of Loch Garry and could not flee east into their own lands. However, 
the ambush by the Clanranald may simply have been so sudden that the Frasers had little 
time to coordinate a retreat, especially if they were outnumbered by their opponents.
53
 The 
high casualty rate, notably among the clan elite, may also be explained by a desire to 
maintain their honour by fighting to the end. 
The Clanranald were joined by the Camerons, the MacDonalds of Keppoch, the 
MacDonalds of Glengarry, and the MacDonalds of Knoydart.
54
 Lesley‟s account of the 
battle emphasises the extent of the bloodshed, and describes a skirmish at range before the 
close-quarters fighting took place: 
…bot suddantlie entered in skarmushing, first with bowis and arrous, quhilkis 
lested a long tyme, quhill thair hoill chaftis was spendit on boith sydis; and shortlie 
thay joynit in battell with suordis, quhair thay faucht so crewellie quhill the most 
part of boith the armies was slayne…at last the nycht come doun apoun thame, and 
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was not knawin quhill the nixt day quhilkis of the parteis was maister of the 
feildis…55 
 
As mentioned, the Fraser history amplifies the ferocity of the battle, making it an 
exceptionally brutal affair: 
 
…[it was] a hott ingagement, fought more like lyons than men, with slashes and 
stroakes, their armes two handed swords and Dence axes, front to front, forceing 
upon each other, so fierce and forward that they seemed to fell one another like 
trees falling in a wood, cutting and consumeing down each other…till at last they 
came to closs combating, and, fighting hand to fist…At length, in their heat and 
fury, two and [two] runn into the Loch, grapling and, lik wrestlers, sticked on 
another with their durks, many, nay, most fought in their shirts, running at each 





Both the Fraser and Mackintosh accounts of the battle mention an auxiliary Fraser force 
led by „Bean Clerach‟, whose absence from the battle proved decisive, but they disagree on 
why his force was not involved. According to the Fraser history, „Bean Clerach‟ was sent 
by Lovat with 100 bowmen to 
…guard a passe, and if need were to assist him if he mett with danger, and strive to 
be within sight of him. Bean Clerk [sic] goes on, and, mistakeing his direction, 




In contrast, the Mackintosh account claims that he „did in the very beginning of the fight 




Most accounts agree that the losses on both sides were extremely heavy,
59
 although 
Gregory has rightly doubted if the Clanranald losses were truly as severe.
60
 Buchanan 
emphasises the heavy casualties of the Frasers and implies a very one-sided engagement by 
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stating „the Frasers being fewer in number, were almost cut off to a man‟.61 The Frasers, in 
order to save face in their own history, claimed that only a handful of warriors from either 
side were left standing by the end of the battle: 
…it is thought that but one of an hundred escaped on either sides; of the Frasers 
onely 4 came alive out of the field…62 
 
The Clanranald and MacDonalds of Knoydart were the „most slain‟ of their party, but the 
death of Ùisdean, the Fraser chief, his eldest son Simon,
63
 and 300 other Fraser clansmen 
meant the „hurt seemed greater on their pairt‟.64 This figure of 300 dead is roughly 
supported by the letter written by Dòmhnall Dubh‟s commissioners, which stated that Iain 
Muideartach in his defence 
...slew the Lord Lowett, his sounn and air, his thre brethir, w
t 
xiii scoir of men.
65
 
An anonymous report for the English government from 1577 on the condition of the 
Scottish nobility claims that the Fraser chief and „all his kin and friends‟ were killed in the 
battle.
66
 The severity of the Frasers‟ casualties spawned an apocryphal story to explain how 
the clan survived: 
Thus would have perished one of the most numerous, and deserving of the Scottish 
clans, unless by divine providence, as we may believe, eighty of the principal men 
of the clan had left their wives pregnant, who, in due time, brought forth males, all 
of whom arrived safely at man‟s estate.67 
  
There is little reason to doubt the devastation wrought by this battle, and the military 
capacity of the Frasers was probably crippled for at least a generation. Continuity in 
leadership was maintained through Alasdair, a surviving son of the Fraser chief, but in the 
aftermath of the battle he was too young to immediately succeed. Management of the 
clan‟s estates was undertaken by his mother, Janet Ross, until Alasdair was confirmed in 
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the barony of Lovat on 29 August 1553.
68
 In the event of a minority chiefship, leadership 
of a clan normally passed to an elder male relative who might act as „tutor‟, but as noted by 
the Fraser history:  




Senior male relatives able to fulfil that advisory role must indeed have been limited 
because Ùisdean‟s three brothers were also killed in the battle.70 
The actions of the Clanranald in the aftermath of the battle are not indicative of a 
clan enfeebled by a Pyrrhic victory. Iain soon joined Dòmhnall Dubh‟s rising and 
immediately achieved a prominent status within the company.
71
 Some members of the 
Clanranald joined with the Camerons in a raid on the Grants‟ lands of Glenmoriston in 
October 1544, and Urquhart Castle six months later in April 1545. The main leaders of this 
raid appear to have been the Camerons, but some members of the Clanranald are named as 
complicit in Regent Arran‟s discharge to the Grants on 20 July 1546.72 Iain Muideartach 
himself was probably not involved as in his eventual contract with Huntly in September 
1553 his „last offens and brak‟ is recorded as the battle in 1544, not the raids of 1544 and 
1545 which had also targeted one of Huntly‟s tenants.73 Despite the raid on Glenmoriston 
in the previous year, the attack on Urquhart in 1545 seems to have taken the Grants 
entirely by surprise as the castle was immediately stormed in a swift assault. Urquhart 
Castle was extensively looted, including 100 cows, 100 calves, „ane kyst‟ which held „thre 
hundreitht pundis of money‟, and „twenty pece of artailzery‟.74 Evidently the raid was so 
unexpected the Grants had no opportunity to hide their loot or mount a stout defence. The 
prospect of plunder must have been a powerful motive for the attack on Urquhart Castle 
and a transient raid, aimed at harassment and enrichment, would have provided a tangible 
reward for the victorious Camerons and Clanranald. Moreover, Urquhart Castle was 
probably attacked specifically because the Grants were, like the Frasers, a client clan of the 
earl of Huntly. On 25 March 1545, the Grants had signed a contract with Huntly, both 
                                                          
68
 Exchequer Rolls, Vol. XVIII, 558-9; Chronicles of the Frasers, 140-1. 
69
 Chronicles of the Frasers, 140. 
70
 Letters and Papers, Henry VIII, XX.II, 134-5. 
71
 State Papers: King Henry the Eighth, Vol. III (1834), 548; Bannerman, „Lordship: Historical Background‟, 
212-3; Cathcart, „Donald Dubh‟s Rebellion‟, 241. 
72
 Fraser, Chiefs of Grant, Vol. III, 98. (transcript of original). As noted, Lesley and Gordon maintain that the 
Clanranald in particular suffered heavy casualties, and so this may explain the apparent leadership by the 
Camerons. 
73
 Spalding Miscellany, Vol. IV, 222-3. 
74
 Fraser, Chiefs of Grant, Vol. I, 112-3 (transcript of original); Cathcart, Kinship, 138. 
142 
 
parties pledging to abstain from convening with „the Ilia men, Clanchamron nor 
Clanrannald, without the [advys] of vthiris‟.75 This was a projection of the military 
capabilities of the Clanranald and their allies, conclusively underlining Iain Muideartach‟s 
hold on his chiefly position and humiliating Huntly by demonstrating his failure to protect 
his vassals. Urquhart Castle was also a stronghold of significance for revivalists of the 
Lordship of the Isles. In 1513, Dòmhnall MacDonald of Lochalsh had taken and occupied 
Urquhart Castle for three years in a symbolic reclamation of the Lordship of Isles and the 




In 1546, Huntly retaliated at the „grievous wound‟ suffered by his clients by 
capturing and beheading Eòghann mac Ailein, captain of the Clan Cameron, and Raghnall 
MacDonald of Keppoch.
77
 Both of these chiefs had participated in Blàr nan Lèine and the 
follow-up raids on the Grants. Huntly may have had a personal stake in apprehending the 
Cameron chief in particular, as Eòghann‟s military actions flagrantly contravened the terms 
of the bond of manrent they exchanged in May 1543.
78
 Following the death of Dòmhnall 
Dubh in 1545, both chiefs, along with Iain Muideartach,
79
 had been among the most 
prominent supporters of the new self-proclaimed Lord of the Isles, Seumas MacDonald of 
Dunivaig. Before his apprehension, the Cameron chief wrote to the English government, 
endorsing Seumas as the „narrast of heir to the hows of the Islis‟ and requesting „munitione 
of werr and money‟ from Henry VIII to resist Huntly and Argyll.80 Bannerman has 
suggested that their execution discouraged MacDonald of Dunivaig from further pursuing 
his claim,
81
 and Huntly‟s swift action may have been a preventative measure to thwart 
another Clan Donald uprising. According to Lesley, this „sharp punishment‟ of Cameron 
and Keppoch alarmed Iain Muideartach and he „fled into the Ilis, quhair he keped him self 
during all the tyme of the warris‟.82  
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Ultimately, the Clanranald chief did not meet the same fate as his allies and 
Huntly‟s failure to capture Iain Muideartach is intriguing and ambiguous. It could lend 
credence to Buchanan‟s assertion that Huntly was complicit in Blàr nan Lèine, but this 
explanation is clearly undermined by the execution of Cameron and Keppoch. Perhaps 
instead Huntly was relucant to risk conflict with the Clanranald, who still posed a potent 
threat to a magnate even as powerful as Huntly. Alternatively, Huntly may have had 
genuine difficulty in reaching Castle Tioram on the banks of Loch Moidart. As stated by 
Gordon, the Clanranald stronghold was 
…defended pairtlie by the west sea, and pairtlie included about with mountanes, 




However, Huntly‟s route would probably have been directly through the Great Glen, and 
he succeeded in apprehending other participants in the battle located in similarly western 
locations. Perhaps his inaction was simply a matter of timing. Pursuit of Iain may have 
been prevented by Henry VIII‟s invasion during the „Rough Wooing‟: Huntly was a 
notable participant at the battle of Pinkie in 1547 where he was captured.
84
 
The Clanranald were summoned to join with the Scottish army in 1547, but Iain 
Muideartach and his clan stayed at home. Perhaps surprisingly, the government responded 
with leniency and issued a respite to Iain
85
 at Musselburgh on 27 August 1548 
…for thair tressonable remaning and abyding at hame fra oure soverane ladyis oist 
and army, devisit and ordanit to convene upoun Fawlaymure the last day of August 
the year of God (1547) yeris, for resisting of the protectour of Ingland and his army 
than beand within this realme for distructioun of the liegis thairof; and for the 
slauchter of the Lord Lowett and his complices at [blank] the year of God 
(154[blank]) yeris…86 
 
It has been suggested that Arran was desperately trying to shore up support following the 
Scots‟ defeat at Pinkie in 1547 and the subsequent occupation of much of south-eastern 
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In 1550, six years after Blàr nan Lèine, Iain Muideartach resurfaced on the political 
scene as an associate of Argyll. On 27 June 1550, Iain Muideartach was named as a 
witness in Argyll‟s arbitration of an internecine dispute within the MacLeods of Harris.88 
Formal reestablishment of amicable relations between Argyll and Huntly may have 
allowed the Clanranald chief to finally raise his head above the parapet. An indenture of 
marriage was arranged on 10 July of 1549 between Argyll‟s eldest son Gilleasbuig and 
Huntly‟s daughter Margaret, for the „conservatioune of the auld allya betuix thai howsis‟.89 
Association with Argyll protected Iain Muideartach from any potential threat still posed by 
Huntly. 
In 1552, the Clanranald and the Camerons were summoned to appear before a 
justice ayre convened by Mary of Guise and the Regent Arran at Inverness, but they failed 
to appear and were condemned for their „inobedience‟ in October. Argyll spoke on behalf 
of Iain Muideartach, assuring Guise and Arran of the „gud mynd and will he beris towart 
our Soverane Lady [and] my Lord Governour‟. Argyll claimed that the Clanranald chief 
would have made an appearance at Inverness had the letter of summons reached him 
before he travelled to Ireland. Given the benefit of the doubt, Iain was ordered to appear 
before the Privy Council next Christmas,
90
 but there is no record of an appearance by Iain 
in 1552 or 1553. In that latter year however, he made amends with his earlier adversary, 
the earl of Huntly.  
On 26 August 1553, Huntly wrote to Mary of Guise, noting that he had „appontit 
the ferd day off this nyxt moneytht to spek the nort Illis men in Badzenaycht gyf thai wyll 
cum‟.91 On 11 September 1553, Iain Muideartach made a contract with Huntly at Ruthven 
in Badenoch, in which the Clanranald were 
…hartlie forgiffing all offensis, wrangis, and disobediens down in tymes bypast to 
the said erll, or one of his…and speciell the last offens and brak maid be thaim, 
thair freindis, alis, and part takkaris, upon his gud friend the lord Louett…92 
 
Iain agreed that he and his son Ailean would „keype guid reqill within thair bondis‟, but 
more important was their pledge to be „trew seruandis to the said erll‟. In that capacity, Iain 
swore to capture Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat and „all udir capitens and chiftenis 
within the north illis, to pas to the Quenis grace‟. Completion of this task would have 
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helped Huntly to maintain „gud rewill…within the ilis pertening [his] luftenentrye 
[lieutenancy]‟.93 Iain Muideartach was now technically a government agent, which further 
divided the loose Clan Donald alliance that, even after Dòmhnall Dubh‟s death, threatened 
to unite behind a new figurehead. If however the Clanranald chief hoped that this contract 




Upon taking personal control of government in April 1554, Mary of Guise decided 
that these diplomatic measures were insufficient and ordered the earls of Argyll and Huntly 
to lead a coordinated assault on the Clanranald and the MacLeods of Lewis. Argyll was to 
attack through the sea lanes of the west coast while Huntly marched overland, with the two 
forces forming a pincer movement to entrap their targets. In July, Guise provided Argyll 
with an artillery piece and ammunition from Dumbarton, which was to be loaded onto a 
ship stationed in Ayr.
95
 In a letter to Guise, Argyll outlined his plans to depart from 
Dunstaffnage Castle on 12 August to convene with Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig and 
Eachann MacLean of Duart on Mull,
96
 at which point they would „tak purpose to pas 
forthwarttis upoun the saidis rebellis‟.97 Despite extensive preparation, this grand campaign 
soon crumbled when Huntly was forced to abandon his mutinous army. According to 
Lesley, the Lowland contingent in Huntly‟s army refused to march into the Highlands 
unless „thay mycht travel on hors, as thay culd on no wayis do in that boundis‟.98 With 
their departure, tensions immediately ran high within Huntly‟s army, now largely 
composed of members of the Clan Chattan who held the earl in contempt for his execution 
of Uilleam Mackintosh, their captain.
99
 Huntly‟s excuses seem somewhat convenient and 
betray a lack of enthusiasm for the campaign. Strong-armed into pursuing the Clanranald, 
Huntly‟s passive approach may have been a circuitous way of honouring his contract with 
Iain Muideartach, arranged just the year before in 1553. In October 1554, the Queen 
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Regent declared that he „had not used his commission according to his acceptation and 
dewtie‟ and imprisoned him until March 1555.100 
 
Argyll‟s movements in 1554 are unclear. Following Huntly‟s withdrawal, Argyll 
probably postponed his own campaign, before reconvening the following summer. 
However, on 1 June 1555, Eòghann „McKnok‟ was paid for the „keeping of the castell of 
Strone takin be the Erle of Argile furtht of the rebellis handis‟.101 This report comes almost 
one month before Argyll was granted a new commission on 27 June 1555, along with 
Huntly‟s replacement, the earl of Atholl, which may suggest that he had persevered alone 
in 1554.
102
 Castle Strome was the ancestral seat of the MacDonalds of Glengarry, a cadet 
of the Clanranald,
103
 so the primary target of the campaign, Iain Muideartach, had eluded 
Argyll‟s grasp. While the capture of Strome seems a token gesture, Argyll may have been 
attempting to isolate Iain Muideartach from potential allies and deny him a source of 
refuge. Alternatively, when his endorsement of Iain Muideartach in 1552 is considered,
104
 
Argyll may have been emulating his counterpart Huntly by shielding the Clanranald from 
the long arm of the government. 
 
Dawson has claimed that Argyll successfully captured Castle Tioram in 1555 and 
presents a rather fanciful picture of artillery battering the castle walls while Argyll‟s 
infantry led an amphibious assault.
105
 Evidence for this is very limited.
 
Iain was not 
apprehended by Argyll in 1555,
106
 and it is unlikely that Castle Tioram was reduced, 
although it may have endured a bombardment from Argyll‟s artillery.107 According to John 
Lesley, it required the „wisdome, policie and guid convoy‟ of the earl of Atholl to convince 
the Clanranald chief to make an appearance before the Queen Regent.
108
 Argyll seemed 
unable – or unwilling – to capture the Clanranald chief himself. Guise allegedly pardoned 
Iain and his kinsmen, but asked the Clanranald men to stay at Methven Castle in Perth, 
where they were „weill treated‟. According to Lesley, Iain and his kin soon broke ward and 
returned to Moidart to incite „new troble‟.109 Recently, Ritchie has followed Lesley‟s view 
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of the escape by stating that they returned to the Highlands to „resume their insurgent 
activity‟,110 but the Clanranald may just have been hoping to be left alone. 
 
Argyll was more successful in his pursuit of the other main target of the campaign, 
the MacLeods of Lewis. A later source, written between 1598 and 1613, claims that 
 
The house of Stornowa in the Lewis is fallin, albeit it had biddin the canon be the 




In June 1555, Argyll acted as cautioner for Ruairidh, the MacLeod chief, in his submission 
to the regent.
112
 The walls of Stornoway Castle were not completely demolished by 
Argyll‟s artillery barrage, but the cannon fire was apparently enough to force MacLeod to 
capitulate. Many of the castles on the west coast were strategically located to thwart 
overland attacks, but the merging of cannon with ship created a mobile gun platform that 
could bombard strongholds from the sea with impunity. 
 
 The Clanranald had again managed to avoid, or escape, the clutches of punitive 
government expeditions. Ten years after the crisis of Blàr nan Lèine, Iain Muideartach‟s 
chiefship remained secure. He held his lands by the sword in defiance of continued 
opposition from the government and Raghnall Gallda‟s progeny: on 28 January 1562/3, the 
lands of Moidart, Arisaig, and the isle of Eigg were granted to Raghnall Gallda‟s son, 
Ailean.
113
 Iain‟s leadership nevertheless held firm, and in March 1565/6, he received a 
remission for his previous crimes from the government.
114
 One of the last incidents Iain 
presided over as chief was a feud between his clan and the MacLeods of Harris, which had 
its roots back in the summer of 1544. 
The Clanranald and the MacLeods of Harris had a history of strained relations, 
which may be traced as far back as the fifteenth century. At a feast held by the Lord of the 
Isles, the Clanranald tutor insulted MacLeod of Harris‟ lineage, which MacLeod avenged 
by raiding Moidart. According to Hugh MacDonald, the Sleat seanchaidh, the two clans 
were „never [again] intimate or in good terms‟.115 The feud in question may have been 
influenced by this chequered past, but it was more immediately concerned with land. In 
1574, Regent Morton granted the escheat of Glenelg in the lordship of Lochaber to the 
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Clanranald. At that time, Morton and Cailean, the sixth earl of Argyll, were locked in a 
heated political dispute over the „retaining‟ of the Crown Jewels by Argyll‟s wife, Annas 
Keith,
116
 and the Campbell chief claimed that Morton made the grant to the Clanranald to 
stir up trouble for him in the Western Isles, evoking Regent Arran‟s tactics in 1543. 
According to Argyll, the Clanranald were „commond murtheris and oppresoris‟ and used 
their escheat to harry Glenelg „nocht sparing the cruell slauchter of man wyiff and 
bairne‟.117  
Glenelg was a longstanding possession of the MacLeods of Harris, but one-third of 
the lands had been contested by the Clan Fraser since at least 1527.
118
 This dispute was 
temporarily settled by the marriage of Agnes Fraser to Uilleam MacLeod in April 1540, 
with the Frasers resigning their claim to the lands,
119
 but the dispute was revived when 
Uilleam died in 1551, leaving Màiri, the only child born of this union, as sole heiress of 
the MacLeod estates.
120
 The internecine strife that ensued within the MacLeods left them 
exposed to the expansionist desires of predatory rivals.
121
 Nor did it help that Uilleam‟s 
instrument of sasine for the lands of Glenelg had gone missing from the MacLeods‟ charter 
chest after his death.
122
 
In the aftermath of Blàr nan Lèine, at some point between 1544 and 1559,
123
 
perhaps after Uilleam‟s death in 1551, it seems that the Clanranald began a hostile 
occupation of Glenelg to disenfranchise the defeated Frasers. Although this was initially 
done at the expense of the Frasers, it eventually embroiled the MacLeods who still sought 
to regain full control of these lands. Members of the Clanranald certainly resided in 
Glenelg during the chiefship of Uilleam‟s successor and younger brother Tormod 
MacLeod,
124
 and perhaps even earlier during upheaval after Uilleam‟s death in 1551.125 
Eventually, the Clanranald in Glenelg became tenants of the Frasers, who essentially made 
the best of a bad situation by formalising an arrangement that had been imposed upon 
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 A letter from April 1596 by Ailean mac Raghnall of „Ester Lagyissets‟ aimed at 
preparing the current MacLeod chief Ruairidh Mòr for an impending court case with the 
Fraser chief to settle the ownership of Glenelg implies that the Clanranald had used this 
tenancy arrangement to justify their „herschipe‟ of Glenelg: 
…ye Clanranald alledgit ye Lord Lowett to be yair Warrand [protector] for 




On 18 February 1571/2, the non-entry payments of the lands of Glenelg were granted to 
Ùisdean Fraser of Lovat,
128
 but in 1573, Màiri MacLeod transferred her claim as heiress of 
the clan‟s estates to Tormod.129 It seems plausible that in 1573 or 1574 Tormod then 
attempted to gain full control of Glenelg, perhaps expelling Clanranald tenants, before the 
subsequent grant to the Clanranald in 1574 by Morton.
130
 The harrying of Glenelg in 1574 
by the Clanranald was not therefore a random attack, but an attempt to underline their 
possession of these lands, first obtained through còir a’ chlaidhimh („sword right‟) and 
then sanctified by law. 
Around two years after the feud‟s outbreak, on 14 September 1576, a bond of 
manrent was made between the earl of Argyll, and Iain Muideartach, the venerable captain 
of Clanranald. In this bond, Iain and his son Ailean agreed to 
 
…demit the lands of Glenelg in favour of Tormoud McLoyd, bind themselvis to 
join with the McLanes and to refer all matters regarding all slaughters and 
hairscheepis debates betwixt the said McCloyd of Harra to the said Earl, the Earl is 
held bound to maintain and defend the said Iain and Allan, and others, and to do 




A provision was put in place that if the Clanranald failed to abide by this bond Lachlann 
MacLean of Duart would „pursue and invade‟ their lands.132 In the eyes of the crown, the 
lands of Glenelg still officially belonged to the Frasers, as shown by a gift to Tòmas Fraser, 
the Tutor of Lovat,
133
 on 16 February 1577.
134
 The Clanranald‟s tenancy had presumably 
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 Tòmas was the brother of Ùisdean, son of Alasdair, son of Ùisdean (d. 1544). See Chronicles of the 
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continued, but the MacLeods refused to recognise the legitimacy of this arrangement and 
portrayed it as an unlawful occupation.  
 
On 11 July 1577, a contract was made between Tormod MacLeod of Harris and 
Ailean, the son of Iain Muideartach, and the new captain of Clanranald. This may suggest 
that Iain had died at some point between September 1576 and 11 July 1577, but his death is 
not specified in the contract, and he may have only relinquished control of clan affairs to 
his son, Ailean.
135
 In the contract, Argyll and Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart acted as 
guarantors as Tormod and Ailean agreed to cease hostilities consisting of 
…debaitis, contraverseis, slauchtaris, hairschippis and all uthir injuries commitit 
and done be alther of thame agains utheris preceeding the dait heiroff…136 
 
The contract singles out the Clanranald as the main aggressors, who are ordered to 
renounce their claim to Glenelg and stop harrying the lands. Later that year, on 1 
November, Argyll was to judge this case at Inveraray. The two parties were meanwhile to 
continue to „stand amicablie…in gude concorde and nychtbourhed‟ according to the terms 
outlined in the earlier bond of manrent made in 1576.
137
 It seems the intervening nine-




Further analysis of the 1577 contract between MacLeod and the captain of 
Clanranald reveals another dimension to this quarrel. It states that Ailean‟s son, Ailean Òg, 
and Ailean‟s brother, Aonghas, had both committed „offensis and injuries‟ against their 
own friends and kin „in support of the said Tormoid‟, Ailean Òg‟s grandfather.139 What 
began as a wrangle over land between separate clans had spiralled into a family feud 
within the Clanranald, internal strife instigated or inflamed by the MacLeods. According to 
the „Red Book‟, Ailean‟s chiefship was a period of calm and tranquillity, defined by his 
„good family‟ and many male offspring.140 The above contract presents a markedly 
different picture of a chief under threat from the ambitions of his closest male relatives. 
Despite excising this discord, the „Red Book‟ implicitly provides a possible explanation for 
                                                          
135
 The „Red Book‟ records Iain‟s death at 1574, so he probably did die around this time. See Reliquiae 
Celticae, 170-1. 
136




 This feud is notable for coinciding with the infamous massacre of Eigg, in which 400 members of the 
Clanranald were allegedly suffocated in a cave by MacLeod raiders. However, the evidence for such an event 
is limited, and the documents discussed here do not mention any incident on the island. See Crawford, 
„Massacre of Eigg‟. 
139
 AT, VII, 26. 
140
 Reliquiae Celticae, Vol. II, 171-3. 
151 
 
the rift in familial relations. The mother of Ailean‟s first born son, Ailean Òg, was the 
daughter of MacLeod of Harris, yet „after her he took unto him the daughter of Maclean of 
Duart‟, and had a „good family‟ by her, including a son, Iain of Strome.141 The wording of 
„after her‟ is ambiguous. While it could suggest she had died, MacDonald & MacDonald 
have plausibly argued that Ailean spurned MacLeod‟s daughter while she still lived.142 We 
cannot know for certain if Ailean did indeed reject his current wife in favour of the 
daughter of Eachann Òg MacLean of Duart, but regardless his new marriage threatened the 
inheritance of his first-born son, Ailean Òg. After succeeding his father Iain as chief 
between September 1576 and July 1577, Ailean may have sought to sever his marital link 
with the MacLeods, with whom his clan‟s relations seem strained at best, and politically 
realign with the Campbell/MacLean powerhouse. Upon his succession, he seems to have 
named his son Dòmhnall, born of his second marriage to MacLean‟s daughter, as his heir, 
supplanting his first-born son, Ailean Òg. This was a serious insult to the MacLeods and 
would have undoubtedly exacerbated his dispute with them, while providing clear 
justification for Ailean Òg to turn against his father and Clanranald kin. With help or 
encouragement from Tormod, Ailean Òg‟s grandfather, this had all the makings of an 
attempted coup. 
 
The 1577 contract and judicial hearing at Inveraray that presumably followed 
appear to have resolved the dispute between the MacLeods and the Clanranald, and healed 
the internal rift within the latter clan. Ailean‟s son and newly named heir, Dòmhnall, was 
sent to the earl of Argyll as a pledge for the future good behaviour of the clan, and he 
eventually succeeded his father as captain of the Clanranald.
143
 Meanwhile, Ailean Òg and 
Aonghas pledged to keep the peace, with Tormod MacLeod acting as their pledge.
144
 It 
was not until 4 February 1579 that Tormod was officially invested by the crown in the 
lands held by his niece Màiri since 1551,
145
 and even then, the contest over Glenelg 
continued for many more years. According to the Chronicles of the Frasers several Fraser 
leaders mounted armed expeditions to Glenelg in the sixteenth century to settle „the 
interest there‟.146 In 1589, Tòmas Fraser „went personally…with a 100 bowmen‟ to arrange 
a seven-year lease of the land and assure the inhabitants of his protection.
147
 Travelling 
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with a sizeable entourage was a sensible precaution for any chief, especially after the 
Frasers‟ defeat in 1544, but an armed escort nevertheless suggests that Glenelg was 
potentially hostile territory.  
 
Members of the Clanranald continued to reside in Glenelg as late as 1610, when 
Lord Lovat pledged to provide them with land of equal value should he be evicted.
148
 
There is however no further evidence for any violence in Glenelg, perhaps indicating that 
they were peacefully sharing the same territory. In 1611, the dispute was finally resolved in 
the MacLeods‟ favour, when all the lands of Glenelg were judged to belong to them 
providing they pay the Clan Fraser 12,000 merks.
149
 Then in 1613, Ruairidh Mòr‟s 
„lauchfull dochtir‟ Moir married Iain, son of Dòmhnall, the Clanranald chief. The lands of 
Glenelg were not mentioned in the marriage contract, but this union was presumably 






Overall, the Clanranald were at the epicentre of several important incidents in the mid-to-
late sixteenth century, and the chiefship of Iain Muideartach was certainly a „troubled 
time‟.151 The interference of the Frasers and possibly Huntly in the succession of the 
Clanranald was catalytic to violence, and leadership contests are a recurrent theme 
throughout this period. Blàr nan Lèine shows that chiefs were willing to use military action 
to protect and secure their own position. Decisive pitched battles were relatively rare in the 
West Highland and Isles in this period, and in fact, the battle at Loch Lochy in 1544 may 
be the largest clan engagement of the sixteenth century.
152
 The impact of the battle was felt 
across the western seaboard, the reverberations creating long-lasting consequences. Not 
only was the Clan Fraser crippled as a political and military force, but the aftershocks of 
the battle eventually led to conflict between the Clanranald and the MacLeods of Harris, 
and initiated a power-struggle within the Camerons, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Descendants of Raghnall Gallda meanwhile continued to challenge for the chiefship of the 
Clanranald as late as 1610.
153 
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Argyll‟s campaign in 1554 and 1555 exemplifies both the strength and limitations 
of government expeditions. Argyll succeeded in capturing the castles of Strome and 
Stornoway, but other strongholds like Castle Tioram could still prove difficult to capture 
even with gunpowder. Moreover, the efficacy of delegation by the crown was dependent 
upon the willingness of the noble to carry out their commissions, and there is evidence to 
suggest that Huntly and Argyll were somewhat reluctant to break their friendly terms with 
the Clanranald. Although quick to resort to punitive measures, Mary of Guise and Regent 
Arran apparently understood that a royal presence in the Highlands and Isles could 
strengthen the crown‟s grip on the region. In 1552 and again in 1556, Guise conducted a 
„progress‟ in the Highlands in emulation of her husband,154 a highly visible approach that 
was not continued by James VI, whose planned expeditions to the Highlands and Isles 
never came to fruition. Despite these efforts, there was considerable room for improvement 
where the Western Isles were concerned, as on both expeditions Guise did not visit the 
Hebrides, and generally stayed to the east of the Great Glen.
155
 
The violence between the Clanranald and the MacLeods of Harris over the lands of 
Glenelg is more small-scale than the other situations discussed in this case study, but is 
equally instructive, allowing fuller comprehension of the long-term effects of a battle like 
Blàr nan Lèine. The Clanranald‟s tenancy in Glenelg may have begun through hostile 
occupation of these lands, but it eventually evolved into a mutually beneficial arrangement 
with the Frasers. Considering the devastation wrought at Loch Lochy in 1544, a peaceful 
tenancy agreement between these clans less than a decade later seems almost unthinkable. 
Although their relationship was probably not entirely amicable or indeed equal in terms of 
a balance of power, this nevertheless highlights that feuds were not necessarily 
interminable, and clans could find areas of commonality even after serious bloodshed. This 
conflict also demonstrates that multiple marriages could cause serious upheaval within the 
internal hierarchy of a clan, as the Clanranald faced its second succession crisis in 30 years. 
Clear parallels can be drawn with the situation in 1544, with Ailean Òg supported by his 
mother‟s clan the MacLeods, just as Raghnall Gallda had the support of the Frasers. 
Violence was again triggered, and although the exact nature of this violence is harder to 
pinpoint, it seems much smaller in scale than in 1544. The main difference between the 
two situations is the more active judicial role played by the earl of Argyll. Further conflict 
between and within the two clans was apparently averted without the need for government 
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intervention, which speaks volumes about the efficacy of reconciliation processes in the 
Highlands and Isles when led by an able magnate, like the sixth earl of Argyll.
155 
 
Chapter 6: The Colquhouns of Luss and the Lennox, 1586-
1608 
This case study will focus on politics and warfare in the Lennox from 1586 to 1608 
primarily through the lens of the Colquhouns, a clan at the epicentre of two crucial events 
in the period: the murder of their chief Sir Umfra (Humphrey) Colquhoun of Luss by the 
MacFarlanes in 1592, and their heavy defeat by the MacGregors at the battle of Glen Fruin 
in 1603. The first section will deal with the short but eventful chiefship of Sir Umfra 
Colquhoun of Luss from 1586 until 1592. During this period, a complex and volatile 
political situation had developed within the Lennox and the Colquhouns were not passive 
victims of MacFarlane aggression. The second section will analyse the aftermath of Sir 
Umfra‟s death, including the continuing feud with the MacFarlanes and the circumstances 
leading to the battle of Glen Fruin in 1603. The latter conflict was a crushing defeat for the 
Colquhouns, but in the long term it was even more pivotal for the MacGregors. Facing the 
full wrath of royal government, they were outlawed and the very name of MacGregor was 
proscribed.
1
 As in other case studies, the machinations of prominent magnates, including 
the earl of Argyll, may have precipitated conflict – possibly in 1592 and almost certainly in 
1603 – and exploring this theme will demonstrate that these individuals could seriously 
destabilise the locality. In military terms, this case study covers a large spectrum of clan 
warfare in the Highlands encompassing transitory cattle raids, the assassination of a clan 
chief, and a full-scale pitched-battle. Examining a region like the Lennox, which has been 
generally neglected by scholarship, broadens our knowledge of the prevalence and extent 
of warfare in the Highlands of Scotland as a whole. 
From at least the middle of the fifteenth century, the Colquhouns held the barony of 
Luss, which included the settlement of Luss itself, the lands of Colquhoun and Garscube in 
the shire of Dumbarton, Sauchie and Colquhoun‟s Glen in the shire of Stirling, and the mill 
lands of Saline in the shire of Fife.
2
 Their main seat was the „castell, toure and fortalice‟ of 
Rossdhu,
3
 which lay to the south of Luss on the west bank of Loch Lomond, overlooking 
the cluster of islands including Inchmurrin. Their political opponents in the later sixteenth 
century, the MacFarlanes, were based in Arrochar on the shores of Loch Long to the north 
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of the Colquhouns‟ powerbase,4 and other important clans, such as the Galbraiths and the 
Buchanans, could be found to the east of Loch Lomond.
5
 When the Stewarts inherited the 
earldom of Lennox in 1488, many successive earls were absentee lords, allowing the 
Campbell earls of Argyll to exert increasing influence on the Lennox from the late fifteenth 
century.
6
 Argyll had a firm hold between 1532 and 1564, and maintained dependents, 
including the Colquhouns, in the region even after the earldom was held by the more active 
earls Matthew Stewart (d. 1571) and Esmé Stewart (d. 1583).
7
 
Although a Highland and Gaelic clan, the Colquhouns may have been considered 
by central government as amenable to its agenda in a way most other clans were not, 
perhaps in the mould of the Campbell earls of Argyll or latterly the MacKenzies of 
Kintail.
8
 This view of the Colquhouns derives from the long history of their chiefs acting 
as representatives of royal government in the Lennox, stretching back at least to Iain (d. 
1439). His grandson Iain (d. 1478) was a member of parliament and the sheriff of 
Dumbarton, and his grandson Iain (d. 1536) was a Lord of the Privy Council.
9
 Both were 
knighted, as were Iain (d. 1574) and Umfra (d.1592).
10
 Favoured by the crown far more 
than neighbouring clans such as the MacFarlanes, the Colquhouns perhaps represented the 
acceptable face of southern Gaeldom, an image of distinctive civility the clan itself may 
have actively cultivated.  
By the end of the sixteenth century therefore, the Colquhouns had long been 
established as reliable crown agents, a trend that continued in Sir Umfra‟s chiefship. His 
father Iain died in 1574 while Umfra was still a minor, leaving his uncle Seumas 
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Colquhoun of Garscube to act as the Tutor of Luss until Umfra came of age in 1586.
11
 In 
June 1577, Umfra was given an annual rent of £40 from the lands of „Goldenhuff‟ in the 
shire of Stirling, and in 1582 he was named the coroner of the shire of Dumbarton.
12
 By 
February 1587, Umfra had received a knighthood,
13
 and he was recorded as one of the 
baillies of Dumbarton in 1588.
14
 In the following year, Sir Umfra was included among the 
cream of the Lowland nobility in the list of „Nobles of Scotland well affected to 
England‟.15 Just one year younger than King James VI himself, Sir Umfra seems to have 
been earmarked as a rising star of the Scottish nobility. 
Despite these royal endorsements, his chiefship was relatively troubled from the 
beginning. One of his first acts as clan chief was to revoke all tacks and contracts granted 
during his minority by his tutor, which had been to „his hurt and damage‟.16 This may 
suggest some tension between Umfra and his uncle Seumas, with the young chief 
determined to take matters into his own hands. He inherited a legal dispute with the 
Galbraiths of Culcreuch over the lands of Kilbride in Glen Fruin,
17
 probably aggravated by 
the above revocation.
18
 Financial problems also blighted the young chief, as, according to 
Fraser, he failed to pay his part of the taxation of £40,000 granted by the nobles of 
Scotland to King James VI.
19
 As a result, on 23
 
November 1588, Sir Umfra was put to the 
horn and stripped of his lands, which were escheated to Robert Chirnsyde of Over Possil, a 
Glasgow baillie.
20
 In January 1591, Chirnsyde bestowed the whole „lands and heritages‟ of 
Luss on Sir Umfra‟s brother, Alasdair, having received „certane gratitudes, gude deidis, 
and pleasouris‟ from him.21 On 1 June of that year, Sir Umfra was again declared an outlaw 
at the behest of Chirnsyde.
22
 These issues were only compounded by flashes of violence by 
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Sir Umfra, which saw him implicated in the murder of William Brisbane of Barnishill,
23
 
and, as we shall see, the killing of a MacFarlane. For these accumulated crimes, the 
Colquhoun chief had squandered much of his royal favour, becoming „obnoxious‟ to 
central government.
24
 In a remarkably short space of time, Sir Umfra had alienated most 
neighbouring families, central government, and perhaps even his own clan, and was 
reduced to the status of a dispossessed outlaw by June 1591. 
At the outset of Sir Umfra‟s chiefship, the Colquhouns seem quite closely 
associated with the Campbell earls of Argyll.
25
 Sir Umfra‟s first wife was Jean (Janet) 
Cunningham, the widow of Gilleasbuig, the fifth earl of Argyll (d. 1573),
26
 and on 30 
October 1590, Gilleasbuig, the seventh earl (d. 1638) gave Colquhoun a charter for the 
lands of Bordland of Saline as thanks for his „faithful service‟ and homage.27 Political 
outrage followed two years later when George Gordon, the sixth earl of Huntly, 
assassinated James Stewart, the „Bonnie‟ earl of Moray, in February 1592. One month after 
the murder, on 16 March 1592, Sir Umfra Colquhoun shifted allegiance away from Argyll 
by pledging his service to Huntly, promising to „becum [his] man servand and dependar‟ 
and to assist him in any „deidlie feidis, by past, present, and to cum‟.28 This is a decisive 
break from Colquhoun‟s previous association with Argyll, and the switch could not have 
come at a more politically volatile time. Anticipating retribution for the murder of Moray, 
Huntly was desperately looking for allies,
29
 and soon he was militarily pursued by the earl 
of Argyll with the support of the royal government, a campaign that eventually culminated 
in the battle of Glenlivet in 1594.
30
 Considering his own troubles with the law, Sir Umfra 
was probably equally keen for the alliance, but this came at the cost of attracting the 
enmity of Argyll. The MacFarlanes were close adherents of the earl of Argyll,
31
 and 
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according to Fraser, they became hatchet men on his behalf, attacking and killing Sir 





Yet this explanation of factional politics hijacking local rivalries does not wholly 
explain the shift to open conflict. The Colquhouns and MacFarlanes had already come to 
blows at least two years prior to Huntly‟s involvement, with the MacFarlanes conducting 
several plundering raids on Colquhoun lands from 1589.
34
 A series of bonds and cautions 
made between March and April 1591 sought to obtain a ceasefire, but if achieved it was 
only temporary.
35
 Hostilities before April 1591 were apparently limited to Colquhoun clan 
branches and did not include the Colquhoun chief himself. Nevertheless, several prominent 
families were involved, including the Colquhouns of Garscube, represented by Umfra‟s old 
tutor, Seumas. On the other side, various MacFarlanes, including their chief Anndra of 
Arrochar, were implicated in the raids and associated violence.
36
 
The Colquhouns equally had blood on their hands. An entry in the Privy Council on 
15 February 1610 claims that the murder of a MacFarlane by Sir Umfra „caused‟ the whole 
feud, which continued for many years.
37
 The murdered MacFarlane can be identified as 
Dòmhnall mac Nèill MacFarlane, the father of Iain MacFarlane of Shemore in Glen 
Finlas,
38
 and the household servant of Raibeart Galbraith of Culcreuch.
39
 Dòmhnall may 
have been killed at some point after May 1589, as Raibeart Galbraith‟s father, Seumas, was 
clan leader until at least 24 May, but Dòmhnall could have been Raibeart‟s household 
servant before his father‟s death.40 Definite knowledge of the order of events (i.e. whether 
the above MacFarlane raids came before the murder of Dòmhnall, or were conducted 
thereafter in retaliation) is difficult to determine. The murder and its aftermath may help to 
explain Umfra‟s sudden shift to Huntly if Argyll and the MacFarlanes were pursuing him. 
Regardless, the repercussions for the Colquhouns were severe and even 20 years later in 
1610 the murder was still regarded as the flashpoint for the entire „dedlie‟ feud with the 
MacFarlanes.  
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Sir Umfra Colquhoun of Luss was certainly dead by 11 August 1592 when his 
lands were gifted to Walter Stewart of Blantyre, Keeper of the Privy Seal, by King James 
VI.
41
 The exact circumstances of his death are extremely murky, but crucial to 
understanding this case study. On 28 April 1607, Sir Umfra‟s successor Alasdair wrote to 
King James about his brother‟s murder at the hands of the MacFarlanes: 
I haue beine urgit be the Counsell to submit with the Mcfarlanes my brotheris 
slauchter and all uther slauchteris, murtheris, hairscheppis, theiftis, reiffis and 
oppressiounis, raising of fyre demolisching of my housis cwitting and destroying of 
woods and plainting committit be thame against me…42 
 
Other sources muddy the waters and suggest a more complex situation. An anonymous 
letter written by a noble in Scotland shortly after Sir Umfra‟s death, paints a lurid picture 
of disorder and unrest across the entire country:   
The estate of our country and court is as changeable as ever it was, with as little 
obedience or justice; many deadly feuds without punishment; and reif and 
oppression throughout all the country. The Macfarlanes are worse than the Clan 
Gregor…Immediately is slain the Laird of Luss by the MacFarlanes in the Lennox, 
betrayed in the night most shamefully.
43
 
The detail that Sir Umfra was „betrayed‟ appears to indicate that an ally or even his own 
kin were implicated in his death. This is expanded upon by Robert Birrell, a burgess of 
Edinburgh, who kept a diary for over forty years, recording events of both national and 
regional importance.
44
 According to Birrell, Sir Umfra‟s brother Iain (John) was 
responsible for the murder: 
The last of Nouember [30 November 1592], Johne Cohoune ves beheidit at ye 
crosse of Edinburghe, for murthering of his awen brother the laird of Lusse.
45
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„A Brief Account of the Familie of Luse‟, a genealogical history for the Colquhouns 
probably composed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century,
46
  reiterates the 
involvement of Iain: 
 
This Humphrey had no sons, he was killed by the Mcfarlands at the Bannochra in 
1591. His second brother was John who was executed at Edinburgh for being 
accessory to his brother‟s murder.47 
 
This shines a new light on this feud, recasting it from a straightforward conflict between 
two separate clans to a more complex political situation of internal strife and fratricide. It 
may be reasonably speculated that Sir Umfra was betrayed and assassinated during a 
parley with the MacFarlanes, possibly at Bannachra Castle. Iain Colquhoun may have 
sought to usurp his older brother as chief, perhaps with direct support from the 
MacFarlanes. Yet a stronger possibility is that Iain betrayed Sir Umfra to end a divisive 
and self-destructive chiefship characterised by violence, financial problems, and politically 
imprudent alliances. Iain may have supported the MacFarlanes in seeking redress for the 
killing of Dòmhnall MacFarlane and handed over his brother Sir Umfra to face their 
private justice, thus clearing the way for a chiefship takeover by his other brother Alasdair, 
who had been given the clan‟s lands in 1591. Unfortunately for Iain, this cost him his life, 
and the circumstances of his apprehension are unknown. Although the removal of Sir 
Umfra was beneficial for himself and the clan, it is possible that Alasdair surrendered Iain 
to crown justice. 
 
A later genealogical history, „An Historical & Genealogical Deduction of the 
Family of Colquhoun of Luss‟, probably composed in the early nineteenth century,48 
conflates Sir Umfra‟s death with the battle of Glen Fruin: 
 
He fought the McGregors at the Conflict at Glenfruin & was that day or the next 
shot thorough [sic] the chink of a cellar window in his own house of Bannachra 
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By merging the two events, the later history elides the fratricide and presents Sir Umfra‟s 
downfall as the outcome of a more conventional inter-clan feud. The maligned 
MacGregors are left to carry the sole burden of the murder, while the MacFarlanes, and 
indeed Iain Colquhoun, evaded culpability. This account may derive from, or be influenced 
by, local tradition, and this is the earliest textual reference to the „window‟ detail, an ever-
present feature of later accounts.
50
 Fraser‟s rendition of Sir Umfra‟s death has the 
MacFarlanes, joined by the MacGregors, encircling the castle and conducting a protracted 
siege, until a servant of Sir Umfra offers to betray his master by throwing „the glare of a 
paper torch upon his person, when opposite a loophole‟. When Colquhoun‟s illuminated 
figure appeared at the window, MacFarlane bowmen shot him in the heart, and the 
besiegers stormed the castle, brutally attacking the remaining occupants.
51
 Oral tradition of 
this event published by Michael Newton retains much of the same detail, except that Sir 
Umfra is flushed out by suffocating smoke created by a „huge heap of brushwood‟ ignited 
by the MacFarlanes (the MacGregors playing no part in this version).
52
 It is interesting to 
note that although the details have been distorted, these two stories still retain aspects of 
treachery and betrayal as core elements of Sir Umfra‟s demise, even if they have forgotten 
or elided Iain Colquhoun‟s involvement in the murder of his brother. 
Considering that Sir Umfra was a chief of some note both north and south of the 
Firth of Clyde, it may seem surprising that there are no surviving Privy Council entries 
from the immediate period that record his death. In contrast to this silence, the Colquhouns 
later employed a highly emotive public display of grief at Edinburgh to secure reparations 
for their kin murdered by the MacGregors at Glen Finlas in 1602. Calls of justice for Sir 
Umfra were non-existent, perhaps because he was indeed considered a liability, with the 
leadership of his brother, Alasdair, preferred by the clan at large. Moreover, the 
involvement of his other brother Iain in his murder must have encouraged the Colquhouns 
to limit their remonstrations. 
Following the death of Umfra and the execution of Iain, Alasdair became chief of 
the Colquhouns. As mentioned, Alasdair had been invested in the lands by Robert 
Chirnsyde of Over Possil in January 1591, but the gift of the barony of Luss by James VI 
to Walter Stewart in August 1592 overrode this investment and Alasdair was forced to 
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purchase the lands from Stewart for 5,000 merks on 25 January 1593.
53
 He was formally 
recognised in the lands by King James in February 1593, and in December he was given 
custody of Sir Umfra‟s „bairne posthume‟, his daughters Margaret and Agnes.54 The feud 
with the MacFarlanes spilled over into Alasdair‟s chiefship, and this lasting enmity 
probably absolves Alasdair of any culpability in the murder of his older brother. In 
December 1593, Alasdair issued a „letter of inhibition‟ against Robert Erskine of Little 
Sauchie,
55
 prohibiting him from selling any Colquhoun lands to MacFarlane of Arrochar.
56
 
Unfortunately for the Colquhouns, this prompted the involvement of crown favourite John 
Erskine, the earl of Mar, who supported his kinsman, Erskine of Little Sauchie, and by 
extension, the MacFarlanes. The prevailing Argyll-Huntly rivalry can also be raised as a 
possible explanation for Mar‟s involvement. He was a prominent member of the king‟s 
court, and while he was not involved directly at Glenlivet,
57
 he supported Argyll in his 
feud against Huntly.
58
 It is possible that Mar backed Argyll‟s adherents the MacFarlanes in 
their dispute with the Colquhouns in an extension of this feud against Huntly.
59
 A letter by 
the Scottish clergyman and politician John Colville to English diplomat Robert Bowes on 
28 June 1595 provides insight into the nature of Mar‟s involvement. Colville discusses the 
„ill-will‟ between Mar and John Maitland, the Lord Chancellor, caused by the murder of 
Mar‟s servant David Forrester, and he muses upon how their feud may proceed: 
 




This probably indicates military activity, or the threat of such, by Mar and the MacFarlanes 
against the Colquhouns, but the precise details are unknown. A letter written on 26 October 
1595 by Roger Aston to Robert Bowes notes that Walter Stewart of Blantyre and the earl 
of Mar have met „for the agreeing of the deadly feud between the laird of Lawes61 and the 
MacFarlanes‟, suggesting Mar was only involved as an arbitrator.62 On 1 November, the 
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feud is referred to by George Nicolson, writing to Robert Bowes, this time without any 
mention of Mar: 
The matters between the laird of Luce and the MacFarlanes is put to comprement 
[compromit] by the means of Blantyre.
63
 
A bond of 1 June 1597 temporarily resolved the feud, with the earl of Mar acting as surety 
that the MacFarlanes would keep the peace with the Colquhouns.
64
 This arrangement was 
ratified by Alasdair of Luss on 7 November 1599, in a bond that pledged the safety of 
Anndra MacFarlane of Arrochar, his son Iain, and „the remanent of thair surname, kind, 
freindes, partie and partakares‟.65 On 31 January 1602, Ludovick Stewart, the Duke of 
Lennox, pledged to provide the king with 200 men for service in Ireland and nominated the 
brother of the heir of Colquhoun of Camstradden and the son of Anndra Dubh MacFarlane 
of Gartavartane
66
 to serve as „captains‟.67 
This truce may have brought some years of peace between the two clans, but the 
Colquhouns became embroiled in another costly feud, this time with the MacGregors. The 
origins of this feud again seem related to factional politics amongst the high-status nobility, 
as a rift emerged between the Duke of Lennox and Argyll – a rivalry that had considerable 
historical precedent.
68
 On 25 November 1600, the Duke initially claimed that his office of 
Lord High Admiral of Scotland had been usurped by Argyll holding courts in the „west 
parts‟ of the realm.69 On 9 December, Lennox appeared before the Privy Council, formally 
accusing Argyll of authorising an attack upon his vassal, MacAulay of Ardencaple.
70
 This 
prompted little reaction from the councillors and in March 1601, Argyll obtained a 
commission to pacify the MacGregors, who since at least 1592 had launched numerous 
cattle raids against various adjacent clans.
71
 At Stirling on 22 April, Alasdair Ruadh 
MacGregor of Glenstrae gave a bond to Argyll for the future good behaviour of his clan.
72
 
By December 1601, Lennox was again at odds with Argyll, claiming this commission 
against the MacGregors had resulted in encroachments upon his lands.
73
 The „malcontent‟ 
between the two nobles only increased in the months that followed, and Lennox began to 
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believe Argyll coveted his titles of lieutenant of the Isles and Lord High Admiral.
74
 In 
April 1602, Lennox again accused Argyll of authorising the raid on MacAulay, and a 
second attack on another of Lennox‟s vassals, Iain Stewart of Ardmaleish, sheriff of Bute, 
by Dubhghall Campbell of Auchinbreck was added to the charge.
75
 On 18 May 1602, the 
king managed to temporarily reconcile the two nobles, with Argyll making assurances for 
Auchinbreck‟s future conduct, and it seemed that the dispute would be „packit up and tane 
away be a amicable and freindlie dres of freindis‟.76  For a few months Lennox and Argyll 
were „cold friends‟, but by August 1602 they again stood in „evil terms‟.77  
Meanwhile, the MacGregors‟ attacks had continued into 1602, unimpeded by 
Argyll, including a wide-ranging raid against the Colquhouns on 4 June.
78
 The Colquhouns 
were granted a commission to resist the Clan Gregor, with permission to carry hagbuts and 
pistols anywhere north of the River Leven.
79
 On 30 November 1602 Argyll was accused of 
negligence in his commission against the MacGregors and consequently his duties as the 
king‟s lieutenant.80 Further MacGregor attacks were launched in December, including the 
raid on Glen Finlas on 17 December, led by Alasdair Ruadh MacGregor of Glenstrae‟s 
brother, Iain Dubh. This cattle raid was hugely damaging for the Colquhouns and their 
tenants. John MacGregor‟s transcription of the now almost illegible original inventory 
suggests as many as 846 ewes, 578 cows, 527 goats, 16 mares, and 2 horses were stolen.
81
 
Around 36 houses were spoiled, at least one man was killed (John McGibbon), and two 
were captured (Thomas Grasicht and John McCasson).
82
  
In a complaint to the Privy Council on 21 December 1602, Alasdair of Luss 
showed keen awareness both of his legal rights and Argyll‟s jurisdictional scope. He 
invoked Argyll‟s commission of 1601, arguing that because Argyll had the „haill race of 
Clan Gregour under his obedience and commandiement‟ he was therefore answerable for 
their behaviour.
83
 In addition to this legal argument, the Colquhoun chief reportedly 
employed a more emotive approach. Semple of Fulwood and William Stewart, captain of 
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Dumbarton Castle, advised the Colquhoun chief to „adres to zour self, wyth als mony 
bludie sarks [bloody shirts] as ather ar deid or hurt of zour men, togitter wyth als money 
vemen [women], to present thame to his Maiestie in Stirling‟.84 They urged him to make 
the display while the French ambassador was still at court,
85
 presumably because the 
presence of a foreign dignitary would embarrass the king into showing sympathy. Gordon 
confirms that this public exhibition of grief did take place, but he amplifies its extent by 
conflating the raid of Glen Finlas with the later, more serious engagement at Glen Fruin.
86
 
As pointed out by John MacGregor, the „bludie sarks‟ strategy was not a „new invention‟ 




On 25 December 1602, Argyll was due to answer to these charges along with fresh 
allegations that he had sought to „trouble the Lennox and the Duke‟s servants and 
followers‟.88 The truce established in May 1602 had been broken by Argyll‟s kinsman, 
Campbell of Auchinbreck, who in November 1602 had raised an army of „1500 men in 
arms, furnished with hagbuts and pistolets, most of them Archibald, Earl of Ergyll‟s men‟ 
and launched another attack on Stewart of Ardmaleish, the sheriff of Bute.
89
 When night 
fell on 19 November, this Campbell host – „specially instigated by the Earl‟ – landed on 
the Isle of Bute and raided the lands of Marion Stewart
90
 and those of the sheriff himself, 
burning crops, assaulting tenants, and stealing cattle.
91
 On 11 January 1603, Argyll and 
Auchinbreck were denounced for this raid.
92
 On 1 February 1603, the dispute between 
Lennox and Argyll was successfully arbitrated by the king, and on that same day, Argyll 
and Huntly were reconciled after their own bitter, long-running feud.
93
 As a consequence 
of his negligent or reluctant approach to carrying out his commission against the 
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MacGregors, Argyll was replaced in this undertaking by Lennox, who made „many 
vows…for their overthrow‟.94 
Just six days later, on 7 February 1603, the battle of Glen Fruin (or „The Slaughter 
in the Lennox‟)95 saw the heavy defeat of the Colquhouns by the MacGregors. The 
Colquhouns had been given a royal commission to resist the MacGregors‟ „crewall 
interpryses‟, while the MacGregors, led by their chief Alasdair Ruadh of Glenstrae, were 
apparently working under instruction of the earl of Argyll.
96
 The MacGregors, „haifing 
concludit the distructioune‟ of the Colquhouns and the Buchanans, joined with members of 
the Clan Cameron
97
 and „Clananverich‟,98 and together their force amounted to around 400 
men.
99
 Contemporary sources for the battle itself are somewhat slight,
100
 but it seems the 
MacGregor-led army came to the Colquhouns‟ lands of Glen Fruin (to the south-west of 
Luss)
101
 in battle array and Alasdair Colquhoun of Luss replied by raising his own force.
102
 
Gordon claims that the two clan chiefs parleyed before the battle, but could not reach an 
agreement. Colquhoun then launched an attack on the MacGregors, hoping to „tak his 
enemies…vnawars‟ and crush them with his superior numbers. However, Alasdair Ruadh 
had divided his army into two separate companies: one led by the MacGregor chief himself 
held its ground against the Colquhoun attack, while the other, commanded by Alasdair 
Ruadh‟s brother Iain Dubh, „drew a compass about, and invaded the Laird of Luss his 
company when they least expected‟.103 Whether or not Gordon‟s account of the 
MacGregors‟ strategy is accurate, they emerged from the battle as decisive victors.104 Their 
casualties were probably very light, with the noted exception of Iain Dubh, Alasdair 
Ruadh‟s brother, who was killed.105 On the other side between 60 and 140 Colquhouns, 
Buchanans and other Lennox men were killed, of whom „twentie-foure or threttie were 
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landed men of good ranke‟.106 It was later alleged that most of those killed on Colquhouns‟ 
side had been taken captive by the MacGregors „befoir thai pat violent handis in thame, 
and crewallie slew thame‟.107 Alasdair, the chief of the Colquhouns, „escaped 
narrowlie‟.108 
The king and Council condemned the slaughter in the first of a series of „ruthless 
edicts‟ against the MacGregors made on 24 February 1603, which called for their 
extirpation.
109
 This punishment aimed to make an example of the MacGregors, to send a 
message of „terroure to all posterities‟.110 Outlawed and with a price on his head set at 
£1000,
111
 the MacGregor chief Alasdair Ruadh first eluded capture by Campbell of 
Ardkinglas, but was then betrayed by the earl of Argyll who had promised to „put him out 
of Scottish grund‟.112 Argyll kept „ane Hielandman‟s promes‟ by sending him to Berwick, 
but Glenstrae was promptly returned to Scottish soil, apprehended, and brought to 
Edinburgh for trial.
113
  Unlikely as it may sound, this genuinely took place, as indicated by 
the payment of John Murray of 20 crowns „as for the pryce of ane broune neag quhilk is 
deid in his Majesteis service in careing of M‟Gregor at our command to Bervic and bak 
heir‟.114 
A declaration by the MacGregor chief at the time of his conviction provides 
fascinating insight into the political machinations of the earl of Argyll. According to 
Alasdair Ruadh, Argyll, acting as the king‟s lieutenant, persistently threatened his clan 
with disfavour unless they performed violent actions against various clans and individuals. 
For example, Argyll demanded that Alasdair Ruadh kill Campbell of Ardkinglas and 
MacAulay of Ardencaple, and launch attacks against the Colquhouns and the 
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 This desire to cause injury to the Colquhouns may have stemmed from their 
bond of manrent with Huntly, again suggesting Argyll‟s collusion in Sir Umfra‟s murder in 
1592. Overall however, it seems that Argyll‟s goal was grander than simply redeeming 
slighted honour. He sought to manufacture unrest within the Lennox by manipulating clans 
into raids and warfare, obtain a government commission to pacify the disorder he had 
created, and then profit from consequent government rewards. Alasdair Ruadh claimed the 
king had promised Argyll the feu of Kintyre if he apprehended him.
116
 If this could all be 
achieved while also portraying his rival the Duke of Lennox as an incompetent, that was 
only an added benefit to Argyll. It seems reasonable to conclude that Argyll‟s 
reconciliation with Lennox on 1 February was insincere, and just days later he induced the 
MacGregors to attack the Colquhouns in order to undermine and humiliate Lennox. There 
was an immediate precedent for this kind of behaviour by Argyll as he had already 
disregarded the terms of the truce between the sheriff of Bute and Campbell of 
Auchinbreck in May 1602. 
The immediate context of MacGregor‟s testimony does challenge its credibility, 
and he may have been casting the blame on Argyll in an attempt to save his own life and 
protect his clan. However, in light of the government‟s hard-line policy towards the 
MacGregors as a whole it was becoming increasingly unlikely that Alasdair Ruadh would 
be released, and perhaps he resolved to expose Argyll‟s duplicity with his last public 
statement. Indeed, the closing lines of Glenstrae‟s declaration weave moral indignation 
with sincere concern for the future welfare of his own clan: 
And now, seing God and man seis it is greidenes of warldlie geir quhilk causis him 
[Argyll] to putt at me and my kin, and not the weill of the realme, nor to pacifie the 
samyn, nor to his Majesties honour, bot to putt down innocent men, to cause pure 
bairnes and infanttis bege, and pure wemen to perisch for hunger, quhen they ar 
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Ultimately, his declaration was in vain, and at his execution in Edinburgh on 20 January 
1604, Alasdair Ruadh, as chief of the MacGregors, was „hangit his awin hight above the 
rest of hes freindis‟.118 
In the years that followed, various clans, including the Colquhouns, hunted down 
members of the Clan Gregor.
119
 On 24 November 1603, the Colquhouns presented three 
MacGregors before the Privy Council and these men were presumably executed.
120
 Six 
years later on 18 November 1609, Alasdair Colquhoun asked the king for restitution since 
the Clan Gregor had returned to „thair former coursses‟, presumably renewed MacGregor 
raids.
121
 Intermittent violence continued and on 5 March 1611, the Colquhouns appeared 
before the Privy Council in Edinburgh with three captured MacGregors and the severed 
heads of three others. For the apprehension and killing of these outlaws they requested 
remuneration of 600 merks, but were only rewarded with 300: „ane hundreth merkis for 
every one of the three heidis of the McGregouris‟.122 The message was clear for those 
hunting the MacGregors: dead was better than alive. 
While this was clearly a period of serious disorder in the Lennox, there were at 
least some years of peace, perhaps as many as eight, between the Colquhouns and the 
MacFarlanes, which should be emphasised to avoid an impression of continuous feuding 
and warfare. However by May 1607, the feud had resumed with a vengeance, described by 
the Privy Council as being in „verie grite heit‟.123 In April, Alasdair Colquhoun wrote to 
the king, complaining that he had still not received assythment for the murder of his 
brother, and expressing concerns that Mar intended to obstruct his fight for justice by 
exploiting his connections with the king.
124
 Both parties, again including Mar, were 
ordered to appear for arbitration by 23 June.
125
 Alasdair Colquhoun refused to negotiate a 
reconciliation claiming that „he could not submit with the Makfarlans becaus they wer the 
King‟s rebells for many criminall caussis‟. Mar countered by pointing out that their 
inclusion was a necessity as they had „bene joynit with him in that querrell‟.126 News of 
this seemingly interminable feud now reached the ears of the king in London, who ordered 
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the earl of Dunfermline and the other Councillors to ensure „all caus of grudge and evill [is] 
removed by thair reconciliatioun‟.127 In April 1608, arbiters were appointed for both sides: 
Walter Stewart of Blantyre for Colquhoun; John Bothwell, Lord of Holyroodhouse, for 
MacFarlane and Mar. Despite „great panes and travellis in that mater‟, the peace talks 
broke down, with the arbiters unable to draw the two parties to any „reasounable mindis or 
compositioun‟.128 
At some point between April 1608 and February 1610 however, the feud was settled.  
The specifics are not known and only the record of another later controversy confirms the 
approximate time of the settlement. On 15 February 1610, Iain MacFarlane, a tenant of 
Colquhoun of Luss (and importantly the son of the MacFarlane murdered by Sir Umfra), 
was charged with the murder of Katherine MacLerich in Little Hills Glen. Colquhoun was 
absolved of legal responsibility for his tenant because: 
…the deadly feud between the Laird of Lus and the ClanFarlane…being removed, the 




Although the feud had therefore been settled by February 1610, tensions clearly still 
remained between the two clans, and the Privy Council feared that any further strain on 
relations could restart hostilities. The Council advised that MacLerich entreat Anndra 
MacFarlane of Arrochar to provide justice for the actions of Iain, as the MacFarlane chief 
had „found surety for making all his men answerable to justice‟.130 The fragile truce 
between the Colquhouns and the MacFarlanes endured. In August 1610 and January 1611, 
the Colquhouns and MacFarlanes were both called up for pursuit of the MacGregors, and 
in September 1610, MacFarlane witnessed a band between Colquhoun and MacAulay of 
Ardincaple.
131
 This suggests that the feud had indeed been „removed‟ and the two clans 
were on relatively amicable terms. However, it is worth noting that in February 1611 both 
clans were charged with failing to pursue the MacGregors, perhaps suggesting practical 





The late sixteenth century was clearly a period of intense crisis for the Colquhouns of Luss. 
They faced a twelve-year minority rule after the death of their chief Iain in 1574, followed 
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by the murder of his son Sir Umfra in 1592 by his own kin. Embroiled in a serious feud 
with the MacFarlanes until at least 1608, they also suffered crushing defeat in battle at the 
hands of the MacGregors in 1603. Power struggles in the Lennox were nothing new, but 
this was a particularly difficult period for a clan like the Colquhouns, prominent north and 
south of the Firth of Clyde. A concrete explanation for Sir Umfra‟s death in 1592 remains 
elusive. It may have been an extension of the Colquhouns‟ feud with the MacFarlanes, a 
leadership challenge by his brother Iain, or indeed a combination of both. A recurrent 
theme of this case study (and thesis as a whole) is the impact of the high nobility‟s 
factional politics, which clearly influenced or even instigated feuds between smaller clans. 
There is compelling evidence to suggest that the rivalries between Argyll and Huntly and 
latterly Argyll and Lennox were significant factors in the Colquhouns‟ feuds with the 
MacFarlanes and the MacGregors. These regional magnates, Argyll in particular, treated 
the smaller clans as little more than pawns, pitting them against each another in proxy 
warfare, all to further their attempts at currying crown favour and enhancing the prestige of 
their own kindred through tangible prizes of land. 
Military activity in the Lennox during this period was extensive, including endemic 
raiding, assassinations and other killings, and eventually a major pitched battle. It must be 
noted that these activities were engaged in by the Colquhouns almost as readily as they 
were by the MacFarlanes or the MacGregors. In both feuds involving the Colquhouns, 
there is a clear sense that cattle raids, especially if repeated annually, could escalate into 
more serious armed confrontation led by chiefs obliged by custom to protect or avenge 
their clansmen. Raids like Glen Finlas damaged the economic potential of the locale, and 
could prove deadly for those who resisted the raiders. The severity of the government's 
response to the MacGregors may be partly explained by the fact that a pitched-battle was 
fought so close to the Lowlands of Scotland, but the timing was also particularly dreadful, 




Chapter 7: The MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of 
Harris, 1594-1601 
The feud between the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Harris in the late 
sixteenth century is best remembered in modern Gaelic tradition as „Cogadh na Cailliche 
Caime‟, or the „War of the One-eyed Woman‟.1 The popular story states that Dòmhnall 
Gorm MacDonald of Sleat entered into a trial marriage (or „hand-fasting)2 with the sister of 
Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod of Harris, but when 
...the sight of one of the lady's eyes were affected...Donald Gorme, to shew her all 
the indignity that he could, sent her back to Dunvegan, mounted on a one-eyed grey 
horse, led by a one-eyed lad, and followed by a terrier, also blind of an eye.
3
 
This story has a clear folkloric element, and the „one-eyed woman‟ motif appears in other 
clans‟ traditions,4 but contemporary evidence certainly shows a divorce took place, and 
there is some justification for crediting the ensuing feud as the last of the traditional clan 
wars fought „over land or slighted honour‟.5  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the origins of the feud are more complex than the 
traditional narrative allows. Tension between the two kindreds was a near constant due to 
their competing claims over Trotternish in the north of Skye, lands which pertained to the 
MacDonalds, but were claimed by the MacLeods.
6
 As pointed out by Dawson, the lands 
„suffered a bewildering series of grants‟ between 1495 and 1507: they were given to both 
the Harris and Lewis branches of the MacLeods, the MacDonalds of Sleat, the 
MacDonalds of Clanranald, and the earl of Huntly.
7
 This may have been the principal 
cause of a feud between the MacLeods of Harris and the MacDonalds of Sleat in the late 
1560s, which the earl of Argyll unsuccessfully attempted to arbitrate in the summer of 
                                                          
1
 Cameron, History and Traditions of Skye, 57-8. 
2
 Anton has demonstrated the dubiety of the hand-fasting tradition in the Highlands, while Sellar explored the 
„irregular‟ nature of marriage customs in the region. See A.E. Anton, „Handfasting in Scotland‟, SHR, 37, 
(October 1958), 89–102; Sellar, „Marriage‟, 469-70, 477-9, 487. 
3
 Cameron, History, 57-8. 
4
 J.P. MacLean, A History of the Clan MacLean (Cincinnati, 1889), 51-2.  In c. 1480, Coinneach MacKenzie 
allegedly repudiated his wife, Margaret, daughter of Iain MacDonald of Islay, in a manner identical to the 
above story. The „History of the MacDonalds‟ claims that Alasdair Crotach MacLeod was imprisoned in 
Castle Tioram for seven years for repudiating Clanranald‟s daughter. See HP, Vol. I, 68. 
5
 MacGregor, „Statutes‟, 136. 
6
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 253; Celtic Scotland, Vol. III, 432-3. At 80 merklands, Trotternish was the most valuable 
region in Skye, surpassing Sleat at 30 merklands.  
7
 Dawson, Scotland Re-formed, 72. On 7 September 1496, Alasdair, the son of Uilleam MacLeod of 
Dunvegan, was granted the two pennylands („unciatas‟) of Trotternish, as well as the bailliary for the same 
lands. See RMS, Vol. II, 514. 
174 
 
1568. In the wake of the arbitration, MacLeod of Harris attacked some of MacDonald of 
Sleat‟s galleys, rekindling the controversy among „that ragged companye‟.8 Any mutual 
animosity was only magnified by continued political opposition in the 1580s, when the 
MacLeods supported Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart in his feud with the MacDonalds of 
Sleat and the MacDonalds of Dunivaig.
9
 In September 1585/6,
10
 James VI wrote to 
Uilleam MacLeod requesting his intervention on behalf of MacLean in „resisting of the 
violence and persute of the said Clandonald‟.11 The MacLeods were clearly involved in a 
significant capacity, as MacLean was only released from captivity by Aonghas MacDonald 




The fallout from this feud fostered a volatile political environment of shifting 
alliances. The MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacDonalds of Dunivaig attempted to buttress 
support against a powerful new coalition in the Isles consisting of the MacLeods, the 
MacLeans, and the MacKenzies by allying with the earl of Huntly and the Clan Chattan 
confederation based in the central and eastern Highlands.
13
 Conflict was averted through 
diplomacy between the MacLeods and the Clan Chattan, who entered into a bond of 
friendship on 15 January 1588.
14
 Relations between the MacDonalds and the MacLeods 
then softened through the marriage of Dòmhnall Gorm MacDonald of Sleat and Màiri (or 
Marion), the sister of Uilleam and Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod of Harris, arranged at some 
point prior to November 1590. 
When Uilleam MacLeod died in 1590, his younger brother, Ruairidh Mòr, became 
the Tutor of Harris and de facto leader of the clan while his nephew, Iain, was a minor.
15
 
For the next five years the MacLeods and the MacDonalds enjoyed a period of cooperation, 
apparently ushered in by the marriage between Dòmhnall Gorm and Màiri MacLeod. In 
June 1593, Dòmhnall Gorm „confederated‟ with Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod of Harris, 
MacDonald of Glengarry, and MacKinnon of Strath, to invade MacKenzie‟s lands in Ross 
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with an army of 2,000 men.
16
 Next year in July 1594, Dòmhnall Gorm joined with 
Ruairidh Mòr in a mercenary expedition to Ulster with a combined force of c. 1,200 men
17
 
to assist Ó Domhnaill and Maguire in their siege of Enniskillen Castle.
18
 The growing 
ambition of Dòmhnall Gorm was an obstacle to any future partnership between the two 
clans. In his conflict with the MacKenzies in 1593, Dòmhnall Gorm had apparently 
declared himself „King of the Isles‟ (Rìgh Innse Gall) and successor to the headship of the 
forfeited Lordship.
19
 During the campaign in Ireland, he reportedly hoped to „put away his 
wife, and to marry O‟Donel‟s daughter‟.20 Ruairidh Mòr may not have been aware of his 
brother-in-law‟s intentions at this stage, but it is clear that from the outset of this marriage 
Dòmhnall Gorm was actively pursuing a more politically expedient marital match. Ó 
Domhnaill and the other Irish chiefs desperately needed „spare forces‟ (the Hebridean 
mercenaries) to challenge the Tudor establishment in Ireland,
21
 and in exchange, they 
could have supported Dòmhnall Gorm‟s revival of the forfeited Lordship. 
MacLeod and MacDonald had returned to Scotland by September 1594, leaving 
behind a band of 300 soldiers placed at the disposal of Ó Néill and Ó Domhnaill.
22
 Initially, 
the campaign was reported a success: the mercenaries were apparently „well entreated in 
Ireland‟ and received „great gains and profit‟. Promising to return next year, the 
MacDonalds and MacLeods began „labouring to gather together for that purpose all the 
forces they can levy‟.23 However, a later report from December claims „the most part of the 
forces left by Donald Gorme and MacLeod Harris in Ireland have returned home 
malcontent‟, suggesting defeat in battle, cash flow problems, or discord with the Irish 
chiefs.
24
 True to their word however, the Hebrideans amassed a huge force of mercenaries 
in the early summer of 1595. By 3 June, Iain, son of Uilleam MacLeod of Harris, had died, 
and Ruairidh Mòr, his uncle, succeeded him.
25
 The ever active Ruairidh Mòr mustered his 
clan to join the MacLeods of Lewis, along with the Sleat and Dunivaig branches of the 
Clan Donald. Together their pooled resources raised a formidable army of around 3,000 
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 The company was reportedly ready to depart as early as June, but Dòmhnall Gorm 
and his „maughe‟ (brother-in-law)27 Ruairidh Mòr „fell out‟.28 The reasons for this upset 
are not known, and could have been a simple disagreement over strategy. Perhaps the 
newly elevated MacLeod chief resented being subordinated by Dòmhnall Gorm's closest 
ally, Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig. Alternatively, the explicit reference to Ruairidh 
Mòr as Dòmhnall Gorm's „maughe‟ could imply the quarrel was related to family affairs, 
specifically marital relations – perhaps the proposed marriage between Dòmhnall Gorm 
and Ó Domhnaill‟s daughter had been discovered. Whatever the nature of the controversy, 
it is clear that familial ties were failing to cool the simmering tension between the 
MacLeods and the MacDonalds. 
Political upheaval may have stalled the sailing of the mercenaries, but their sizeable 
force still remained on the west coast of Scotland and threatened to tip the balance of 
power in Ireland. Anxious to prevent their intervention, the English government put 
pressure on James VI to employ the earl of Argyll and Lachlann Mòr MacLean to prevent 
their sailing. This placed the MacLeods of Harris in opposition to MacLean, their long-
term ally.
29
 Despite this, and their apparent clash with Dòmhnall Gorm, the riches 
promised by the earl of Tyrone proved irresistible and they resolved to maintain their 
involvement. Nevertheless, the MacLeods were careful to avoid upsetting MacLean and 
landed on Mull to parley before leaving for Ireland. According to John Auchinross, 
MacLean's secretary,
30
 the  
...MacLeod Lewis and the principal friends of MacLeod Harris came on land and 
spoke [with] MacLean in Duart, to excuse themselves for their passing to Ireland 
with Donald Gorme MacConnell. The only cause thereof was their receipt of great 
gains which came to Scotland from Tyrone, and seeing the voyage was no way to 
hurt MacLean they thought good to take commodity and profit when offered, and 
assured MacLean that whenever he shall "haif to do" against the Clan Domhnall 




                                                          
26
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 648. 
27
 „Mauch‟ or „maughe‟ refers to a „male connection by marriage‟, for example, a brother-in-law or son-in-
law. See Dictionary of the Scots Language <http://www.dsl.ac.uk/entry/dost/mauch_n_1> 
28
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 619.  
29
 Bound together by familial links, the MacLeods and the MacLeans maintained a close allegiance in the 
1590s. In 1591, the former are described as Lachlann‟s „principall freendes and partakers‟, and later in 1595, 
Lachlann defended the character of his faithful allies to the English diplomat, Robert Bowes. See Ibid., Vol. 
X, 613; Vol.XI, 629. 
30
 Maclean-Bristol, Murder Under Trust, 68. 
31
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 650. 
177 
 
From the MacLeods‟ perspective, this was a shrewd piece of diplomacy that placated 
MacLean while ensuring their place on the expedition. In truth, MacLean was not 
concerned by their involvement, describing the MacLeods of Harris (and the MacLeods of 
Lewis) as 
...my friends and have been in my service against them [the MacDonalds], but, 
being young men of high spirit, desirous to acqwent thame in wars and receiving 





George Nicolson, the English diplomat, offered an alternative and expanded view of this 
politicking. He claimed the MacLeods did not visit MacLean of their own volition, but 
were sent by the MacDonalds to „persuade his aid‟ in their expedition. The MacLeods of 
Lewis
33
 were swayed by MacLean and agreed to leave the expedition, confessing its 
„whole intentions and counsels‟.34 After their meeting with MacLean, the MacDonalds 
„took suspicion of [MacLeod of Lewis] and carried him captive so that he and his forces 
should not leave them‟.35 It does not appear that MacLeod of Harris was also captured, but 
this was clear intimidation from the MacDonalds. Lines of loyalty were being drawn. 
Tensions ran high within the mercenary camp with the looming presence of 
MacLean and Argyll sowing doubt among the leaders.
36
 After a month of delay and 
indecision, the islanders finally departed for Ireland on 18 or 19 July.
37
 The campaign was 
a debacle from the outset. In a „pretty feat of war‟, MacLean ambushed the Clanranald 
contingent on Mull before they crossed the Irish Sea, capturing 700 soldiers, including the 
Clanranald chief and Dòmhnall Gorm‟s brother.38 The main force fared little better. A 
large fleet of Islanders landed in Carrickfergus to receive supplies from the Earl of Tyrone, 
before mooring in the bay of the Copeland Isles off the north-east coast of Ireland,
39
 On 27 
July, they waylaid a merchant ship laden with wine, stole several casks, and that night 
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„drank freely‟.40 On the morning of 28 July, they were ambushed by Captains George 
Thornton and Gregory Rigges of the HMS Popinjay and HMS Charles: 
They have slain many of them and drove them to a little isle, where they landed. 
But the island being little and wanting covert they slew them there out of their ships, 




Escape was impossible, forcing the MacDonalds to provide pledges to Thornton and 
Rigges. They went further, offering to switch sides and provide „their service against Her 
Majesty's enemies‟.42 Soon after, they returned to Scotland, although Aonghas MacDonald 
of Dunivaig, ashamed that „materis ar nocht keipit to the Erle [of Tyrone]‟, sent Ó 
Domhnaill a force of 600 men led by his son Aonghas Òg.
43
 By 22 August 1595, the 
majority of the company had returned to Scotland, many fearful their unprotected lands at 
home would be harried by MacLean.
44
 
The MacLeods of Harris were elsewhere during the incident at the Copeland Isles, 
but suffered a setback of their own when they were attacked by English cavalry upon 
landfall in Lough Foyle in Ulster.
45
 This resulted in the deaths of „sixteen gentlemen of 
[their] house, two or three of them very special gentlemen‟.46 On 24 August, George 
Erskine reported: 
MacLeod of Harris is still in Ireland in great anger for revenge, if possible, for such 
scathe and dishonour he has gotten...Argyll's messenger is returned, without 
availing to withdraw MacLeod of Harris from these parts. He and his whole people 
are so stirred to anger by their last dishonour that they have vowed never to leave 
Ireland if it be not repaired to their contentment…This people is of all the islesmen 
the most courageous and of best spirit…47  
 
Lachlann MacLean claimed that the MacLeods were „in some wrath‟ with the MacDonalds‟ 
switch of allegiance.
48
 Clan expectations demanded retribution for the loss suffered at the 
                                                          
40
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 683. 
41
 Ibid. In 1594, the Popinjay had been specially selected for this service against the Scottish galleys. See 
Calendar of Carew, Vol. III, 107. 
42
 CSPI, Vol. V, 359, 370; CSPS, Vol. XI, 684-5; Calendar of Carew, Vol. III, 234, 237; Hayes-McCoy, 
Scots Mercenary Forces, 251-2. 
43
 CSPI, Vol. V, 359; CSPS, Vol. XI, 684. 
44
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 648. 
45
 Ibid., 683; AFM 6, M1595.15. 
46
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 687; Hayes McCoy, Scots Mercenary Forces 254. 
47
 CSPS, Vol. XI, 687-8. 
48
 Ibid., 685. 
179 
 
hands of the English, a responsibility magnified – and made deeply personal – by the 
likelihood that some of Ruairidh Mòr‟s closest male family members were among the 
MacLeod dead (probably the two or three „very special gentlemen‟). Duty-bound and 
personally motivated to enact vengeance, Ruairidh Mòr must have felt betrayed by the 
limp capitulation and volte-face of his brother-in-law and the other MacDonalds. The 
MacLeods stayed in Ireland with 600-700 men and joined up with Ó Domhnaill,
49
 and with 
their help he captured the castle in Costello, before ravaging Connaught and Galway, 
carrying off „wealth and riches‟.50 The MacLeods‟ campaign of 1595 is celebrated in Eoin 
Óg Ó Muirgheasáin's elegy for Ruairidh Mòr, composed c. 1626:  
 
Tar Drobhaois tar Sligigh siar 
gan shlighidh rochaoil ‟na raon, 
tug iarraidh ar ndíol na ndámh, 
a lán diobh triallaidh re a thaobh. 
 
Baile an Mhúta adhnaidh uaidh 
gan adhbhaidh dúnta ‟na dhiaidh; 
comha is í dá déanamh dhóibh 
fóir Sgí ní ghéabhadh gan gliaidh. 
 
Dún Mheic Fheórais airgthear uaidh 
go i daingne scólais tar sáil… 
 
Crodh Bóghaineach d‟éigsibh uaidh 
di óroineach ní hé a-mháin, 
ní thug ar ais uatha féin 
réir ‟s na tuatha leis do láimh… 
 
A bhfuair riamh mun ráith-sin Ír 
do riar buair nó d‟fháinnibh óir 
gan áireamh ar chrodh do chléir – 
ag réir sgol do dháileadh dhóibh. 
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On a wide ranging advance to the west 
across the Drowes, over the river of Sligo, 
he saw that the poets were rewarded -  
a full company of them were with him. 
 
He set Ballymote aflame; 
in his track no house stands with closed doors; 
there was an attempt at terms with them, 
but the Skye troops would not accept; they would fight. 
 
Dún Mheic Fheórais was pillaged by him; 
to that stronghold he directed his course across the sea... 
 
To give away the cattle wealth of Banagh 
to his poets was characteristic of his golden generosity, 
and not that only, he did not take in return 
from his clansmen that were with him the tribute due him... 
 
All that he ever got in Ráth Ír [Ireland] 
in booty of cattle or golden rings –  
for the poets cattle unnumbered – 




The repeated use of the motif of the patron‟s generosity to his company of bards has been 
described as „excessive‟,52 yet when viewed in the context of surrounding events, it may 
imply the main objective of the campaign, for Ruairidh Mòr at least, was not solely the 
acquisition of wealth and riches, but salvaging the honour of the chief and the clan. A 
desire for vengeance may be reflected in the unrelenting and unmerciful nature of the 
MacLeod advance: „there was an attempt at terms with them, but the Skye troops would 
not accept; they would fight‟. 
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In a letter from March 1596, Lachlann MacLean notes Dòmhnall Gorm and 
Aonghas MacDonald were already „making prepara[tions] for mending of their 
galleys…appointed for transporting of their a[rmed] men‟ into Ireland once more.53 
However, the balance of power had firmly tipped towards MacLean‟s faction with the 
marriage of his eldest son to MacKenzie‟s sister in the early months of 1596.54 According 
to Robert Bowes 
MacLean has greatly increased his force by the late marriage solemnised betwixt 
his eldest son and the sister of MacKenzie (a person of great power and action in 
the Highlands in the north). In which respect the King intending to use the service 
and means of MacLean and MacKenzie to draw the Isles to his obedience…55 
 
After the disaster of the last campaign, salvaged only by their own efforts, the MacLeods 
were presumably disillusioned with the entire mercenary venture, particularly the 
leadership of the MacDonalds, and they must have recognised the strength of the emerging 
MacLean/MacKenzie faction. Upon his eventual return to Scotland in early March,
56
 
Ruairidh Mòr seems to have honoured his pact with MacLean, resulting in his capture and 
imprisonment by an indignant MacDonald of Sleat. On 30 April 1596, Robert Bowes 
reported: 
Donald Gorm and his faction have taken prisoner MacLeod Harris returning from 
MacLean. This is done either upon jealousy that Harris was joined with MacLean 
against Tyrone or else by this fine pretence to keep Harris fast to themselves and 




This corresponds with an account by Dioness Campbell the Dean of Limerick written 
around April 1596: 
There was also discention betwene yonge Donell Gorme and William M
c
Cloyd of 
the Herrys, whose sister, by M
cIllaines [MacLean‟s] aunt, the said Donell Gorme 
did marry, beinge in that respecte his owne cosen germaen but by reason of the 
controversie growinge to bloodshead about some land in the iland Skihanagh [Skye] 
or Troutornes, I know not wheather, [Dòmhnall Gorm] was devorsed from her upon 
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Limerick‟s account has been identified as confirming the traditional version of the origins 
of the MacLeod-MacDonald feud in 1601 due to the similarity of events (particularly the 
marital upset).
59
 However, as it was written in 1596, it details incidents that took place at 
least five years before the eventual feud in 1601. Other contextual evidence indicates that 
he was writing about events in 1596. For one, Limerick‟s avowed involvement in 
negotiations between the clans is extremely significant. He was definitely in Scotland in 
early 1596, on a diplomatic mission to convince the earl of Argyll to provide military 
support for the Elizabethan government in Ireland.
60
 Therefore, it seems plausible that he 
approached the MacLeods and the MacDonalds to bring about their involvement on behalf 
of Elizabeth, but then became embroiled in negotiations between the feuding parties. 
Limerick may have been attempting to ensure the safe release of Ruairidh Mòr as well as 
resolve the marital situation. Although Bowes does not detail any specific violence or set-
piece skirmish, it seems fairly likely that „bloodshead‟ was involved in Dòmhnall Gorm‟s 
apprehension of Ruairidh Mòr. Interestingly, Limerick implies that the publically stated 
reason for the dissolution of the marriage was an invention of Dòmhnall Gorm: he 
divorced Màiri „upon some causes pretended‟. 61 Admittedly, this leaves open the 
improbable possibility of a humiliating repudiation based on Màiri‟s disfigurement, yet 
Bowes‟ explanation for MacLeod‟s capture may reveal Dòmhnall Gorm‟s true justification 
for divorce. Since at least 1594, he had probably been looking for a convenient excuse to 
separate from Màiri while marrying Ó Domhnaill‟s sister remained a reasonable prospect. 
Ruairidh‟s pact with Lachlann may have personally aggrieved Dòmhnall Gorm, but it also 
provided an ideal pretext for divorce. In summary, it seems probable that around April 
1596 Dòmhnall Gorm divorced, or at least repudiated his wife Màiri, while he held his 
brother-in-law Ruairidh Mòr captive. 
By June 1596, Ruairidh Mòr had been released, and in January 1597 he again 
attached himself to MacLean, accompanying him in his negotiations with the earl of 
Tyrone.
62
 Dòmhnall Gorm‟s brute force tactics had backfired as MacLeod of Lewis was 
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also reported as having been „abstracted‟ to MacLean in August 1595.63 Politically 
outmanoeuvred by MacLean, Dòmhnall Gorm was losing allies at an alarming rate.
64
 Even 
by 1598 however, these growing tensions had not escalated into all-out warfare, and the 
relations of the clans took another interesting turn. In March, Dòmhnall Gorm condemned 
the execution of Torcall Dubh MacLeod of Lewis by Coinneach MacKenzie and called for 
a general pursuit of the MacKenzie chief.
65
 In this endeavour, he claimed support from all 
of the principal island chiefs, including Lachlann MacLean „by McLeod of Harris‟s means‟, 
perhaps a sign of growing rapprochement between the island clans.
66
 It seems however that 
Dòmhnall Gorm‟s true objective was the revival of the Lordship of the Isles through an 
alliance with the English queen. As noted by MacCoinnich, the discord between Queen 
Elizabeth and James VI provided an opportunity for Dòmhnall to „create the most 
favourable conditions to further his claim to the Lordship‟.67 On 29 March 1598, it was 
reported by George Nicolson that the „Islanders come not in, neither give their obedience, 
looking for troubles between her Majesty and the King‟ so that Dòmhnall Gorm could 
„claim his title to be Lord of the Isles‟.68 In April, an anonymous letter of service to 
Elizabeth claimed that Dòmhnall Gorm, the „Lord of the Isles of Scotland and Chief of the 
whole Clandonell Irishmen‟, had support from most of the major clans in the West 
Highlands and Isles.
69
 The Clanranald, the Camerons, and the MacLeods of Lewis were all 
„faithfully bound, obliged and sworn to follow, serve obey and assist with all their powers 
and forces‟ while Ruairidh Mòr and Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig were „faithfully 
bonded and confederate‟ with Dòmhnall.70 Importantly, Ruairidh Mòr is referred to as 
Dòmhnall Gorm‟s brother-in-law.71 This may suggest the repudiation or divorce of 1596 
(or even earlier) had been reversed and the couple had since reconciled. There is however a 
possibility that the anonymous writer was simply misinformed about the nature of the 
familial relations, and because the divorce had not yet been formalised, Ruairidh Mòr was 
still technically Dòmhnall Gorm‟s brother-in-law. At the very least however, the two clans 
were clearly on more amicable terms than in 1595/6. 
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Dòmhnall Gorm‟s invocation of the Lordship of the Isles has led to him being 
dubbed a „dangerous lunatic‟ who harboured „delusions of potency‟ by Maclean-Bristol.72 
While Dòmhnall Gorm may have struggled to match the widespread support of previous 
claimants to the lordship like Dòmhnall Dubh in 1545,
73
 the title still held significant 
power in the Isles. By aligning with the English Queen, evoking Dòmhnall Dubh‟s alliance 
with Henry VIII and the earlier Treaty of Westminster-Ardtornish in 1462, Dòmhnall 
Gorm hoped to outmanoeuvre the Scottish king and restore the MacDonalds‟ 
counterbalancing powerbase on the west coast.
74
 Yet the English had little serious interest 
in fostering problems for the Scottish king and were instead committed to stopping the 
Highland mercenary trade with Ireland.  
Dòmhnall Gorm‟s biggest rival in the Isles was Lachlann Mòr MacLean of Duart, 
who may have had serious pretensions to the forfeited Lordship (in all but name) through 
his military aptitude and „consinguintie with the principall lords of the ilands‟.75 At the end 
of the sixteenth century, the MacLeods of Harris, while a powerful clan in their own right, 
were caught between two supremely ambitious chiefs. However, there may have been 
burgeoning cooperation between the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeans of Duart as 
Dòmhnall Gorm‟s letter of service in April 1598 was delivered to Nicolson by John 
Auchinross, MacLean's servant. This had the potential to ripple out and heal the rift 
between MacLean and Dunivaig, and Ruairidh Mòr and Dòmhnall Gorm.
76
  
Just a few months later on 5 August 1598, Lachlann Mòr MacLean was killed in 
battle against the MacDonalds of Dunivaig in their ongoing feud over Islay.
77
 News of his 
sudden demise was met with shock and disbelief,
78
 and immediately created a power 
vacuum in the Isles. For the MacLeods, the death of their close ally was a significant blow, 
leaving them isolated and at risk from MacDonald aggression. Some historians claim that 
the MacLeods remained loyal to their MacLean allies and joined (along with the Camerons, 
the MacKinnons and the MacNeils of Barra) in retaliations against the MacDonalds, 
culminating in the defeat of the MacDonalds at the battle of „Bern Bige‟ in Islay in 1598, 
but there is little contemporary evidence for these events.
79
 Four years later, in 1602, 
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Lachlann‟s son Eachann invaded Islay in a delayed retaliation for his father‟s death, but the 




The precise timing of the commencement of open war between the MacLeods and 
the MacDonalds meanwhile is unclear. Government documents begin reporting the feud in 
late June 1601 and claim hostilities had „lately‟ broken out.81 In Limerick‟s account from 
April 1596, the land dispute over Trotternish was the underlying source of conflict between 
the two clans – „by reason of the controversy growing to bloodshed about some land in the 
island Skihanagh [Skye] or Troutornes‟ – and this may again have been the principal cause 
in 1601.
82
 Significantly, Trotternish had been included in the original 1598 grant of lands 




perhaps stimulating the MacLeods or the MacDonalds to assert 
their control before it could be claimed by the inbound Lowlanders.
 
The traditional catalyst of Dòmhnall Gorm‟s repudiation of Ruairidh Mòr‟s sister is 
still possible considering their apparent reconciliation by April 1598. A second abrupt 
repudiation would only have amplified the MacLeods‟ humiliation. Robert Gordon‟s 
account, written between 1615 and 1630, mentions a repudiation of Màiri before a formal 
legal divorce took place: 
Donald Gorme Mackonald had mareid Sir Rory Mackloyd his sister, and for some 
displeasure or jealousie conceaved against her, he did repudiat her; whervpon Sir 




This could refer to events in 1596. Gordon continues: 
Donald Gorme not onlie refused to obey his request, bot also intended a 
divorcement against his wyff; which when he had obteyned, he mareid the sister of 
Kenneth MacKeinzie, Lord of Kintayle. Sir Rorie Macloyd took this disgrace (as he 
thought it) so heighlie, that he assembled all his countreymen, and his tryb (the 
Seill-tormat) without delay, and invaded with fyre and suord a pairt of Donald 
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According to Gordon therefore, Ruairidh Mòr gave Dòmhnall Gorm one last chance to 
reverse his decision. War followed only when the divorce was formalised and Dòmhnall 
Gorm married into another family. Just as the marriage of MacLean‟s son and 
MacKenzie‟s sister had aroused much comment in 1596, this new union was of „major 
political significance‟ and signalised a general shift in the political landscape.86 Three 
years earlier, Dòmhnall Gorm had led condemnations of MacKenzie‟s execution of Torcall 
Dubh MacLeod of Lewis, but now the two leaders were apparently joined by familial 
bonds. Meanwhile, there is reason to believe the MacLeods of Harris remained cordial 
with their Lewis kin, which in turn strained their relations with the MacKenzies.
87
 
Affinities had drifted far from the political situation in the 1580s, which saw the 
MacKenzies and MacLeods of Harris allied against Dòmhnall Gorm. The hostility between 
the MacKenzies and the MacLeods of Lewis now made such an arrangement less tenable. 
By marrying into the MacKenzies, a clan on the rise, Dòmhnall Gorm had finally found 
himself a suitable match, and was making a clear political statement of dissociation from 
the MacLeods of Harris. 
Eventually, Ruairidh Mòr abandoned diplomacy and resorted to military action. His 
first target, according to Gordon, is extremely significant: „a pairt of [Dòmhnall Gorm‟s] 
lands in the yle of Sky‟.88 Avenging the insult given to his sister and clan was a matter of 
urgency, but he may have taken the opportunity to push his claim to the contested lands of 
Trotternish. Retaliatory raids were conducted by both clans, initially choreographed to 
avoid open battle. After the MacLeods‟ invasion of the MacDonalds‟ lands in Skye, 
Dòmhnall Gorm, „impatient of this injurie‟, struck back with a raid on Harris.89 Another 
notable encounter was the battle or skirmish of Carinish in North Uist, which saw the 
defeat of a MacLeod raiding party of forty men by a small MacDonald force of twelve.
90
 
Apparently forewarned about the MacLeods‟ raid, the locals left their cattle and goods 
within the sanctuary of the lands of Trinity Church in Carinish, which the MacLeods stole 
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before being ambushed by the MacDonalds.
91
 Local tradition and poetry suggest that the 
two sides initially exchanged volleys of arrows, with the outnumbered MacDonalds using a 
gradual tactical retreat to inflict heavy casualties on the MacLeods.
92
 The MacLeod leader 
Dòmhnall Glas and „most‟ of his followers were killed.93 Dòmhnall mac Iain mhic 
Sheumais, the leader of the MacDonalds, also fell wounded: 
 
Latha Blàr na Fèitheadh 
Bha do lèine na ballan. 
Bha an t-saighead na spreòd 
Throimh chorp seòlta na glaineadh. 
The day of the Battle of the Runnel 
your shirt was blotted. 
The arrow stuck out of 




Repeated tit-for-tat incursions led to an intensification of conduct from both clans. Their 
raids became notable for their brutality and extensive devastation of territory, as described 
by Robert Gordon:  
Thus both parties (the Clandonald and Seill-Tormat) wer bent headlong against 
others, with a spirite full of revenge and furie; and so continued mutuallie infesting 
one another with spoills and cruell slaughters, to the vtter ruyn and desolation of 





This excerpt has been used by some historians to encapsulate the harsh realities of 
Highland warfare.
96
 Gordon‟s avowed prejudice against the Highlands clans may mean 
that embellishment was employed here, but it could well be a fair representation of the 
severe consequences of a large-scale feud between two powerful clans. The Chronicles of 
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the Frasers claims that 1601 and 1602 were particularly wretched years in the Highlands 
due to plague and famine. The former „spread from Forth to the North, and raged here the 
length of Glenelg [but] non dyed there nor in our farr Highlands and north isles‟. In 1602, 
famine struck „all the North and Highlands over‟: fungus „blasted‟ the barley and the corn 
yield was „lick-dusted trash‟.97 With these natural hardships overlapping with a destructive 
feud, the desperate situation described by Gordon may have been very real for the common 
people of the warring clans. 
Raids and scorched-earth tactics had failed to bring about a decisive outcome, and 
the feud finally culminated in a large pitched-battle between the two clans in 1601. Known 
to tradition as Blàr Coire na Creiche, the „Battle of the Corrie of the Spoil‟,98 this 
engagement was fought in Skye at „Binquhillin‟ (one of the Cuillin hills).99 While Ruairidh 
Mòr was in Argyll, „craveing aid and advyse from the Earle of Argyle‟, the MacDonalds 
marched into the MacLeods‟ lands in Skye, forcing Ruairidh Mòr‟s brother Alasdair to 
assemble an army to resist: „all the inhabitants of his brother‟s lands, together with the 
whole tryb of Seill-Tormat, and some of the Seill-Torquill [the MacLeods of Lewis]‟ 
followed his lead.
100
 In an inversion of Carinish, it was the MacLeods, arrayed on the 
slopes of the hill, who held the advantage in terms of terrain.
101
 Gordon describes the battle 
as a „cruell and terrible skirmish, which continued all the day long‟, but the MacDonalds 
ultimately managed to „overthrow‟ the MacLeods, taking a number of important hostages, 
including Alasdair, the brother of Ruairidh Mòr.
102
 George Nicolson, writing to Sir Robert 
Cecil in February 1603, stated: 
I hear that McLeod of Harris and Donald Gorme have fought and a thousand of the 




Nicolson‟s description may be somewhat exaggerated, but it imparts an impression of a 
very large scale battle indeed. An estimated muster of various clans in the Isles from c. 
1595 places the strength of the MacDonalds of Sleat and the MacLeods of Harris at 1,500 
and 560 respectively.
104
 These estimates are not precise (the MacLeods may have fielded 
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as many as 800 men in Ireland and the muster of 560 does not include Glenelg), but they 
provide an impression of the relative military strength of the clans. Almost certainly 
outnumbered, the MacLeods took advantage of their superior position on the high ground 
and inflicted heavy casualties upon their MacDonald opponents, but eventually, they were 
overwhelmed and defeated. 
On 29 June 1601, the „variance lately fallen out between‟ Dòmhnall Gorm and 
Ruairidh Mòr was reported to the Privy Council, with the two parties ordered to cease 
hostilities.
105
 Later on the 19 August, the feud was described in considerable, if fairly 
generic, detail, with both clans having reportedly engaged in 
...violent persute of utheris be way of deid and oppin hostilitie, committing 
schamefull and barbarous slauchteris and murthouris, besydis oppin heirschipis, 




On 22 August, both sides were ordered to „dissolve their forces and observe the King's 
peace‟. Ruairidh Mòr was to surrender to Gilleasbuig, earl of Argyll, while Dòmhnall 
Gorm was to give himself up to George, Marquis of Huntly. Both clans were to „release 
peacefully all prisoners‟.107 The government-backed mediators do not seem to have been 
involved in the reconciliation process, as a truce was achieved through the mediation of 
Aonghas MacDonald of Dunivaig and MacLean of Coll.
108
 The reconciliation was 
formalised by a bond made on 19 September 1601 at Eilean Donnan. This bond clearly 
suggests that Màiri MacLeod was at the centre of the feud:  
...I [Dòmhnall Gorm] bind and oblies me my airis and assigneyis that albeit Marie 
McCloid lauchfull sister to ye said rorie McCloid of donbeggan entir and persew us 
be the forme of law anent quhatsumevir actioun or actions at ony tyme heireftir 
cuming. That then and In that case the samen sall nocht be haldin be vs or our 
foirsaidis to be na kynd of brak of the foirsaid appoyntment mayd zit ony part or 
portioun yairof at na tyme heireftir nor sall nocht quarrell the said rory Mccloid for 
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Màiri may have already threatened legal action against her ex-husband, presumably for his 
repudiation of her or for breaching their marriage contract. Future pursuit of Dòmhnall 
Gorm would jeopardise the resolution achieved by the two clan chiefs and neither party 
wanted Màiri to revive the dispute at a later date. It is possible that in order to ensure a 
settlement and the release of his imprisoned kin Ruairidh Mòr was forced to disown his 
sister, or at least leave her to fight her own battles. As pointed out by MacGregor, the 
MacDonalds‟ capture of several important MacLeod prisoners, including the chief's 
brother, meant they „held the whip hand when it came to making the peace‟.110 The 
presence of several MacKenzie witnesses in the bond, and the location of Eilean Donan, 
suggests they also desired an end to the feud, as well as official recognition of Dòmhnall 
Gorm‟s new marriage.111 The formal, legal divorce between Dòmhnall Gorm and Màiri 
MacLeod was finally procured on 10 November 1605 and all administrative costs 
(amounting to 500 merks) were covered by MacKenzie,
112
  again emphasising his personal 
interest in concluding the feud and solidifying the new marriage.
113
 
Eight years later on 24 August 1609, another bond between the MacLeods and the 
MacDonalds was made, presided over by Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, as part of the 
process of the Statutes of Iona: 
...the saidis parteis considdering the godles and unhappie turnis done be other of 
thame yair freyndis serwandis tennentis dependaris and partakeris to utheris 
quhilkis frome yair hairtis ai and ilkame of thame now repentis. Thairfoir the saidis 
donald gorme mcdonald and Rorie mccloyid parteis above rehersit takand ye 
burdein on thame ilkane of yame for yair awin kin freyndis tennentis dependaris 
and aleyis to haif remittit frilie dischargit and forgevin Lyke be the tennor heirof fra 
yair hartis ffreilie remittis dischargis and forgevis ilkane of thame utheris and yair 
foirsaidis ffor all and quhatsumevir slauchteris Murthowris hairschippis spuilzeis of 
guidis and raising of fyre comittit be ather of thame agains utheris yair freyndis 
seruandis tennentis and dependaris at ony tyme preceiding the dat heirof 
Renunceand all actioun instance and persute quhatsumeivir criminall or ciuile yat 
can or may be competent in ather of yair personis or yair foirsaidis...
114
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Violence between the two clans had evidently not resumed following negotiations in 1601, 
and this agreement was founded upon mutual forgiveness rather than immediate 
disarmament. The bloodshed may have ended, but Knox feared the personal enmity had 
receded little in the intervening years. Future legal disputes were anticipated as Trotternish 
remained contested land, but this bond was Knox‟s attempt to decisively settle the 
bloodfeud. On a more symbolic level, MacGregor has argued that this bond may instead be 
deliberately anachronistic, especially when viewed in tandem with the Band of Iona, with 
the two chiefs „turn[ing] the clock back to do what they had already done‟ to display the 
termination of the „deidlie feidis‟ of the Highlands and Isles.115  
Conclusion 
Marriage was a genuine attempt to heal discord and build new bonds of kinship, and only 
hindsight makes the breakdown of the marital union between the MacDonalds and the 
MacLeods seem inevitable. Dòmhnall Gorm‟s (possibly second) repudiation of Màiri may 
have been the short-term incitement to war, but the dispute was the result of decades of 
tension over contested land in Skye. Marital links failed to patch over the cracks of this 
historic rivalry, and a lasting alliance was probably untenable if the issue of ownership of 
Trotternish went unresolved.  
Much like the MacLean/MacDonald feud in the 1580s and 1590s, this was a high-
level dispute between two of the most powerful chiefs in the Isles. Both Ruairidh Mòr and 
Dòmhnall Gorm were spirited individuals, and in some respects, this feud was a clash of 
personalities. Salvaging honour must have been a clear motivating factor for Ruairidh Mòr 
in the feud, and his righteous fury after defeat in Ireland in 1595 shows a chief operating in 
a milieu that placed much stock in the collective honour of the clan and the personal 
honour of its leader. Dòmhnall Gorm meanwhile had clear aspirations regarding the 
forfeited Lordship of the Isles, and was willing to draw the ire of other clans to achieve this 
goal. The involvement of the MacLeans, led by Lachlann Mòr, reinforced the perception of 
the MacLeods and the MacDonalds as natural rivals or enemies, as they found themselves 
consistently aligned in political opposition.  
After the reconciliation in 1601 (or 1609), the two clans never again took to the 
battlefield to settle their disputes, but legal action over the contentious lands of Trotternish 
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 Looking to the successes of MacKenzie of Kintail, the main beneficiary of 
this feud, and the disintegration of the MacLeods of Lewis, both parties were perhaps 
beginning to recognise the increasing need to cooperate with the royal government.
117
 
After an evidently bloody feud, there may have been a mutual realisation that further 
conflict between such evenly-matched clans would only result in more „godles and 
unhappie turnis‟, suffered most keenly by ordinary clan members.118 
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Chapter 8: The Camerons, 1569-1614 
As part of the expedition to the Western Isles by Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles, in the 
summer of 1609, which resulted in the famous Statutes of Iona,
1
 the principal Hebridean 
chiefs agreed to the Band of Iona on 24 August 1609 in which they pledged their loyalty to 
the crown and promised to lead the „reformatioun of this our puir cuntrey‟.2 The Band 
identified „the unnaturall deidlie feidis quhilkis hes bene foisterit amangis us in this lait aig‟ 
as the principal cause of the „grite miserie, barbaritie and povertie‟ which had supposedly 
blighted the Western Isles. Importantly however, it noted that these „deidlie feidis‟ had 
since been terminated.
3
 Over on the mainland however, in the Clan Cameron heartlands of 
Lochaber, an internecine feud was brewing, very much in the mould of the previous 
century or earlier. The bulk of this case study focuses on the period 1612-14 in which the 
clan was riven by violent struggle, but it will begin with an investigation of an earlier event: 
the assassination of the Cameron chief Dòmhnall Dubh c. 1569. The ramifications of this 
murder provide essential context for the later upheaval, as the culprits‟ offspring 
challenged the next generation of Cameron chiefs. 
In this period, the Camerons were based in Lochaber at the west end of the Great 
Glen, around Loch Eil, Loch Arkaig, and Loch Lochy. The earliest known charters 
belonging to the Camerons were granted by the MacDonalds of Lochlash: one by 
Gilleasbuig in November 1472, and two by his son Alasdair in July and August 1492.
4
 In 
1472, Ailean was recorded as the captain of Clan Cameron and the constable of Castle 
Strome (which belonged to the MacDonalds of Lochalsh) and was due to marry Marion, 
the daughter of Aonghas, son of Alasdair MacDonald of Keppoch.
5
 The two charters from 
1492 granted Eòghann, son of Ailean, 14 merklands in the lordship of Lochlash and 30 
merklands of Lochiel.
6
 Thereafter, and doubtless before, Lochiel was the holding most 
closely associated with the chiefly lineage. On 24 October 1495, following the forfeiture of 
the Lordship of the Isles in 1493, these charters were confirmed by King James IV.
7
 By 
1570/1, the Camerons‟ lands are recorded as including the 10 merkland of Glen Nevis, the 
10 merkland of Letterfinlay, Stronaba, Lendally, and the £20 land of „Niknodort‟, all in the 
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 In February 1534, the Camerons became tenants of George Gordon, 
the earl of Huntly,
9
 an arrangement that generally continued with their successors for the 
rest of the century.
10
 As a result, the Camerons became increasingly integrated with the 
clans of the central Highlands, without fully leaving the MacDonalds‟ sphere of influence, 
as shown by the Camerons‟ support of the Clanranald in the 1540s.11 Indeed, a serious 
breach in the Camerons‟ relationship with the Gordon earls of Huntly must have emerged 
in 1546 when the Cameron chief, Eòghann mac Ailein, was executed by Huntly for his 
participation in Blàr nan Lèine in 1544 and subsequent raids.
12
 The Camerons‟ relatively 
recent and fragile alignment with Huntly, following their long association with the 
MacDonalds, gave the earl of Argyll a foothold to supplant his rival Huntly and exert his 
influence over the Lochaber clan. 
The genesis for the eventual violence that erupted between 1612-14 lies at least 
forty years earlier with the assassination of the Cameron captain Dòmhnall Dubh c. 1569 
by members of his own clan.
13
 The nature of this killing is extremely murky. Donald 
Gregory, and more recently John Stewart, argued that the main conspirators were the 
Cameron branches of Erracht and, to a lesser extent, Kinlochiel.
14
 These clan branches 
(shown below in Appendix 2.2) began with Eòghann and Iain Dubh, the younger sons of 
Eòghann mac Ailein (d. 1546), born of his second marriage with the daughter of Lachlann 
Mackintosh.
15
 Eòghann mac Ailein‟s first-born son Dòmhnall seems to have died during 
his own lifetime, but he was succeeded by his grandson, Eòghann Beag, son of Dòmhnall. 
His chiefship was soon disputed by his uncles, Eòghann of Erracht and Iain Dubh of 
Kinlochiel. On 27 September 1550, Eòghann, the Captain of Clan Cameron, along with 
fifteen accomplices, was accused of the „cruel slaughter‟ of his uncle Iain Dubh mac 
Eòghainn.
16
 When Eòghann Beag, son of Dòmhnall, died childless in 1553/4,
17
 his younger 
brother Dòmhnall Dubh (d. 1569) succeeded.  
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On 1 November 1564, shortly after he had been confirmed in the clan‟s estates on 6 
March 1563/4 by Queen Mary,
18
 Dòmhnall Dubh appeared before the Privy Council to 
negotiate a truce with some of his relatives: Somhairle mac Dhòmhnaill mhic Ailein, the 
tutor of Glen Nevis, and Alasdair, the heir apparent to the Glen Nevis branch. Both parties 
had „divers actionis and caussis to persew aganis utheris‟, but these grievances were not 
specified.
 19
 On 3 November, Dòmhnall Dubh was ordered to „remane in fre ward‟ in 
Edinburgh and find surety of 2,000 merks for his future good behaviour.
20
 Later that month 
on 27 November, Dòmhnall Dubh found a cautioner in Iain Grant of Freuchie, and pledged 
before the Council to „keip guid rewll and ordour in the cuntre‟.21 However, in his absence, 
other claimants to the Cameron chiefship had begun exerting control over the clan, and 
between 1567 and 1569, Iain Dubh, son of Eòghann of Erracht and grandson of Eòghann 
mac Ailein, completed the coup by masterminding the assassination of Dòmhnall Dubh.
22
 
When Dòmhnall Dubh was killed, his son
23
 Ailean was a minor. Allegedly, his 
supporters sent him to Mull to be fostered with his maternal relations, the MacLeans of 
Duart, for his own safety.
24
 The period until his return to Lochaber in 1577 is remembered 
in Cameron tradition as anarchic, with many apocryphal stories about An Tàillear Dubh, 
„the Black Tailor‟, a warrior with uncertain loyalties.25 Many of these stories may be 
inventions or embellishments, but they nevertheless provide an impressionistic view of the 
disorder in this period.  By 1570, the leadership of the Camerons does appear to have split 
into at least two factions: some supported Dòmhnall mac Ailein mhic Eòghainn, probably 
another grandson of Eòghann mac Ailein allied with the Erracht faction, while others 
backed the son of Eòghann Beag (d. 1553/4), possibly An Tàillear Dubh. Although there 
was clear division within the clan, it was not necessarily manifested in bloodshed. On 15 
April 1572, Dòmhnall Dubh‟s brother, another Iain Dubh, initiated judicial proceedings 
against 25 Camerons apparently involved in the killing of Dòmhnall Dubh. All were 
declared rebels.
26
 On 9 July, Dòmhnall Dubh‟s cousin, Iain Dubh, son of Eòghann of 
Erracht and grandson of Eòghann mac Ailein, was charged with his murder, along with 34 
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 None of those charged in July appear in the list of accused in April, 
suggesting the sedition against Dòmhnall Dubh had been fairly widespread within the clan. 
In the July charge, Ùisdean Fraser of Lovat and Lachlann Mackintosh were both fined for 
the non-appearance of these individuals before the court of law, perhaps indicating their 
support for the overthrowing of Dòmhnall Dubh.
28
 
In early 1577, two other Camerons, Iain Cam and Alasdair Dubh, both supporters 
of the Erracht faction, were arrested by the earl of Atholl and languished in Blair Castle.
29
 
On 26 February 1577, they were brought to court in Edinburgh by Atholl‟s servant, where 
they were denounced for the murder of Dòmhnall Dubh by his „brothers and other 
friends‟.30 These proceedings reveal that the earl of Argyll was probably supporting the 
Erracht faction. On 1 March 1577, Alasdair Dubh was in ward in Edinburgh, and the earl 
of Argyll had agreed to act as surety for him and his brother, Iain Cam.
31
 They appear to 
have escaped or been released from their ward, as on 1 January 1578 Argyll was charged 
£1,000 when all parties failed to appear in court.
32
 This period of uncertainty within the 
Clan Cameron may have provided Argyll with an opportunity to exert his influence over a 
kindred that had been aligned with the earl of Huntly since 1534. 
The coming of age of Ailean, son of Dòmhnall Dubh, must have prompted the 
rounding up of those suspected or accused of involvement in Dòmhnall Dubh‟s murder. By 
January 1578, Ailean had returned to Lochaber. To signal his homecoming and formal 
succession, Ailean gave a bond of assurance to Mackintosh, describing himself as „chief 
and captain of Clan Cameron‟ and pledging the safety of certain Camerons, including the 
Glen Nevis branch, in „the lands that they possessed and manured last within the bounds of 
Mamore and Lochaber‟. He also promised to maintain the sons of Iain Dubh of Erracht, the 
man charged with the murder of Dòmhnall Dubh, in their current „rowmis‟ (territory).33 
The fact that this bond was given to Mackintosh is another indication that he had supported 
the Erracht faction after Dòmhnall Dubh‟s death. Whether he was an active conspirator in 
the assassination itself is more difficult to prove. Significantly, on 11 June 1577, Iain Dubh 
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of Erracht made a bond of manrent with the earl of Argyll, providing further indication that 
Argyll too had backed the Erracht faction.
34
 Overall, a fragile truce had been established 
within the Clan Cameron. Later intervention by Argyll and Huntly provided an opportunity 
for Iain Dubh of Erracht‟s son, Iain Bodach, to challenge the incumbent Ailean. 
In the short-term, the main cause of conflict within the clan was a struggle for 
overlordship over the Camerons between the seventh earl of Argyll and the sixth earl (later 
first Marquis) of Huntly. The Camerons‟ association with Huntly had been renewed on 5 
March 1590, when Ailean made a bond of manrent with the earl,
35
 and in 1591 
…Huntly sent Ailein M‟konilduy [Cameron] into Badenoch against the 
Clanchattan, and, after a sharp skirmish, they fled and killed 50 of them, with the 




However, the Camerons‟ powerbase in Lochaber also lay within the Campbells‟ sphere of 
influence. In May 1591, Ailean made a bond of protection and manrent with Donnchadh 
Campbell of Glenorchy „against all persons‟ except for the king, the earl of Huntly (for 
Ailean) and the earl of Argyll (for both Ailean and Donnchadh).
37
  
A contest over their loyalty was emerging and a critical point of convergence was 
the battle of Glenlivet on 3 October 1594. Before the battle, the Camerons were in 
Huntly‟s company, and Ailean was chosen as envoy to „move Argyll for peace or to spare 
the spoil and slaughter of his poor tenants‟.38 On one level, Ailean was a natural choice 
considering his connections on both sides, but it may also have been a test of loyalty. 
Despite Ailean‟s efforts, Argyll refused to withdraw and reportedly 
…granted leave to MacKendowy, holding his lands “on” Huntly, to remain at home, 




What Ailean and the Camerons did next is unclear. They may have tried to adopt a neutral 
stance by returning to Lochaber, but Huntly would probably have regarded that more as 
open defiance than neutrality. One contemporary report claims Ailean actually switched 
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sides to join Argyll‟s force,40 but this may have been done against his will – another report 
states that Ailean initially came to Badenoch with Argyll, but then escaped „with six and 
himselfe and paste to Huntley, wher his company mett him‟.41 One of the later narratives 
of the battle of Glenlivet says Ailean, „chiefe of the Clan Cameron, a race of Highlanders 
in Lochabre‟ was present in Huntly‟s vanguard.42 At Glenlivet, the Camerons probably 
maintained their traditional ties with Huntly, but it is abundantly clear that their allegiance 
was actively sought by Argyll. 
 
Over the next few years, the Camerons conducted several attacks on neighbouring 
clans and families,
43
 including a cattle raid on Iain Ferguson of Derculich in Atholl in 
1602.
44
 It is difficult to say if the Camerons were raiding on their own initiative or being 
compelled by Huntly as in 1591. The Camerons of Glen Nevis participated in at least two 
of these incursions, one of which – a raid on Glenalmond in 1595 – was conducted by them 
alone. Considering their past quarrels with the Lochiel family, this could imply that Ailean 
was struggling to restrain the Glen Nevis branch.
45
 Ailean found diplomatic success in July 
1598 when he reached an agreement with the Mackintoshes over the contested lands of 
Glen Loy and Loch Arkaig,
46
 although this land dispute would later be revived in 1617.
47
 
In this agreement, bonds of manrent and maintenance were exchanged, yet more 
significantly, the Cameron chief agreed to support Mackintosh in any future disputes 
between Mackintosh and Huntly.
48
 The divide between the Camerons and Huntly was 
widening. By 1603, the clan as a whole were considered rebels by central government, a 
status shared notably with the MacGregors, and in apparent solidarity with that clan, some 
Camerons fought on their side at the battle of Glen Fruin in that year.
49
 This further 
indicates a growing shift in allegiance towards the earl of Argyll as the MacGregors were 
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On 16 February 1609, the earl of Argyll obtained a sasine of the lands and barony 
of Lochiel, apparently purchased from Eachann MacLean of Lochbuie.
51
 According to 
Donald Gregory, Argyll was „eager to extend the influence of his family, more particularly 
where this could be done at the expense of his rival, the Marquis of Huntly, to whose party 
the Clanchameron were attached‟.52 His next move supports this view. With his legal right 
settled, he did not seize or occupy the lands, but supplanted Huntly as landlord by 
reconfirming the Camerons in their territory as his own tenants and vassals. Writing in 
September 1613, James Primrose, Clerk of the Privy Council, states: 
 
The Marquest of Huntlie being informit heirof, and taking offence that Aileine 
should acknowledge ony superiour within Lochquhaber bot him, he delt with 
Aileine to renunce the securitie he had tane of the Erll of Ergyll, and to take ane 
new right and securitie of the same landis fra him. Aileine refusit this conditioun 
with mony protestationis that, althoght he held that xx merk land of the Erll of 
Ergyle, yitt that sould be no prejudice to his obedience and service to the Marques 
of Huntley, bot that he sould continew asl loyall to the house of Huntley as him self 
and his foirbearis had formarlie bene. This ansuer nowayes contentit the Marques; 




Huntly‟s stratagem was to „renew the dissensions‟ which had riven the Clan Cameron 
during the minority of Ailean, the current chief, and to that end, he approached some of 
Ailean‟s kinsmen – Iain Bodach (son of Iain Dubh, murderer of Dòmhnall Dubh) and 
Alasdair of Glen Nevis – with the offer of investment in Ailean‟s lands in Lochaber.54 The 
precise timing of Huntly‟s offer is difficult to pinpoint, but there are two obvious junctures: 
September 1610 and February 1612. 
The Camerons had recently been at feud with the Clanranald over the lands of 
Knoydart, but they were reconciled before the Privy Council on 28 June 1610, as part of a 
general summons of Highland chiefs, soon formalised as an annual occurrence.
55
 On 14 
August 1610, the Camerons were ordered by the Privy Council to join the pursuit of the 
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outlawed and proscribed Clan Gregor.
56
 A later letter from James VI, written in August 
1611, relates that Ailean‟s service against the MacGregors had been incentivised by the 
promise that he would be confirmed as a tenant of the crown in lands which „pertained 
formerly to…McIntosh and now by his Majestys gift to Sir Alexander Hay his secretary‟.57 
On 24 September 1610, it was reported that some of the Cameron clansmen had refused to 
assist in this service, claiming that they were „favourers of the said Clan [Gregor]‟, a 
position substantiated by the Cameron presence at Glen Fruin in 1603. However, assuming 
Huntly had approached Iain Bodach and Alasdair of Glen Nevis by this point, this 
ideological opposition may have been mere pretext for general insubordination against 
their chief. Whether conscientious objectors or discontented clansmen, these Camerons 
were ordered to appear before the Privy Council under pain of rebellion.
58
 On 28 May 
1611, the remainder of Clan Cameron still loyal to Ailean joined with Campbell of 
Glenorchy and Campbell of Lawers with the aim of capturing MacGregors and handing 
them over to the earl of Argyll. Ailean and his followers were now clearly established as 
Argyll‟s agents. During these efforts, the Camerons and their associates, the MacDonalds 
of Keppoch, discovered some of the „principal ringleaders‟ of the Clan Gregor were under 
the protection of the Clan Chattan and the Macphersons in Badenoch. Raghnall, the heir of 
the Keppoch chief, led an expedition into Badenoch, but the Clan Chattan and 
Macphersons anticipated his arrival and „rose all in arms to the number of 300 men‟, 
capturing Raghnall and twelve of his kin.
59
 The Macphersons and the Clan Chattan were 
adherents of the earl of Huntly,
60
 and therefore their shelter of the Clan Gregor and 
obstruction of the MacDonalds was perhaps at the behest of the Marquis. 
 
Perhaps in response to Huntly‟s obstructiveness, the earl of Argyll‟s claim to the 
lands of Lochiel was given royal approval. In a letter to Ailean of Lochiel, dated 3 August 
1611, King James states 
 
…the Earle of Argile had submitted his clame that he had to the lands of Locheil 
[sic] to his Majesty in which his Majesty promised him all manner of justice and 
that if his right to them was not good that he should be a mean of making it 
better…61 
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The king implored Ailean to „prosequute his service [against the MacGregors] with all 
diligence and fidelity according to the directions of the Earle of Argile his Majestys 
Lieutennant‟.62 
 
By 25 February 1612, the mutinous clansmen led by Iain Bodach and Alasdair of 
Glen Nevis had become open rebels against Ailean Cameron of Lochiel. This is the most 
likely point for Huntly to have made a formal offer of investment and support, while 
Ailean and Argyll negotiated the formal terms of their „Principall Articles of Aggreement‟, 
later concluded on 22 August 1612.
63
 According to Ailean and his supporters, the rebels‟ 
insurrection was founded upon their displeasure at having „randerit thair obedience to his 
Majestie‟, which had resulted in the Cameron‟s involvement in the pursuit of their „friends‟, 
the Clan Gregor and „all broken men‟. Alignment with the „rebellious lymmairis of the 
Heylandis and Illis‟ would have made them 
…the more able undir thair patrocinie and protectioun to have continewit in thair 
iniquitie and wickedness, fra the quhilk thay feir now to be reclamed be thame.
64
 
It is important to note that this complaint, made by Ailean, was probably intended to smear 
his political opponents as supporters of the vilified Clan Gregor, deflecting scrutiny away 
from his own chiefship. Yet it may be true that some within the Clan Cameron genuinely 
feared that their way of life was threatened by their chief‟s recent decision to pursue the 
MacGregors on behalf of the crown, as this may have precluded future raids undertaken by 
the clan.
65
 Crucially, he had „betrayed‟ his allies, the MacGregors, whom the rebels 
continued to support. On 19 May 1613, Alasdair Cameron of Glen Nevis was accused of 
resetting certain MacGregors, a charge also levelled at various Macphersons and 
Mackintoshes.
66
 Although Erracht and Glen Nevis had ulterior motives for deposing 
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Ailean, this does not preclude the possibility that they opposed his chiefship on the basis of 
their conscience and morality. 
 We are fortunate to possess a report on the outbreak of violence between the 
Camerons provided by James Primrose, Clerk of the Privy Council, in September 1613. 
This is an account brimming with the kind of anecdotal detail usually reserved for 
traditional clan histories. According to Primrose, the Cameron chief was quick to react to 
the rebellion within the ranks, and met with Iain Bodach and Alasdair of Glen Nevis to 
discuss their grievances in apparent good will: 
…seameing to tak no offence aganis thame for taking of his land over his heade, he 
shew to thame that he undirstoode perfytelie that thay wer induceit thairunto aganis 
thair willis be the Marques, and thairfoir he desyrit of thame that thay wald gif over 




The rebels promised to renounce their claims, but when Ailean pressed for a pledge in 
writing, they refused, requesting he visit Huntly and reconcile with him: 
Aileine, lyke ane auld subtile fox, persaving thair drift, and being als cairfull to 
preserve his heade as they wer curious to twyne him frome it, he tooke the mater to 
advisement, pairtit with thame in outward showe of good termes, and come to this 
burgh to advise what course he sould follow oute to come be his land agane.
68
 
In Edinburgh, Ailean received intelligence that the rebels had arranged another meeting, 
this time with murderous intent, hoping to kill him and definitively „secure thame selffis in 
the land‟. The Cameron chief secretly returned to Lochaber to muster support from those 
still loyal to him. Raising a force of 120 men, Ailean ordered them to hide in a forest half a 
mile from the agreed meeting place; meanwhile he would meet with his rebellious kin 
accompanied by only six men. Even at this point, Ailean apparently still hoped for a 
peaceful solution, but he had prepared a lethal contingency plan should negotiations turn 
sour. At the meeting point, when the rebels saw Ailean with his small retinue of six men, 
they clearly did not expect any foul play, and immediately they „all brak at him, resolveing 
then to haif his lyffe‟:  
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[Ailean fled] hard by the wode quhair his ambusche lay. Thay follow him that same 
way with schouteing and shoiting of arrowis; and, when thay ar all by, the 
ambusche comes furthe. Aileine persaveing, he turnis, and, thay upoun the bak, and 
he upoun the face, makis ane cruell and bloodie onsett upoun thame, slayis tuentie 




The two main leaders of the rebels, Iain Bodach and Alasdair of Glen Nevis, were among 
those slain.
70
 Now leaderless, the internal challenge to Ailean‟s chiefship was effectively 
over. Perhaps surprisingly, an element of empathy creeps into Primrose‟s account, as he 
seemingly regards Ailean‟s actions as justifiable, possibly because they were an example 
of strong lordship. He states that Ailean, having regained possession of his lands, had 
offered „ane lessone to the rest of his kin who ar alyve in quhat forme thay sall carye thame 
selffis to thair cheif heirefter‟.71 
In contrast to Primrose‟s approving tone, on 16 December 1613, the Privy Council 
made an incensed denunciation of Ailean Cameron who had 
…of laite committit most detestable and cruell murthouris and slauchteris upoun 
diverse of his Majesteis peciable and good subjectis, and having treasounablie 
rissin fyre, brynt houssis, cornis, and barnis, besydis diverse utheris insolencyis and 
villannyis committit be him, to the offence of God, contempt of his Majestie, and 
misregaird of law and justice, for the quhilk he is denunceit rebell and put to the 
horne…72 
The charge also noted that Ailean was a man naturally „inclynnit to murthour, treacherie 
and rebellion‟, who had „enterit in blood with his awne kynnismen and freindis‟.73 This 
overlooks the fact that Ailean initially tried to resolve this situation through diplomacy at 
great personal risk, and while it is factually accurate that Ailean killed his kinsmen, he was 
arguably acting in self-defence. 
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A bounty of £1,000, dead or alive, was placed upon Ailean‟s head, payable by the 
Marquis of Huntly who was tasked with leading the hunt for the Cameron chief.
74
 Uptake 
for the pursuit was slow, with „divers personis of all rankis‟ failing to join with Huntly. On 
7 July 1614, the Privy Council enacted punitive measures to compel the noncommittal, 
granting the earl of Enzie (Huntly‟s eldest son) the right to fine those who failed to appear 
in his host.
75
 On 8 August, a number of prominent chiefs were charged not only for their 
failure to join Enzie‟s pursuit of Ailean but also for sheltering him. The named chiefs – 
MacLean of Duart, MacLeod of Harris, MacKinnon of Strathardle, MacLean of Coll, and 
MacLean of Lochbuie – had gone beyond neutrality and were now actively assisting the 
outlawed Camerons.
76
 The widespread sympathetic support from neighbouring chiefs, 
perhaps encouraged by the earl of Argyll,
77
 but more likely stemming from a sense of 
natural justice and solidarity, must have hampered Enzie‟s campaign, yet one source 
claims the Gordons eventually met with success. According to Sir Robert Gordon, Ailean 
surrendered to Huntly and was imprisoned in Inverness, before being released „vpon 
sufficient souertie and caution for keeping of the king‟s peace in tyme coming‟.78 This 
submission is not recorded in any other sources and Gordon‟s „close connections with the 
House of Huntly‟ cast some doubt on the veracity of his account.79 
 On 27 July 1617, Ailean of Lochiel was again recorded as „unrelaxed from a 
horning‟, and on 31 July, any support of the Cameron chief or his associates was 
forbidden.
80
 The Camerons as a whole remained outlawed for many more years. On 21 
March 1621, the Privy Council wrote to the king claiming „the whole Ilia and continent 
nixt adiacent ar in a maner reduceit to obedience, and no publict dissobedyence profest bot 
be Aileine M
c
eanduy‟.81 Several government-sponsored expeditions led by Mackintosh 
and Huntly failed. Various other clans, including the MacDonalds of Sleat, the 
MacKenzies of Kintail, and the MacLeods of Harris, made little effort to join the pursuit of 
the Camerons, presumably from a sense of solidarity, a lack of proper motivation, or a 
combination of both. Finally, on 28 June 1624, over a decade after he was first declared a 
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rebel, Ailean Cameron of Lochiel was granted remission by King James.
82
 Tension 
between the Camerons, Gordons, and Mackintoshes continued in the following years, 
fluctuating in severity, but the Camerons were no longer the bêtes noires of Scotland.  
Conclusion 
The exceptionally long-lived Ailean Cameron of Lochiel, who was „from his cradle to his 
grave, involved in a laberynth of troubles‟ finally died in April 1647.83 A later poem 
written by John Drummond for Ailean‟s descendant Dòmhnall Cameron of Lochiel 
(d.1748) presents Ailean as the last of a dying breed, too preoccupied with military affairs 
to recognise the harm being done to his clan: 
 But Ailein, Loe! Black Donald‟s warlike Son, 
By too much Bravery almost is Undone: 
Like a bold Lyon, with resistless paws, 
His foes He oppresses, but provokes the Laws 
The Royall gifts of Kings is torn away, 
And On‟s Estate Rapacious Neighbours prey! 
Till his Wise Son did Calm the Noble Heate 
And gather‟d up the Wracks of his Estate! 84 
 
Ailean‟s response to the internal challenge he faced certainly indicates a ruthless streak, 
and that he was willing to use violence when necessary. Furthermore, although the kin-
based nature of Highland society fostered strong bonds between kindreds and clan 
members, it could also generate disorder and conflict. Neither did familial bonds preclude 
the use of violence, yet while Ailean did ultimately resort to bloodshed to suppress the 
pretensions of his opponents, it was arguably a measured response used with considerable 
restraint. The ambush of his kin was a limited engagement, and there is no indication of 
reprisals being conducted against supporters of the rebellious branches – his objective had 
already been achieved. Ailean‟s actions cannot be condoned, but they were undoubtedly 
very different from the kind of brutal fratricide allegedly perpetrated by the warring 
brothers of Clan Donald of Sleat in the wake of the forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles.
85
 
This case study further emphasises the difficulty in reducing conflict to one cause – a 
bloodfeud, a land dispute, and a succession crisis were all factors in the violence that 
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occurred. Another major contributing factor was the contest between Argyll and Huntly for 
overlordship in Lochaber, which saw the two magnates exploit internal divisions and 
instigate warfare within the Clan Cameron.
207 
 
Chapter 9: The ‘Islay Rising’, 1614-5 
 
Between 1614 and 1615, the ancient MacDonald stronghold of Dunivaig Castle was 
besieged several times by both crown agents and various members of Clan Donald of 
Dunivaig. These sieges constitute the major military action of the „Islay Rising‟ led by Sir 
Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig, an attempt at challenging the Campbell hegemony on the 
west coast and restoring the fortunes of the Clan Donald. This episode of Highland history 
has been given comparatively more attention than other events in this period. It was 
discussed in detail by Donald Gregory in 1836 and more recently by Edward J. Cowan and 
David Stevenson, the former describing it as a „sordid story of treachery‟.1 Gregory‟s 
general narrative remains strong, and Stevenson‟s focus on one key participant, Colla 
Ciotach (the father of Alasdair MacColla), provides a useful perspective, but there remains 
scope for further assessment with an emphasis on warfare and military affairs. Even as a 
standalone study, it offers much in relation to the conduct of warfare in the West Highlands 
and Isles, especially in contrast to the military power of the government. When viewed 
within the broader chronological context of 1544-1615, it also allows the historian to trace 
continuity and change in Highland military tactics, the mentalities of the Gaelic nobility, 
and the government approach to the Highlands and Isles. 
 
In the early seventeenth century, the MacDonalds of Duniviag, riven by infighting 
and mounting debts, lost their ancestral base of Islay. Their chief, Aonghas, first 
surrendered Dunivaig Castle to the crown in 1605, before renouncing ownership of the 
whole island in favour of Sir Iain Campbell of Cawdor on 1 January 1612, in exchange for 
6,000 merks.
2
 Kintyre, another ancestral possession, was acquired by the Campbells in 
1607.
3
 In September 1612, Raghnall MacDonald of Dunluce (the future earl of Antrim) 
then bought out Cawdor‟s claim, with royal approval, but his „Irish‟ form of landlordism 
alienated his new tenants in Islay.
4
  Recovery of the clan‟s rapidly dwindling patrimony 
was a foremost concern for many of the kindred‟s leading men, not least Sir Seumas, the 
eldest son of Aonghas. He had usurped the leadership of the clan from his father in 1598,
5
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but was later captured and imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle in 1604.
6
 Although Sir Seumas 
could do little to help the clan while behind bars in Edinburgh, some of his kinsmen shared 
his aspiration. 
 
By 1614, Islay had been nominally controlled by Raghnall MacDonald of Dunluce 
for two years, but the upper echelons of the MacDonalds of Dunivaig maintained a 
presence on the island in this period of transition. Dunivaig Castle itself was lightly 
garrisoned by a handful of crown agents associated with Andrew Knox, Bishop of the Isles. 
In May 1610, he had been named Steward of the Isles and had adopted Dunivaig as his 
headquarters.
7
 Sensing an opportunity to easily reclaim the castle, a small MacDonald 
company commanded by Raghnall Òg, the illegitimate son of Aonghas MacDonald of 
Dunivaig, launched an attack on Dunivaig in March 1614. According to the minutes of a 
Privy Council meeting in April 1614, Raghnall Òg 
 
…a vagabound fellow…come latelie to Yla, and finding the House [Dunivaig 
Castle] to be but slenderlie keeped, resolued to surpryse and tak the same: And for 
this effect, he and his complices, being four or fyve in nomber, retered thame selves 
to ane wood, neare by the House, whair that made some laderes, and with thame, 
one day, airlie in the morning, they clam the vtter wall, keeped thame selues 
obscure whill the yettes were opined; and they took the House, and put the 




Only a handful of MacDonalds had come to take the castle,
9
 but their ingenuity prevailed. 
The tiny garrison of Dunivaig Castle, consisting of the brother of the Bishop of the Isles 
and „two or three seruandes‟, suggests that there was no real expectation of an attack, and 
these „seruandes‟ may not have been soldiers. The restraint shown by Raghnall in his 
release of the defending garrison is worthy of note, and suggests he was attempting to 
mitigate the severity of the inevitable government response. 
 
Ostensibly, the principal impetus behind Raghnall Òg‟s actions was the death in 
early 1613 of his father, Aonghas,
10
 which may have impelled him to reclaim Dunivaig and 
then Islay in his father‟s name when the timing was opportune. Perhaps he even sought to 
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assert his leadership over the clan while Sir Seumas, the eldest son, languished in prison. 
However, the exact motivations of Raghnall Òg‟s capture of Dunivaig Castle hinge on two 
conflicting versions of events: one provided by the MacDonalds, and another by Andrew 
Knox, the Bishop of the Isles. 
 
Aonghas Òg, the younger legitimate son of Aonghas of Dunivaig, had allied with 
his older brother Sir Seumas against their father in 1598,
11
 but remained at liberty after 
Seumas‟ capture in 1604, and now resided in Islay around six miles from Dunivaig.12 
According to the testimony of Sir Seumas in April 1614, Aonghas Òg heard about the 
attack on the castle by his half-brother Raghnall Òg and „immediatlie [sent] the fyre crose 
athorte the countrey warning all the countrey people who wer affected to his maiesties 
obedience to ryse and concur with him in the recourie of the hous‟.13 Dunivaig Castle was 
then besieged by Aonghas Òg. Raghnall Òg‟s company apparently 
 
…held good for sex dayes, being weel prouyded with pulder, lunt [match], and 
bullet, whereof thay fand good store in the House; and thay wer prodigall anough in 
bestowing the same vpon the beseagares; bot in end, perceaueing that thay war not 
able to keepe the House, thay in the night eshued [escaped] at a bak yett [gate], in a 
litle boat with sex oares, which lay at the Castell; and took with them such goodes 




This two-part siege may highlight the effectiveness of experienced Gaelic warriors at this 
time. Raghnall Òg and his small band of followers were able to easily outwit and 
overwhelm the castle garrison, and when in possession of the castle and its supplies, they 
withstood a six-day siege by a numerically superior force, utilising firearms to keep 
Aonghas Òg at bay. Notably, Raghnall Òg was mindful to time his manoeuvres for 
maximum effect: attacking the castle „airlie in the morning‟ and using the cover of 
darkness to later escape.  
 
Dunivaig Castle was now in possession of Aonghas Òg, who attempted to present 
himself as a dutiful crown servant. Sir Seumas helped his brother foster this image by 
claiming Aonghas Òg had immediately tried to restore the castle to the bishop‟s servants, 
but they had refused to receive it. This explanation was met with some scepticism from the 
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 as an alternative narrative of the above events had been provided by 
Andrew Knox, the Bishop of the Isles. Knox argued that Aonghas Òg and Raghnall Òg 
were in league, with the former encouraging the latter to capture the castle and be „the first 
authour of his rebellioun‟.16 Aonghas Òg then conducted an elaborate show siege to 
convince the king of his loyalty, and thereby obtain the rights to the castle of Dunivaig 
from the grateful monarch. On 9 June 1614, the Bishop of the Isles conveyed this 
information to the Privy Council: 
 
…the surpryse and taking of the house be Ronnald proceeded from the said Angus, 
and by speciall comand, warrand and direction from him, And that he fearing that 
the said Ronnald wold discover that mater, hes now latelie slane his foure men, and 
tane him self prisoner…17 
 
It soon became clear that, despite Sir Seumas‟ claims to the contrary, Aonghas Òg was 
refusing to convey the castle to the bishop. In his defence, he claimed his tight grip on the 
castle was only for fear of prosecution for capturing it without a royal commission.
18
 
Calling his bluff, the government clerk, James Primrose, claimed the Council „wes 
graciuslie plesit to grant unto thame oure favour and pardoun for all thair bigane offensis 
conditionale that they wald rander the said house to the said bischop‟.19 Instead, the 
MacDonalds reinforced their garrison with more men and supplies with the apparent 
intention of holding the castle as „ane house of warre‟ against the king.20  
 
For a brief moment, it appeared that the bishop had actually made some headway in 
negotiations and the castle would soon be surrendered. On 6 August 1614, the Privy 
Council issued a remission for Aonghas Òg and his accomplices, and praised his „good 
service‟ for ousting the previous lawless occupants of the castle. It was noted he was 
„willing to rander and delyver bak agane the said hous to Andro, Bischop of the Ylis‟.21 
This came just three days after the principal island chiefs were summoned to Edinburgh on 
3 August to renew their pledge to uphold the Band and the Statutes of Iona of 1609. 
MacGregor interprets the summons as a precautionary measure to „contain‟ the 
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MacDonald rebellions on Islay.
22
 The Band and Statutes of 1609, especially the former, 
had been designed as a pledge of loyalty to the crown, and renewing these promises in the 
wake of this uprising was a strong test of that loyalty. It may also have been a message to 
the MacDonalds, emphasising their political isolation, and it seems to have been briefly 
successful. 
 
However, by the middle of September, relations had again deteriorated, and the 
Bishop was attempting to muster the „cuntrie people‟ of Islay to oppose Aonghas Òg. The 
people of Islay were reportedly too „busied with thair harvest‟ to help,23 and Knox also 
failed to secure the military support of prominent island chiefs: MacDonald of Sleat, 
MacLeod of Harris, and MacLean of Duart.
24
 Only 70 men followed the bishop – 50 were 
professional soldiers supplied by the government and 20 were clansmen of MacAulay of 
Ardincaple – and he was becoming rapidly outnumbered.25 With Dunivaig Castle acting as 
a focal point for the rising, the MacDonalds gathered together a sizeable force of 140-160 
men and went on the offensive on 21 September. In the middle of the night, they 
surrounded the bishop‟s house on Islay and destroyed his four boats. In the morning, the 
MacDonalds made „mony threatening speitches to haue massacred him and his 
company‟.26 Knox was forced to sign a contract binding him to procure Aonghas Òg a 
seven-year lease of Islay, and secure a pardon for all of the rebels.
27
 To compel his effort in 





With the Bishop of the Isles twice humiliated and Dunivaig Castle firmly in the 
hands of militarily active MacDonalds, there was much discussion among royal agents 
about how to proceed. The MacDonalds‟ aggression towards the bishop was enough to 
convince the Privy Council that Aonghas Òg had „falslie and treacherouslie‟ captured 
Dunivaig under the false pretence of aiding the king.
29
 Around this time, MacDonald of 
Dunluce‟s claim to the island was reneged in favour of Campbell of Cawdor, after he 
pledged to recover Dunivaig Castle and „command the hail Ile‟. For that purpose, the Privy 
Council liaised with Sir Arthur Chichester, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, to provide Cawdor 
with six cannons and 200 professional English soldiers. Any more soldiers were to be 
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raised by Cawdor himself.
 30
 On 11 October 1614, Knox begged the king to reconsider 
Cawdor‟s ownership of Islay, highlighting the futility of rooting „out one pestiferous clan 
[to] plant in one lytill bettir‟. This, he said, could only „breid grit trubill in ye Iylles‟.31 His 





Over the last few months, the reputation of Dunivaig Castle‟s defensibility had 
been greatly embellished by Sir Seumas, and it was widely believed to be „infinitt stronge‟ 
with walls (presumably made of turf) 30 feet thick.
33
 Taking no chances, the government 
ordered a trial run of its artillery against „some yett [gate] within the Castle of Edinburgh‟ 
to have „some proofe quhat the pittart [petard] will be able to do‟.34 The Privy Council had 
by now come to strongly suspect Sir Seumas‟ collusion in this MacDonald conspiracy and 
instructed the Captain of the Guard in Edinburgh to „keepe him close prisonar‟.35 Able to 
provide the Privy Council with information of the status of Dunivaig in April 1614, he was 
clearly in communication with his kinsmen. When his cell was searched in June, letters to 
Aonghas Òg and his mother were found, but they contained nothing incriminating to 
implicate him in a conspiracy.
36
 Writing from his prison cell in Edinburgh Castle in 
October, Sir Seumas made one final plea for freedom,
37
 but according to Alexander Seton, 
the earl of Dunfermline and Lord Chancellor, on 9 December 1614, the king was not 
interested in making any deals with „sic peopill‟ and was confident the government‟s 
military could „dantoun all the pride of sic barbarous limmers‟.38 
 
Late in November, Cawdor‟s army was closing in on Dunivaig Castle, but 
reinforcements from Ireland led by Sir Oliver Lambert did not arrive until 14 December, 
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by which time Cawdor had retreated to the mainland and „dispersed his men‟.39 The 
campaign was re-launched in January in defiance of the „worst of all weathers ever heard 
of‟. 40 Cawdor was instructed to pardon Aonghas Òg should he safely deliver the pledges 
(Knox‟s son and nephew) and leniency was also recommended for any „cuntrie people‟ 
whose aid had been forcefully extorted by the MacDonalds. Any known and willing 
collaborators were to be punished as rebels however, unless they informed Cawdor of 
„associats of this rebellion of as goode rank as them selfes‟.41 Knox was concerned that 
Aonghas Òg‟s followers would discover these unfavourable terms and threaten the safety 
of the pledges, so he planned to accompany Cawdor on his campaign. The delicate nature 
of the mission was made clear to Cawdor who was urged to use „all possible cair and 
dexteritie‟ to secure the release of the hostages.42  
 
The unexpected intervention of the earl of Dunfermline rendered these warnings 
moot. In late November or early December 1614, Dunfermline dispatched one of his 
servants, George Graham of „Eryne‟ „quha had guid Irish‟, to receive the pledges and the 
castle from Aonghas Òg. Graham had been authorised by the Chancellor to negotiate in his 
name, and the offered terms (according to Aonghas Òg anyway) were exceedingly 
generous: in exchange for the release of the hostages, the Chancellor would cancel 
Cawdor‟s commission, name Aonghas Òg „constable‟ of Dunivaig, and „acquire him ane 
richt of the lands of Ila‟.43 The MacDonald leader was amenable to these terms and on 17 
December the hostages were handed over safely, along with the „keyis off the houss‟.44 
When Graham was leaving with the hostages in tow, Aonghas Òg expressed concern that 
„keiping of the Castell micht breid some trouble to him heirefter‟ and requested Graham 
hold the castle himself. The Chancellor‟s servant refused, stating he was only empowered 
to confirm Aonghas Òg as castellan.
45
 Releasing the hostages was an act of good faith by 
Aonghas Òg, but as they were his main leverage in negotiations he would come to regret 
his decision. 
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On 6 January, Campbell of Cawdor landed on Islay with the 200 English soldiers, 
and by the next day his ranks had swollen to 340 men.
46
 On 7 January, he sent a scouting 
force of 160 men to Dunivaig Castle with instructions to pursue the rebels if they were „in 
the fieldes‟.47 They arrived at Baile Neachdainn within half a mile of the castle on 10 
January, and were joined by the rest of Cawdor‟s army two days later.48 On 20 January, 
Cawdor gathered supplies to build temporary lodgings for his fellow commanders.
49
 That 
night, four of the rebels fled Dunivaig Castle and were received by Cawdor „according to 
the tenor of his hienes proclamatioun‟.50 The following day, 21 January, Raghnall mac 
Sheumais (uncle of Sir Seumas and Aonghas Òg) and three others surrendered to 
Cawdor.
51
 On 25 January, a culverin and cannon leased to Cawdor by the government 
landed in Islay, and another cannon followed on the 27 January. This latter artillery piece 
was brought ashore within range of the castle walls and the rebels opened fire on Cawdor‟s 
men who were dragging it up the beach to a gun-platform that had been prepared in 
advance, possibly around 180 metres to the north-east of the castle.
52
 One „Hylander‟ was 
shot in the chest and died a few days later, while a „worthie gentelman‟, Captain Crawford, 
received a „shott that brake the smale of his legg all to shivers‟. Six days later he had his 
leg amputated, but died two hours after the surgery.
53
 Despite these casualties, Cawdor‟s 
men successfully deployed the cannon and entrenched the land surrounding the castle to 
prevent the MacDonalds‟ escape overland. Meanwhile, Dòmhnall Campbell of Lochawe 
and Captain Button were sent to „watch the rebelles by sea‟.54 
  
 The artillery barrage finally began in the morning of 1 February.
55
 The 
MacDonalds soon sent a messenger to request a parley inside the castle, but Cawdor, 
fearing for his safety, refused. For the rest of the day the cannonfire continued, pausing 
only to allow the MacDonald messenger to walk back-and-forth between the two armies.
56
 
By the evening, the MacDonalds were „greatlie discouragit be the effect of the battrie‟, and 
Cawdor, anticipating an escape by the sea, strengthened his naval guard.
57
 In the morning 
of 2 February, the cannon fire continued, until Cawdor sent his own men to invite Aonghas 
                                                          
46
 Ibid., 179. Perhaps local support from his new tenants on Islay. 
47
 Ibid., 179-80. 
48






 Ibid., 181. 
52
 Caldwell has suggested that the remains of the platform survive at the noted location: Caldwell, „The 
Campbell Takeover‟, 97. 
53
 CSPI, Vol. XV, 7; Book of Islay, 242; HP, Vol. III, 182. 
54
 HP, Vol. III, 182-3. 
55
 Ibid., 183; CSPI, Vol. XV, 7. 
56
 Ibid., 182. 
57
 Ibid., 183. 
215 
 
Òg to a parley. The MacDonald leader immediately protested that he held the castle as the 
king‟s man in accordance with instructions received from the Lord Chancellor‟s servant, 
Graham. Cawdor informed him that Graham „had no suche power‟ and had „deceavit 
him‟.58 Graham‟s assurances, allegedly supported by a letter from the Chancellor himself,59 





 The sequence played out once more: the parley was concluded, the cannons 
resumed firing, and soon „ane wther‟ parley was requested by Aonghas Òg. This time 
however, Cawdor‟s patience had run out. Outright refusing any further negotiations, he 
demanded Aonghas Òg‟s immediate submission, and unable to withstand the continuing 
barrage any longer, Aonghas Òg, accompanied by other „principall of the rebelles‟, left the 
castle at five or six o‟clock, „knilit all befoir the luiftenant‟, and offered their unconditional 
surrender.
61
 Not all who submitted were fighting men: Lambert noted that Aonghas Òg‟s 
wife, Colla Ciotach‟s wife, „nurses, and children‟ all left the castle.62 Cawdor could not yet 
claim possession of the castle however, as Colla Ciotach and a small band of followers still 
remained inside. With no means to bargain for their lives, that night they made a „faire 
skape to the sea‟.63 Cawdor‟s naval guard had become complacent and 
 
…under clood of night…ye rebellis wshit owt in a boat whiche yei haid fittit for ye 
purpos. Sum of the luiftenant‟s men that watchit for yem by sea did geive them a 
wollie of shoat and lenchit owt yair boatis and followed them which ye rebellis 
answerit wth yair shoats…and all yat war one the shoare might sie the luiftenant‟s 
boattes and ye rebellis boate gif fyre to wthers a longe tyme; a rock lykwayis neire 
to the Castell wherone yair was plantit a nuber of muskiteris did geue ye rebellis at 
thair wshing owt a woille of shoat. The rebellis boat being moire swift then the 
boats yat were apoyntit to wache them that night did ower rowe them and the 
rebelles boatte being sum what onthight [not watertight] althoghe werrie swift yei 
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were forcit to drawe to the narrest shoire yei culd cum att and landit in the Od [Oa 
peninsula] of Illa where yair boate wes sunk…64 
 
The MacDonalds nevertheless managed to elude Cawdor‟s forces, but the lieutenant sent 
soldiers in pursuit and ordered all of the boats and galleys in Islay be destroyed „so as yei 
can not eshaipe‟.65 Six of Colla Ciotach‟s followers were eventually apprehended and 
executed on 6 February. Another handful of MacDonalds seized at the „fort‟ of Loch Gorm 
situated on Eilean Mór was initially given the same sentence.
66
 Ultimately, Dunivaig 
Castle did not live up to the reputation painted by Sir Seumas. The artillery bombardment 
had destroyed most of the castle, reckoned to have been „invincible without the canon and 
famyn‟.67 The barrage was so damaging that an „aboundance of rewins and rubbidge‟ 
caused the inner bawn [defensive wall] and castle well to be „chocktt vpp‟.68 
 
Aonghas Òg was brought to Edinburgh for interrogation,
69
 during which he 
attempted to shirk all responsibility for the events at Dunivaig. He claimed Colla Ciotach 
had led the attack on Raghnall Òg in Dunivaig Castle in 1614, after which Aonghas Òg 
hunted down Raghnall Òg, eventually capturing him 20 days after the siege. According to 
Aonghas Òg, Raghnall Òg then revealed that his initial assault on Dunivaig had been 
encouraged by Sir Seumas‟ illegitimate son, Dòmhnall Gorm, who warned that all his 
„freindis‟ in Islay were to be „turnit out‟.70 Any confessions wrung from Aonghas Òg are 
rendered questionable by the fact his life was at stake, but this may confirm Sir Seumas‟ 
involvement through his son, Dòmhnall Gorm. Finally, Aonghas Òg claimed the 
connivance of a „greate one‟, an individual who had orchestrated this whole affair, and 
whose identity would be revealed if Aonghas Òg was given „assurance of his life‟.71 
Donald Gregory believed this „greate one‟ was the earl of Argyll, who was attempting to 
manipulate the MacDonalds into self-destruction.
72
 If the king suspected Argyll‟s 




Ultimately, the promise of revealing the „greate one‟ was not enough to save 
Aonghas‟ Òg‟s life. He and several of his followers were condemned for high treason and 
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hanged at the Market Cross in Edinburgh on 8 July.
74
 They went to their deaths protesting 
about George Graham‟s promises, and according to Calderwood, because the „said George 
was not troubled by the counsel or anie other, the people thought hard of it‟.75 By 
Stevenson‟s estimation, Aonghas Òg was a „remarkably bad politician‟ and a mere 
figurehead, with Colla Ciotach acting as the main „driving force behind the rebellion‟.76 
The contemporary opinion of Lambert supports Stevenson‟s view as he observed there was 
„noe great substance in Aggnus [sic] other than Coll McDonnell thrust into him‟.77 
Certainly, Aonghas Òg‟s release of the hostages was a politically imprudent move, and the 
version of events provided at his interrogation stretches credibility. 
 
Back on Islay, Cawdor‟s suppression of the rising was nearly complete. In a letter 
from 7 February by Lambert to King James, he commended Cawdor as a „worthy 
gentleman of an excellent good nature and well disposed‟. Lambert was less 
complimentary about the Highlanders under Cawdor‟s command: 
 
They are obedient to noe commande, subiecte to noe order; ravine [rapine] and 
spoyle all where they come. Marshall lawe in noe request amongst them – noe way 




In the event of future uprisings by the Highlanders, Lambert advised the king that a small 
force of 400 paid soldiers, with an auxiliary force of 100 „Iryshe‟, could easily suppress a 
Highland army of „thowsandes‟. Nevertheless, he recognised that they had „good and able 
boddyes‟ and could „easilye [be] made soldiours in an other government‟.79 Although 
dismissed as uncivilised and disorganised, the Highlanders were acknowledged for 
possessing latent military potential which could be harnessed, integrated, and redirected 
towards state interests, perhaps foreshadowing future trends of military recruitment in the 
Highlands. 
 
Incredibly, the saga of Dunivaig Castle was not yet over. After several abortive 
attempts over the years, Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig escaped Edinburgh Castle at 
the end of May 1615, fleeing north and west to the Isles. The Privy Council regarded his 
breakout as confirmation of his complicity in the treasonous plot to capture Dunivaig 
Castle, but Sir Seumas justified his actions in a series of broadly similar letters to the Privy 
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Council, the Bishop of the Isles, and the Earls of Caithness, Tullibardin, and Crawford.
80
 In 
all of these letters he claimed he fled in fear of his life, which was threatened by his 
brother-in-law, Campbell of Cawdor.
81
 His death would certainly have tightened Cawdor‟s 
grip on Islay, but this threat (although perhaps genuine) was probably not Sir Seumas‟ only 
motivation. His desperation for release was plainly evident in the previous year and as far 
back as June 1607, when he beseeched the king to „remember my miserie, and gett me 
libertie or banismentt‟.82 Upon his escape, Sir Seumas immediately convened with „rebellis 
and broken men‟, MacDonald of Keppoch and the eldest son of Clanranald, and soon 
began to reclaim his clan‟s lost territory.83 
 
In a „quasi-inaugural progress through the west Highlands and Islands‟, including a 
ceremonial reception from Colla Ciotach on the isle of Eigg,
84
 Sir Seumas gathered troops 
for his first target: the heavily damaged Dunivaig Castle.
85
 Cowan has argued that Sir 
Seumas was „a man alone…not greatly admired by the men of Islay‟, but quite the reverse 
seems to be true.
86
 Sir Seumas was an undoubtedly charismatic figure and a natural leader, 
whose position was reinforced by the legitimacy he wielded as the eldest son and heir of 
the Dunivaig kindred. The military prestige accrued by felling the mighty Lachlann Mòr 
MacLean of Duart in 1598 must have instilled further confidence in his cause. Revival of 
the Lordship of the Isles may even have seemed viable under his leadership.
87
 For these 
reasons, many within the Clan Donald flocked to his banner. Shortly after his escape, Sir 
Seumas was only accompanied by 14 „men and boyis‟, soon reinforced by Keppoch and 
Colla Ciotach who brought in 16 and 80 men respectively.
88
 By 20 June 1615, Seumas‟ 
company had grown to an impressive 300 men, thanks to the support of MacIain of 
Ardnamurchan who came „with all his cumpany with him‟.89 
 
Support from other clans was more limited however. Three chiefs –MacDonald of 
Sleat, the captain of Clanranald, and MacLeod of Harris – allegedly provided token 
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contingents of clansmen, but were careful not to officially endorse the rising.
90
 On 24 June, 
Tullibardine reported that these chiefs had garrisoned their „sea poirtis‟ with soldiers to 
prevent Sir Seumas from mooring in their territory.
91
 This may indicate the binding 
strength of the chiefs‟ renewed pledge of loyalty in August of 1614, but they were also 
directly ordered to pursue the MacDonalds by land or sea.
92
 Providing only nominal 
support to the MacDonalds gave the chiefs immunity while allowing them to stir the pot. 
While they may have been waiting for proof of Sir Seumas‟ abilities to gauge the 
rebellion‟s chance of success before fully committing to his cause, they could also have 
been waiting for a sign of weakness. On 20 June, a bounty of £2000 was offered for the 
capture or killing of Sir Seumas (soon raised to £5000) and 5,000 merks for his main 
accomplices, Colla Ciotach and MacDonald of Keppoch.
93
 Such a high reward may have 
been a sorely tempting prospect for some of these chiefs, especially those with substantial 
debts like MacLeod of Harris and MacDonald of Sleat.
94
 Perhaps in frustration at this 
reserved response, Sir Seumas captured the second son of MacDonald of Glengarry and a 
son of the Captain of Clanranald.
95
 Glengarry‟s eldest son reportedly retaliated by 
attacking MacDonald of Keppoch‟s company, capturing two rebels, whom he promised to 
present before the Privy Council.
96
 Meanwhile, Dòmhnall, the captain of Clanranald, was 
asked by Sir Seumas to attend a meeting where he would have „delyverit him his sone‟, but 





Now a symbol of dogged MacDonald resistance, the capture of Dunivaig was a 
necessary first step in the revival of the clan‟s fortunes. On 23 June, the MacDonalds again 
used the element of surprise to compensate for their lack of siege equipment, although Sir 
Seumas commanded a much larger infantry force than had his two brothers.
98
 In a letter to 
the earl of Crawford, Sir Seumas claimed that he and his men 
 
…lay in ane buis [ambush] about the hous, till the Captane and tuelf of his best 
men com out. We persewed ouer rathlie or they come far from the hous. The 
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Captanes men fled, bot him selue and three or foure, they wer slane. We zeid in at 





Inside the outer curtain wall, the MacDonalds took the outer tower and ignited the gate of 
the inner barmkin, all the while exchanging gunfire with the garrison: 
 
…we shott from four in the morning till efter tuelfue. Tuo of myne wes killed, a 
shouldior [soldier] and ane boy; tuo lightlie hurt. The hous wes promised to yield or 





Again the garrison, including the Commendator of Ardchattan and his two sons,
101
 was 
spared, but James did not shy from using deadly force in the opening assault, killing the 
„Capitane‟ of the castle, Alasdair MacDougall.102 Overall, he faced stout resistance from a 
small but well-trained garrison, suggesting the previous incidents at Dunivaig Castle had 
led to a significant upgrade in defences.  
 
Although the siege was a success, the beleaguered Dunivaig had clearly lost all 
viability as a defensible structure,
103
 as Sir Seumas quickly moved north to fortify the 
castle situated on Eilean Mór in Loch Gorm.
104
 In July it was reported that the MacDonalds 
  
…ar all bissie fortiefeing the eyllan of Ellan loch gorme with ane baoune of feall 
[bawn or enclosure of turf] of ane greit breid, as the reportis, tuanttie foote bread 




Between 1 and 3 July, Sir Seumas sent another series of letters to prominent nobles, just as 
he had done upon his escape from Edinburgh, all of which provide interesting insight into 
his motivations. In his letter to the earl of Caithness, he reiterated that the threat posed to 
his life by Cawdor forced his escape,
106
 but offered a more emotive rationale in his letter to 
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Lord Binning. He beseeched him to convince the king „not to zield to my vnfreindis, to ruit 
me and my whole race out, being fyve or sex hundreth zeiris possessouris‟, and then made 
a vow: 
 
 …for that is certane, I will die befoir I sie a Campbell posses [Islay].107  
 
The struggle for control of Islay had become deeply personal, and in the eyes of this 
MacDonald leader, the Campbells were the enemy. He assured Binning that he would 
never have attacked Dunivaig if it had been held by the king‟s men or the Bishop of the 
Isles – it was assaulted only because it was possessed by those who „crewellie opprest the 
pure cuntrie‟.108 
 
Having secured one part of the homeland, Sir Seumas left Islay for Kintyre in late 
July,
109
 where he was „so swelled in pryde‟ that he „sent the fyre corss throw the cuntrie 
and wairned all the inhabitants betuix Tarbert and the Mull of Kintyre to tak thair land‟ 
from him.
110
 This was another move laden in symbolism, an act of reclamation not 
occupation. Indeed, his overall campaign was much more ambitious and aggressive than 
that of his kinsmen Raghnall Òg and Aonghas Òg. Not content to simply wait behind the 
walls of Dunivaig Castle, he proactively began to claw back the lands held by his father 
and his predecessors. 
 
Throughout June and July, the Privy Council received a number of reports that 
emphasised the seriousness of Sir Seumas‟ rising, which was soon to reach its peak in 
terms of manpower.
111
 In just over two weeks, 20 June to 5 August, estimates of his army 
size doubled from 300 to 600 men.
112
 It was later reported that the „haill cuntrey people of 
Kintyre, Ilay, Colonsay, Juray, and Gigha‟ supported him with shelter, supplies, and 
fighting men.
113
 Worrying reports indicated Sir Seumas was poised to invade Argyll.
114
 His 
new base in Islay was acting as a magnet for disaffected clansmen from across the Isles, 
and on 15 July it was even reported (via information provided by Sir Seumas‟ wife, 
Margaret Campbell of Cawdor) that the MacDonald leader had made a „speciall band‟ with 
MacDonald of Sleat, the Captain of Clanranald, and MacLeod of Harris, while MacLean of 
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Duart would stay neutral.
115
 Curbing the rebellion was now an immediate priority as it had 




Although receiving an enthusiastic offer of service in June from Ruairidh MacLeod 
of Harris,
117
 the government ideally wanted the earl of Argyll to pursue the MacDonalds. 
The Council invoked the MacDonalds‟ self-professed motive of reclaiming land given 
„over thair headis‟ to the Campbells as recourse for laying responsibility upon Argyll.118 
He had been residing in England for some time, and on 29 July 1615, MacNeill of Taynish 
reported to Binning that Argyll‟s long absence from Scotland had emboldened the rebels – 
„all the cuntries ar aloft‟.119 This news prompted Binning to chastise Argyll‟s sluggish 
response to the crisis, claiming it was to his dishonour, „disadvantage and discredit‟.120 
Despite his reluctance allegedly on account of his ill-health,
121
 Argyll was ultimately 
convinced to lead the campaign. With the Council anticipating a largely naval expedition, 
he was provided with „galayes, birlinges, and veshelles‟ outfitted with a „whole furnitoure 
of warre and with fourtie dayes prouision and victuales‟.122  
 
Assembling a force of around 1,500 men in total, Argyll set off in pursuit of the 
MacDonalds from Duntroon on Loch Crinan in early September.
123
 In the intervening time, 
Sir Seumas‟ army had continued to grow and now probably numbered around 1,000 
men.
124
 Argyll divided his army into two main divisions: one to the east of Kintyre and one 
to the west. Two companies under the command of Cawdor numbering 700-800 men in 
total were sent along the western coast to capture Sir Seumas‟ galleys at his landing point 
on the west coast of Kintyre. Failing that, they were to wait for Argyll to arrive overland 
from the east side of Kintyre with another two companies, commanded by Captain Boswell 
and Campbell of Kilmichael, again numbering 700-800 men.
125
 Argyll arrived at Tarbert at 
night, just two miles away from Sir Seumas‟ camp. The MacDonald leader had directed his 
uncle Raghnall to block Argyll‟s path overland with a force of 300-400 men, while Colla 
Ciotach was sent with 60 men to Tarbert, where he captured Cailean Campbell of Kilberry, 
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who had become separated from Argyll‟s camp.126 Fearing „ane trayne‟ [a trap], Argyll did 
not personally pursue Colla, but sent his naval force after him. Colla received intelligence 
that Cawdor was on the isle of Gigha, and „not beleving that it could be possible‟, he sailed 
towards the island, where he was ambushed by Argyll‟s western company – 15 or 16 of his 
men were killed and four of his bìrlinnean were captured.
127
 MacDonald of Keppoch was 
also attacked by this western force, and was pushed back to the southern end of Kintyre 




Figure 5: Military activity during the ‘Islay Rising’, 1615 
 
Thus far the engagements had not gone in Sir Seumas‟ favour. Two of his key leaders had 
been driven off by Argyll‟s forces, and his only success had been in halting Argyll‟s 
overland advance. Recognising that his men were „so disordourit‟, Sir Seumas broke up 
camp in Kintyre and sailed south to Rathlin Island. A few days later, he sailed north again 
and set up camp on the southern edge of the Rhinns of Islay near the small island of Orsay, 
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where he gathered around half of his scattered army, to the number of 500 men.
129
 From 
Argyll‟s perspective, the campaign had gone according to plan. He had already severely 
weakened Sir Seumas‟ military capacity, while his force remained almost entirely 
unscathed. 
 
Two English ships-of-war commanded by Captains Wood and Monk had been sent 
to support Argyll‟s expedition, and they transported him to Islay, landing in the natural 
harbour of „Loddummes‟, far enough away from Sir Seumas‟ camp to prevent any 
harassment.
130
 Argyll‟s army camped for two days „for refrescheing of his men‟ and 
negotiations with Sir Seumas, who pledged to surrender in four days‟ time. Deducing that 
Sir Seumas was just buying time for the wind to favour a swift escape north, Argyll only 
agreed on the condition that Sir Seumas surrendered within 24 hours and relinquished 
control of the „two fortis he keipit‟ in Islay.131 Running out of options, Sir Seumas 
beseeched Colla Ciotach to give up the two castles, but he „altogidder refuised‟.132 Colla 
had made his own bargain to surrender the castles to Argyll, freeing the Campbell chief to 
launch an attack on Sir Seumas‟ camp. When night fell, he sent Cawdor with the king‟s 
warships and 1,000 men to capture the MacDonalds‟ ships and trap them on the island.133 
The MacDonalds were alerted to this danger by „great beakins vpone the tope of ane hie 
hill‟ made by some sympathetic islanders. Their loyalty to their chosen chief seems 
genuine. According to Argyll, some of the islanders begged Sir Seumas to stay because 
they had „hazard all for him, and knew thair wald be no mercie schawin to thame, they 
sould all die at his feit‟, but MacDonald of Keppoch convinced Sir Seumas to escape. 
Accompanied by Keppoch and around 20 others, the MacDonald leader sailed around the 
northern coast of Ireland to „Inchedaholl‟,134 a small island near Inishowen on the western 
coast.
135
 The remainder of Sir Seumas‟ army – perhaps as many as 450 men – were forced 
to „tak the hillis in the nicht‟.136 
 
The next morning, Argyll received the submission of Colla Ciotach, who 
surrendered Dunivaig Castle and Loch Gorm and released his prisoner, Campbell of 
Kilberry.
137
 Reporting his campaign before the Privy Council on 21 December 1615, 
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135




 Ibid.; HP, Vol. III, 301, 294, 295-6. 
225 
 
Argyll justified his decision to spare Colla‟s life and a „few utheris‟ due to „unseaounable 
weather, the extreame seiknes of the maist pairt of the sojouris, and the grite skairsnes of 
viveris, without ony hoip of supplie‟.138 Nevertheless, Argyll did not release the whole 
garrison as 15 of the ringleaders were executed,
139
 and another five of Sir Seumas‟ 
accomplices were presented to the Privy Council on 24 November 1615.
140
 Colla Ciotach 





By early October, Islay had been secured,
142
 and Cawdor was confirmed in the 
escheated patrimony of the MacDonalds of Dunivaig by Argyll.
143
 However, Sir Seumas‟ 
escape meant that Argyll‟s victory was far from total, and the Privy Council feared another 
uprising was on the cards. Argyll had sent 30 men in hot pursuit of Sir Seumas in Ireland, 
but he eluded them by fleeing to the Spanish Netherlands.
144
 Lord Binning complained to 
Campbell that the whole expedition was „without any effect, bot the wrack of the poore 
beggerlie tennentis of Ilay and Kintyre‟, and that with the escape of the most prominent 
MacDonald leaders, the „rebellion will never be thought quenched‟. Emphasising the point, 
he claimed he did not „know quhat ringleadars these ar whome ye…bring in‟.145 The 
campaign may have been less conclusive than the Privy Council would have wished, but 
realistically Argyll had achieved much in a very short space of time. The efficacy of his 
strategy was in his manoeuvring and locational awareness, which had funnelled Sir 
Seumas into chokepoints and left him isolated on the island he called home. As a 
commander, Argyll was perhaps overly cautious, and may have achieved total victory had 
he attacked Sir Seumas on foot in Kintyre, yet his willingness to delegate was clearly 
effective. An apparent reluctance to lead from the front could indicate aversion to open 
battle, having experienced extreme personal danger at Glenlivet in 1594, and he certainly 
exhibited little of his youthful fervour during this campaign. Stevenson has suggested he 
had increasingly come to find „the quiet life of an English gentleman preferable to that of a 
Highland war leader‟.146 Argyll may also have been aware that the use of excessive force 
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could alienate the people of Islay and hinder the Campbells‟ exercise of lordship over the 
island in the future. Any apathy for the campaign was further compounded in the 
immediate aftermath when he was forced to pay for the hired troops out of his own pocket, 
exacerbating an already difficult financial situation. At the hearing on 21 December, the 
Privy Council refused to cover the expenses of army upkeep for November and December, 
claiming to have only agreed to pay for September and October.
147
 This reputedly cost 





At the height of the rising in July, it seemed for a fleeting moment that a Hebridean-wide 
rebellion was at least possible, with the mooted involvement of heavyweights like the 
MacDonalds of Sleat, the Clanranald, and the MacLeods of Harris. In the end, these clans 
remained largely aloof, content to see how the uprising panned out before committing 
direct support to Sir Seumas‟ cause and facing the wrath of central government. The 
viability of future risings was profoundly dependent upon the MacDonalds‟ recovery of 
their ancestral stronghold, which could have been used as a nerve centre for further 
reclamation of their lands. Ultimately, the loss and failed recovery of Islay were immutable 
symbols of MacDonald decline, but this outcome cannot be viewed as an inevitability or as 
„one of those magnificent, futile enterprises which are so characteristic of so much 
highland history‟.149 The seriousness of the rising is evident from the government response, 
and at its height it had the potential for success. 
 
This succession of sieges exhibits the quintessential military tactics of West 
Highland clan chiefs, and their more variable political acumen. The general approach to 
warfare, as shown by the MacDonalds, Cawdor, and the earl of Argyll, was founded upon 
keen intelligence and situational awareness. On a small-scale level, reconnaissance and 
planning are in evidence before Seumas MacDonald‟s assault on Dunivaig Castle, and in 
general the MacDonalds were consistently able to exploit the surrounding terrain to their 
advantage. On a larger scale, the earl of Argyll utilised wide flanking manoeuvres to 
contain the MacDonalds to the west-coast. As effective as the MacDonalds‟ tactics could 
be in small-scale engagements, they struggled to compete with the organised government 
forces, and this episode showcases the growing might of new military technology. Guns 
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were widely used by both sides, yet it was artillery that made the greatest impact. Sir 
Oliver Lambert commented: 
 
Your Majesteis cannons have soe well proclaimed your royall power vnto them, 




With James‟ succession to the throne of England in 1603, the full apparatus of the English 
war-machine was made available for deployment against uprisings of this nature, and the 
king‟s confidence in the ability of his military to suppress the rebellion was justified. 
Given relatively short notice the Privy Council was able to arrange the deployment of 
professional troops from Ireland, an arrangement that would have been virtually impossible 
during Elizabeth‟s reign. Apart from the missed rendezvous in the winter of 1614, 
Cawdor‟s campaign was a significant logistical achievement: trenches were dug to encircle 
the castle, temporary camps were constructed for the soldiers, gun-platforms were prepared, 
and several cannons were transported from ship to land with efficiency. Although some of 
the credit should be apportioned to Lambert, a veteran of Queen Elizabeth‟s wars in 
Ireland,
151
 he was quick to commend Cawdor‟s own leadership of this composite army 
during the campaign. 
 
Even if the cannon had diminished their defensive strength, this case study shows 
the enduring usefulness of castles in war, paralleled by their enduring potency as a symbol. 
When he laid siege to Dunivaig Castle in 1615, Sir Seumas must have been aware that his 
attack was eliminating the last vestiges of the castle‟s defensibility, but he did not call off 
the siege. Even if rendered militarily useless, the reclamation of the MacDonalds‟ ancestral 
seat was a matter of pride, and an essential act if the clan hoped to restore their ailing 
fortunes. No matter how battered the edifice became, whoever controlled Dunivaig Castle 
controlled Islay and the future of the clan. The castle remained a focal point for unrest for 
many years to come. King James recognised it as a „centre of sedition‟ and recommended 
to Cawdor that it be „utterly demolished so as no longer to afford shelter to traitors‟.152 His 
advice was not followed, but the same solution was proposed in 1630 when a small group 
of „disorderly thieves and limmers of the Yles‟ made an unsuccessful bid at capturing the 
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structure in a manner reminiscent of the actions of Raghnall Òg in 1614.
153
 Cawdor had 
given possession of Islay to his son, Iain, who asked permission to demolish the castle and 
build a „more commodious house for his own dwelling in a more proper part of the isle‟, an 
attempt at conclusively terminating the MacDonalds‟ persistent armed disaffection and 
underlining the Campbells‟ control.154 Once again it seems that this was not carried out, as 
the MacDonald stronghold was contested during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. In 1647, 
Alasdair MacColla sent his father, the old Colla Ciotach, to hold Dunivaig Castle and 
claim Islay in his name. Returning to the castle over 30 years since he had surrendered it to 
Argyll, Colla led the garrison for around two months before yielding to David Leslie‟s 
Covenanting army on 1 July 1647. Later in September or October of that year, he was 
executed at the order of the earl of Argyll.
155
 As argued by Stevenson, this episode, rather 
than the 1614-15 rising, was the „last great struggle‟ of Clann Iain Mhòir, which 
exemplifies the abiding resonance of Islay and Dunivaig Castle.
156
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
The temporal parameters of this thesis – 1544 and 1615 – coincide with events of national 
significance in Scotland. In 1544, the defeat of the Frasers by the Clanranald at 
Blàr nan Lèine sent shockwaves throughout the east and west, and in the following year 
the Dòmhnall Dubh Rising had the potential to permanently redraw power relations in 
Britain and Ireland. Seventy years later in 1615, the „Islay Rising‟ was no „futile‟ effort,1 
but a major military campaign by the MacDonalds of Dunivaig to reclaim Islay, Kintyre, 
and other lost lands. Throughout this 70-year period were other events of huge import in 
which the Highlanders and Islanders of Scotland played centre stage. The battle of 
Glenlivet in 1594, for example, was probably the largest military engagement fought in 
Scotland since Pinkie in 1547, and at that earlier battle too the Highlanders had played an 
important role. Throughout the sixteenth century meanwhile, the mercenary trade with 
Ireland demonstrated the international significance of the Highlanders and Islanders, 
particularly when it reached its apogee in 1594 and 1595. During those years, the 
movements and motivations of the „redshank‟ mercenaries dominated diplomatic 
interactions between James VI and Elizabeth I. All of this serves to emphasise that the 
West Highlands and Isles of Scotland was not a „frontier‟ society on the periphery of the 
national affairs.
2
 At many points between 1544 and 1615, chiefs and their clansmen were a 
fundamentally important part of the fabric of Scottish society, a position due in large part 
to their military activities. 
This thesis has shown that small-scale warfare like cattle raiding was common 
across the West Highlands and Isles in this period, with an intensification in scale and 
scope in the decade between 1593 and 1603. Such an apparent upsurge in warfare could be 
a statistical consequence of the broader source base for this period, yet there are several 
genuine developments that support its existence, and allow the construction of a revised 
narrative. The Western Isles and some parts of the Highlands, such as the Lennox, were 
most strongly affected by this intensification, whereas other areas in the Highlands, such as 
Argyll and Cowal, remained largely unaffected, although low-level disorder continued. 
The causes of this intensification varied. In the Western Isles, the economic dislocation 
caused by the eclipse of the mercenary trade turned warfare inwards and strained personal 
relationships between clans. Government intervention exacerbated these tensions by 
precipitating conflict in Lewis, and sowing the seeds of future MacDonald risings by 
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parcelling out traditional heartlands to the Campbells. In the Lennox meanwhile, warfare 
was instigated by one of Scotland‟s most senior magnates, the earl of Argyll, in an 
extension of his personal feud over titles and jurisdictions with the duke of Lennox. This 
resulted in the proscription of the MacGregors, the kindred that waged Argyll‟s proxy war 
in the Lennox. At the turn of the seventeenth century therefore, at least three major 
kindreds – the MacLeods of Lewis, the MacDonalds of Dunivaig, and the MacGregors – 
were fighting for their survival. 
Following this intensification, there appears to have been a sharp decline in the 
military capacity and activity in the West Highlands and Isles. Compare for example, the 
two risings that bookend our period, both of which vie for the title of the „final‟ attempt to 
restore the Lordship of the Isles.
3
 The Dòmhnall Dubh rising in 1545 enjoyed widespread 
support within the Western Isles, and through its alliance with the English it posed a 
significant challenge to the Scottish government. In comparison, the „Islay Rising‟ of 1615 
was much more limited in both scope and ambition, with the MacDonalds of Dunivaig left 
fighting against the tide as a comparatively isolated rump of the Lordship of the Isles. 
Moreover, the political situation in the West Highlands and Isles, and Scotland as a whole, 
had changed dramatically within those seventy years. The accession of James VI to the 
English throne in 1603 was an undoubted turning point in the power relations between the 
government and the clans of the West Highlands and Isles, granting the government 
newfound reach and resources for curbing independent action and upheaval. Crucially, the 
Gaelic clans on the west coast could no longer exploit the enmity between the monarchs of 
Scotland and England through an alliance with the latter. 
This external political change was mirrored by an internal shift within the West 
Highlands and Isles. Most clans gradually adopted a more cautious, pragmatic approach 
that involved cooperation with central government, and by the 1610s, feuds had visibly 
decreased. Few clans were willing to risk the repercussions that followed the waging of 
private war as they had two vivid examples of the consequences of drawing the ire of the 
crown: the MacGregors and the MacLeods of Lewis. Widespread inter-clan unity 
throughout the Hebrides was gradually supplanted by a growing focus on protecting the 
integrity of the individual kin group. For example, in 1613 Ruairidh Mòr MacLeod of 
Harris overturned his kindred‟s close association with the MacLeods of Lewis by handing 
over Niall Odhar MacLeod of Lewis and his son Dòmhnall for execution by the 
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 In 1615, Ruairidh Mòr enthusiastically offered to serve against the 
MacDonalds of Dunivaig on behalf of the crown,
5
 and later aided Campbell of Argyll‟s 
suppression of the independent military action of MacIain of Ardnamurchan in 1624-5.
6
 
Arguably he had little choice in these matters as the „preservation of his own clan was at 
stake‟,7 but the contrast even since his open war with the MacDonalds of Sleat in 1601 is 
marked. By the end of this period, the clans‟ only opportunity for „legitimate‟ military 
activity within Scotland was as enforcers for the government in „quasi-policing operations‟, 




MacGregor‟s assertion that the „military capacity of the west Highlands and Islands 
seems to have fallen away dramatically‟ after 1615 has considerable justification.9 In 
contrast to the alleged „Military Revolution‟ taking place on the European continent 
between c. 1560 and 1660,
10
 the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland between 1544 and 
1615 perhaps experienced an overall military decline, precipitous from 1603 onwards (or 
even earlier with the end of the mercenary trade in 1595). Notably, Donald Gregory ended 
his History with the death of James VI and I in 1625, but the final section of his narrative 
relates the „last serious insurrection in the West Highland and Isles‟ by the MacIains of 
Ardnamurchan in 1624-25. Dispossessed of their land, the clan chief and his elite were 
reduced to roving the west coast of Scotland in an English ship, before they were promptly 
defeated by a combined force led by the Campbells of Argyll and the MacLeods of 
Harris.
11
 Gregory clearly saw this period as the end of an era. 
Even a cursory glance towards the next generation reveals that the Highlanders and 
Islanders played an important role in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.
12
 Therefore, it may 
be premature to identify 1615 as a point of terminal decline, and instead the military 
capacity of the West Highlands and Isles may have merely been lying dormant. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that Alasdair MacColla initially struggled to raise forces in the 
Western Isles, and his Highland contingent at Perth in 1644 was composed of men from 
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 The lacklustre response of the Hebridean chiefs to Alasdair 
MacColla mirrors the aversion of the previous generation to Sir Seumas MacDonald‟s 
rebellion in 1615, suggesting that an overall change in mindset had indeed occurred since 
the 1545 Dòmhnall Dubh rising. Much of what had previously sustained the distinctive 
military capacity of the West Highlands and Isles had waned, or even disappeared 
altogether, by 1615: castles, galleys, the mercenary trade with Ireland, and Anglo-Scottish 
enmity. Restoring the Lordship of the Isles in the face of this political change and military 
decline must have seemed a much more unlikely prospect. 
In the West Highlands and Isles, the self-image of the clan elite was heavily 
predicated on the warrior, and aptitude in military affairs was an important requirement for 
chiefs. Military service was frequently offered by clansmen with enthusiasm, especially if 
it involved the defence of rights or a mercenary campaign to Ireland. Immersion of the clan 
elite in the idealised world envisioned by bardic poetry may have affected their behaviour. 
For example, at the battle of Glenlivet in 1594, Lachlann Mór MacLean of Duart was 
praised for conducting himself like a „good commander…and soldier‟,14 but equally he 
was acting like a good chief. The hundreds of common troops who fled at Glenlivet 
probably did not carry the same burden of expectation: they had little to gain from staying 
on the field, but for MacLean and those close to him, who fought to the end against 
Huntly‟s cavalry, their undying reputation and honour was at stake. While warfare was 
undoubtedly one of the central pillars of elite society, it did not supersede all others, and 
the overall level of militarisation in the West Highlands and Isles can be overstressed. Clan 
society in general was perhaps defined less by the exigencies of war and more by 
protection. Military aptitude was a near necessity for clan chiefs, but mainly as proof that 
they could protect their own clan. Moreover, the military capacity of the West Highlands 
and Isles has been greatly exaggerated in recent years, although the region probably still 
maintained a level of military preparedness and activity that outstripped other areas of 
Scotland, before a possible decline from 1595 onwards. 
A universal concern from 1544 to 1615 was the assertion of rights to chiefship and 
to land. In 1544, Iain Muideartach took up arms to defend his right to the chiefship of the 
Clanranald, and in 1615, Sir Seumas MacDonald of Dunivaig did the same to reclaim the 
lands of his clan. Another consistent feature was that warfare was a last resort for chiefs 
and clansmen. Even in the most intense of feuds, mediation was often attempted to avert 
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potential conflict. Again Sir Seumas tried in vain to negotiate a new settlement with the 
government and the king, and warfare eventually became his only recourse for reclaiming 
the land of his forebears. Mediation also took place before Blàr Tràigh Ghruinneart in 
1598 and Ailean Cameron‟s ambush of his rebellious kin in 1613, and possibly the battle 
of Glen Fruin in 1603. Clan society placed a high premium on the fighting elite and leaders 
were reluctant to risk their lives in pitched battle. To protect the clan‟s military capacity, 
any advantage was seized, and thus skirmishes and especially ambushes were the dominant 
mode of armed conflict in the West Highlands and Isles. In contrast, battles were rare, and 
in this period only four major pitched battles were fought between opposing clans: 
Blàr nan Lèine in 1544, Blàr Tràigh Ghruinneart in 1598, Coire na Creiche in 1601, and 
Glen Fruin in 1603. The time-gap between Blàr nan Lèine and Blàr Tràigh Ghruinneart is 
immediately striking. This admittedly elides other serious military activity, yet the 
possibility that there were no major clan battles for over 50 years presents a clear challenge 
to traditional perceptions of this period and simultaneously reinforces the idea of an 
intensification of warfare around 1600. Apart from a few select and arguably extreme 
instances, the cold-blooded massacres that came to define this period in tradition were very 
infrequent. Overall in fact, a great deal of restraint was shown as small-scale warfare and 
violence generally only involved cattle raiding or the targeted killing of one individual. 
Even in serious feuds and military engagements, captured prisoners were released 
unharmed more often than they were killed. Although there was no great transformation in 
the waging of war, conduct did evolve, albeit slowly, between 1544 and 1615. The steady 
increase in the use of the gun did not herald a revolution in warfare, but extended the 
repertoire of the traditional soldier. Bow, spear, and gun were all used in an effective blend 
of old and new. Perhaps the most dramatic change was the decline of the bìrlinn, which, 
although a useful form of transport, had been all but shorn of its military facility by the end 
of the sixteenth century. 
A significant proportion of this thesis has been concerned with „how‟ warfare was 
waged, but of even greater importance is „why‟. As shown in Chapter 2 and especially the 
case studies, a full understanding of warfare can only be achieved through the analysis of 
causation, which generally involved the convergence of multiple short-term and long-term 
factors. At the level of the clan itself, causation typically included the issues of honour and 
protection, marriage and succession, and rights to land. These factors, which could often 
overlap, were further exacerbated by the intervention of regional magnates, who incited 
proxy warfare for their own gain by exploiting internal division within clans. Running as a 
leitmotif throughout this period is the struggle to succeed the MacDonalds‟ overlordship in 
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the west, contested most prominently by Argyll and Huntly. Other important lords 
maintained their own sphere of influence, including the MacDonalds, Lennox, Atholl, and 
the MacKenzies, creating a complex web of competing loyalties. At the highest tier, the 
Scottish crown legitimised the actions of regional magnates, whilst also adopting an 
increasingly interventionist approach towards the end of the sixteenth century, eventually 
resulting in the expropriation of entire kindreds. This latter strategy severely destabilised 
the West Highlands and Isles, as it provoked clans to resort to warfare as a means of 
survival. Consideration of all of these factors will allow us to more fully understand why 
many conflicts took place, and thus move past oversimplified and archaic explanations of 
violence in the Highlands, typified by the idea that war was the „natural condition‟ of the 




For centuries, much ink has been spilled in recounting stereotypes of the warlike 
Highlander and yet there have been few concerted attempts at in-depth analysis of warfare 
in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland. The modern military history of the region 
therefore remains a relatively nascent field of study. With an expansive scope embracing 
many different clans and localities, this thesis has filled a gap in the historiography, and 
future studies can only add further texture to this picture. Regional studies of neglected 
areas like Cowal, the Lennox, Sutherland, Caithness, and the eastern Highlands would 
undoubtedly yield much of value, as even now historians tend to give more attention to 
clans like the MacDonalds or the Campbells to the detriment of others. The Irish 
mercenary trade in the sixteenth century and earlier also merits further study as its 
international dimension offers much for the historiography of Scotland, and indeed Ireland 
and England. Nonetheless, this thesis has already shown that while warfare did not exert an 
all-encompassing hold over clan society, it was nevertheless a crucial and often celebrated 
aspect of life. Even though warfare was widespread, the traditional reputation of this 
period as „chaos‟, characterised by unrestrained armed conflict, clearly fails to account for 
the diverse contemporary experience. This thesis has demonstrated that warfare can only 
be fully understood through close analysis of the political context of violence that could 
otherwise appear casual or „wild‟ when viewed in isolation. What is now abundantly clear 
is that warfare in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland was a complex and nuanced 
affair, driven by internal and external pressures, and waged by rational and multifaceted 
individuals.
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Appendix 1: Musters of the Western Isles 
1.1: Estimated Muster of the Isles, 15931 
Island Muster Owner 
Lewis 700 MacLeod of Lewis 
Harris 140 MacLeod of Harris 
North Uist 300 MacDonald of Sleat 
South Uist 300 Clanranald 
Barra 200 MacNeill of Barra 
Rona 60 MacLeod of Lewis 
Pabay 40 MacLeod of Harris 
„Helsker‟ (Monach Islands 
or Haskeir?) 
20 Murray „Ycolmkyll‟ (Iona) 
St Kilda 0 MacLeod of Harris 
Trotternish (Skye) 500 MacDonald of Sleat 
Sleat (Skye) 700 MacDonald of Sleat 
Strathardle (Skye) 160 MacKinnon of Strath 
Waternish (Skye) 200 MacLeod of Lewis 
Duirinish, Bracadale, and 
Minginish (Skye) 
500 MacLeod of Harris 
Raasay 80 MacLeod of Lewis 
Eigg 60 Clanranald 
Rum 10 Clanranald 
Canna 20 Clanranald 
Muck 16 MacIain of Ardnamurchan 
Scalpa 20 MacLean of Duart 
Mull 900 Not specified (split between 
MacLean of Duart, 
MacLean of Lochbuie, and 
MacLean of Coll?) 
Lismore 200 The Earl of Argyll (and 
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Campbell of Glenorchy) 
Two „Hwnais‟ 
 (Shuna? Slate Islands?) 
60 
 
MacDougall of Lorn and 
John Stewart of Appin 
Ulva 60 MacQuarrie 
Gometra 20 MacLean of Duart 
Inchkenneth 20 MacLean of Duart 
Iona Not specified The Bishop of the Isles 
Coll 140 MacLean of Coll 
Tiree 300 Not specified (MacLean of 
Duart?) 
Islay 800 Contested by MacLean of 
Duart and MacDonald of 
Dunivaig 
Jura 100 Contested by MacLean of 
Duart and MacDonald of 
Dunivaig 
Colonsay/Oronsay 100 MacDuffie (held from 
MacDonald of Dunivaig?) 
Seil 120 The earl of Argyll 
Luing 20 MacLean of Duart (held 
from the earl of Argyll) 
Scarba 20 MacLean of Lochbuie 
Gigha 100 MacDonald of Dunivaig 
Rathlin Not specified MacDonald of Dunivaig 
   
TOTAL:  6,876 (incl. Mull and 
Tiree) 
 
1.2: Estimated Muster of the Isles, c. 15952 
Island Muster Owner 
Lewis 700 MacLeod of Lewis 
Harris 140 MacLeod of Harris 
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North Uist 300 MacDonald of Sleat 
South Uist 300 Clanranald 
Barra 200 MacNeill of Barra 
Bernera 60 MacLeod of Lewis 
Pabay 40 MacLeod of Harris 
„Helsker‟ (Monach Islands 
or Haskeir?) 
20-24 MacDonald of Sleat 
Trotternish (Skye) 500 MacDonald of Sleat 
Sleat (Skye) 700 MacDonald of Sleat 
Srathardle 160 MacKinnon of Strath 
South Rona (Skye) Not specified MacLeod of Harris 
Waternish (Skye) 200 MacLeod of Lewis 
Duirinish (Skye) 240 MacLeod of Harris 
Bracadale (Skye) 140 MacLeod of Harris 
Raasay 80 MacLeod of Lewis 
Eigg 60 Clanranald 
Rum 6-7 Clanranald 
Canna 20 Clanranald 
Muck 16 Laird of Ardinwrthe (?) 





MacLean of Duart 
MacLean of Lochbuie 
MacLean of Coll 
Laird of McKynvin (?) 
Lismore 100 MacDougall of Lorn 
„twa Iles callit the Hwnayis‟ 
(Shuna? Slate Islands?) 
60 
60 
MacDougall of Lorn 
John Stewart of Appin 
Ulva 60 MacQuarrie 
Gometra/Inch Kenneth 16-20 MacLean of Duart 
Iona 0 The Bishop of the Isles 
Coll 140 MacLean of Coll 
Tiree 300 MacLean of Duart 
Islay 400 
400 
MacLean of Duart 





MacLean of Duart 
MacDonald of Dunivaig 
Colonsay/Oronsay 100 MacDuffie 
Seil 120 The earl of Argyll 
Gigha 100 MacDonald of Dunivaig 
Rathlin 100 MacDonald of Dunivaig 
Arran 100 Lord Hamilton 
Bute 300 Lord Hamilton 
   














Iain Muideartach  
(d. 1576/7?) 
Ailean (d. 1590) 
m/ MacLeod of 
Harris' daughter 
Ailean Òg  
(fl. 1577) 
m/ Janet MacLean 
Dòmhnall  
(d. 1617) 









































(d. c. 1540) 
Eòghann Beag  
(d. 1553/4) 
Tàillear Dubh  
(fl. 1570)  








(d. ?)  
Iain Dubh  
(d. 1585) 
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